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Edited by
BENJAMIN D. MERITT

KEMP MALONE, HENRY T. ROWELL

Honorary Editor
DAVID MOORE ROBINSON

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ST. JEROME'S TESTIMONY CONCERNING THE SECOND GRADE OF MITHRAIC INITIATION.

Among the numerous Mithraic texts and testimonies collected by Franz Cumont¹ there is only one which cites the seven grades of initiation in the Mithraic religion. This is the testimony of St. Jerome in his *Epistula ad Laetam* which, according to the authoritative critical edition by Hilberg,² reads:

Ante paucos annos propinquus uester Graccus nobilitatem patriciam nomine sonans, cum praefecturam regeret urbanam, nonne specu Mithrae et omnia portentuosissima simulacra, quibus corax, cryphius, miles, leo, Perses, heliodromus, pater initiantur subuertit, fregit, exussit et his quasi obsidibus ante praemissis inpetrauit baptismum Christi?

Now, it is a remarkable fact that not one of the six manuscripts of St. Jerome which Hilberg collated reads *cryphius*. One manuscript reads *nymphus*;³ two others, *nimphus*;⁴ a fourth, *nimplus*,⁵ which is corrected to read with the remaining two, *nimfus*.⁶ Likewise three other manuscripts, which had been collated earlier by Cumont but whose evidence Hilberg did not use, support the testimony of the six manuscripts which Hilberg emends. One of these reads *nunphus*; the other two, *nymphus*.⁷

¹ *Textes et Monuments figurés relatifs aux Mystères de Mithra*, II (Brussels, 1896), pp. 1-184, 457-476.

² *Epistula* CVII, 2, edited by Isidor Hilberg in *Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum*, LV (Vienna, 1912), p. 292, 2-7.

³ Vaticanus lat. 355 and 356, saec. ix-x.

⁴ Caroliruhensis Augiensis 105, saec. ix-x, and Berolinensis lat. 18, saec. xii.

⁵ Turicensis Augiensis 41, saec. ix.

⁶ Spinaliensis 68, saec. viii, and Augustodunensis 17 A, saec. x.

⁷ Parisinus lat. 1867, saec. ix (*nunphus*); Parisini latt. 1871, saec. x,

In the face of such documentary evidence it would seem presumptuous to set aside St. Jerome's testimony unless very strong reasons unequivocally demanded it. Such counter-evidence has been thought to be supplied in several inscriptions from a Mithraeum found in the Piazza S. Silvestro in Rome.⁸ These inscriptions provide corroborative evidence for five of the grades in St. Jerome's list, viz., *hierocoracica* (no. 751^b), *leontica* (nos. 749, 752 [*bis*], 753), *persica* (no. 750), [*h*]*eliaca* (no. 750), and *patrica* (no. 751^a).⁹ Thus there are lacking grades corresponding to St. Jerome's *nymphus* and *miles*. In two of these inscriptions, however, are found two expressions which suggested the emendation that now is printed as the text of St. Jerome. These two inscriptions are, in part:

... consulibus s(upra) s(criptis) ostenderunt cryfios
VIII kal(endas) mai(as) felic(iter) (no. 751^a, A. D. 358).
... cons(ulibus) s(upra) s(criptis) tradiderunt chryfios
VI idu(s) apr(iles) felic(iter) (no. 753, A. D. 362).

From *cryfios* and *chryfios* Cumont and Hilberg produce *cryphius* and introduce it into St. Jerome's text in the place of *nymphus*.

But some evidence has recently come to light to prove that one of the regular Mithraic grades of initiation was that of *νύμφος*. Excavations at Dura-Europos have unearthed a Mithraeum whose graffiti supply parallels for all of St. Jerome's grades except *heliodromus*.¹⁰ The disputed rank of *νύμφος* is found

and 1872, saec. xi (*nymphus*). Cumont (*op. cit.*, II, p. 18) rejects their testimony in favor of the emendation *cryphius*. (It may be noted that Cumont's statement [*op. cit.*, I, p. 316, n. 7] that "the mss. of St. Jerome give *gryphus* or *nymphus*" is made without the citation of any evidence and must be accounted an error.)

⁸ *C. I. L.*, VI, 749-753 (= Hermann Dessau, *I. L. S.*, 4267 f.).

⁹ Each of these neuter adjectives is the object of *tradere*, "to confer (the degree)."

¹⁰ The reading *Helios, Dromo* in Migne's *Patrologia Latina*, XXII, col. 869, is an arbitrary emendation by Vallarsi (cf. the note by Dom John Martin, *ibid.*, col. 1264). The only parallel to *Heliodromus* which Ernst Wüst cites in *R. E.*, s. v. "Mithras" (1932), col. 2142, is a half-Christian, half-pagan inscription at Otourah dated A. D. 314 (published by Sir William M. Ramsay in *J. H. S.*, IV [1883], p. 420) where [*Ἡ*]λιοδρόμον Διός occurs. He might have cited also the phonetically equivalent Ελλειοδρόμος which appears five times in some magic tablets discovered in Rome (Richard Wünsch, *Sethianische Verfluchungstafeln aus Rom* [Leipzig, 1898], tablet 21, lines 5 and 15; tablet 22, line 6; and tablet 27, lines 6 and 38).

fully a dozen times, sometimes with the epithet ἀγαθός.¹¹ The manuscript tradition of St. Jerome regarding *nymphus* is therefore correct and modern scholars—down to the most recent (1942) editor of St. Jerome's letters, James Duff—are wrong.

But what did *nymphus* or νύμφος mean to the Mithraic initiate? A precise answer to this question must wait until the full text of the inscriptions at Dura has been published. In the absence, however, of complete data, several proposed interpretations may be analyzed. The suggestion by Vallarsi¹² that *nymphus* is Νύμφη, the sign of *Virgo* in the zodiac, has *prima facie* plausibility by reason of the presence of zodiacal signs in much of Mithraic art. If this interpretation is correct, the grade may have involved the inculcation of chastity and perhaps imposed on the initiate vows of continence.¹³ If, however, this grade were derived from the zodiac, one would expect not only that others of the seven grades would disclose a similar derivation,¹⁴ but also that instead of seven there would have been twelve grades.

The obvious meaning of νύμφος is "the grade of the Bridegroom," equating the word with νυμφίος and perhaps involving a mystic marriage (with the deity?) in which the initiate may have been clad in a wedding garment.¹⁵

¹¹ *The Excavations at Dura-Europos, Conducted by Yale University and the French Academy of Inscriptions and Letters; Preliminary Report of the Seventh and Eighth Seasons of Work, 1933-1934 and 1934-1935*, edited by M. I. Rostovtzeff, F. E. Brown, and C. B. Welles (New Haven, 1939), p. 123. Cf. also Rostovtzeff in *Röm. Mitt.*, XLIX (1934), p. 206.

¹² *Op. cit.*, col. 869. The difference in gender is not a serious obstacle to such identification.

¹³ My senior colleague, Professor Otto A. Piper, has suggested to me that this would then be the positive doctrine of sexual continence corresponding to the negative symbolism which he believes to be represented in the tauroctony by the scorpion attacking the genitals of the bull. Mention may be made, too, of an Ostian dedication (*C. I. L.*, XIV, 66) which seems to indicate that a man could follow Mithras not only as leader but also as moral exemplar. It is, in part: C. Valerius Heracles pater et antis | tes dei iuvenis inconrupti solis invicti Mithrae. . . . See A. D. Nock in *J. R. S.*, XXVII (1937), p. 112.

¹⁴ Vallarsi's attempt (Migne, *P. L.*, XXII, col. 869) to equate five of the other grades with stars or signs of the zodiac is not convincing.

¹⁵ Pseudo-Augustine, *Quaestiones veteris et novi testamenti*, CXIV, 11 (*C. S. E. L.*, L, p. 308, 19 ff., ed. Souter) and the Konjica relief (Cumont,

But Cumont objects to this interpretation on the score that such a grade would be rather inappropriate in a religion which admitted only men to its membership. He is inclined to think that, as *νύμφη* meant properly a young woman of marriageable age, so *νύμφος*, in religious terminology, may have been applied to an "adolescent." The initiation to this degree would then be, according to Cumont, a relic of the "rites de passage" which are observed among many peoples at the time of puberty, when the child is admitted to the society of full-grown men.¹⁶

But against this interpretation and in favor of the meaning of "bridegroom" is a liturgical formula¹⁷ preserved by Firmicus Maternus which, in the Teubner text of Firmicus, reads * * * δε

op. cit., I, p. 175, fig. 10) indicate that each initiate, wearing the insignia appropriate to his degree, would attempt to imitate the animal or person involved. Thus, donning a mask of a crow or a lion, they would flap their wings and imitate the cry of a crow or growl like a lion.

¹⁶ *C. R. Acad. Inscr.*, 1934, p. 108. Also, to the same effect, Joseph Bidez and Franz Cumont, *Les Mages hellénisés; Zoroastre, Ostanès et Hystaspe d'après la Tradition grecque*, II (Paris, 1938), p. 154.

¹⁷ This formula has been generally referred to the Eleusinian mysteries; e.g., by Theodor Friedrich, *In Iulii Firmici Materni de errore profanorum religionum libellum quaestiones* (Diss. Giessen, 1905), pp. 25 and 44 ff., and J. Coman, *Revista Clasica*, IV-V (Bucharest, 1933), p. 93. But other scholars hold other opinions; e.g., Gillis P:son Wetter, *Phōs; eine Untersuchung über hellenistische Frömmigkeit* (Uppsala and Leipzig, 1915), p. 19, thinks that *νύμφη* is Attis; Albrecht Dieterich, *Eine Mithrasliturgie*, 3te Aufl., herausg. Otto Weinreich (Leipzig and Berlin, 1923), pp. 122 f., 214, and 256 f., refers it to Dionysus; and recently, in his edition of Firmicus, Gilbert Heuten (*Travaux de la Faculté de Philosophie et Lettres de l'Université de Bruxelles*, VIII [1938], p. 179) has revived—apparently without his knowing its ancestry—a suggestion made long ago by Bishop Münter (in his edition of Firmicus [Hauniae, 1826], p. 76, adn. 1) that the formula be referred to the Mithraic cult. Whether any of these theories is true or not must remain uncertain because the immediately preceding context of Firmicus is corrupt. (Ziegler, the editor of the Teubner text, believes that a whole leaf was lost from the archetype of the only extant manuscript.) But, to whatever cult this formula be referred,—and it is not necessary for the present argument that it be Mithraic,—it seems to the present writer that the way Firmicus opens the following chapter, which clearly refers to Mithraism, almost precludes the Mithraic origin of the formula involving *νύμφη*. The following chapter begins: *Alterius profani sacramenti signum est θεὸς ἐκ πέτρης* (XX, 1).

νυμφίε, χαῖρε νυμφίε, χαῖρε νέον φῶς.¹⁸ It is significant that the only manuscript of Firmicus has in both instances ΝΥΝΦΕ [=νύμφε] which was corrected in each case to νυμφίε. Now, from the context immediately following it can be seen that Firmicus understood νύμφος to mean *sponsus*.¹⁹

So much for νύμφος, *nymphus*. Whether the term *cryfios* (*chryfios*) in the two Roman inscriptions refers to a grade of initiation involving a ceremony of veiling and subsequent unveiling (as Cumont²⁰ and many other scholars²¹ believe), or whether it involved the display of certain "hidden objects" (as

¹⁸ XIX, 1 (ed. Ziegler).

¹⁹ Although, of course, Firmicus' understanding of νύμφος is not proof positive that such was also its original significance in Mithraism, he nevertheless supplies valuable evidence for its current meaning in his day.

²⁰ *Textes et Monuments*, I, p. 316 (English translation, *The Mysteries of Mithra* [Chicago, 1903], p. 154). After Cumont had suggested this interpretation, an interesting relief from Arçar (Ratiaria) was published (Gawril Kazarow, "Die Kultdenkmäler der sog. thrakischen Reiter in Bulgarien," *Arch. f. Religionswiss.*, XV [1912], pp. 156 f. and plate I, fig. 4) showing a kneeling figure, who is wearing the "Phrygian" cap, partly hidden by a veil held before him by two other figures. Rostovtzeff explains this scene in terms of the Mithraic *ostenderunt cryfios* (*Predstavlenie o monarchitcheskoi vlasti v Skithii i na Bospore* [Petrograd, 1913], p. 53, quoted by H. Stuart Jones in Hastings' *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics*, VIII [1916], p. 756b, n. 1).

²¹ This opinion, with variations, is entertained, e.g., by Sir Samuel Dill, *Roman Society from Nero to Marcus Aurelius* (2nd ed., London, 1905), pp. 611 f.; Eduard Roese, *Über Mithrasdienst* (Stralsund, 1905), pp. 18 f.; Jules Toutain, *Les Cultes païens dans l'Empire romain*, II (Paris, 1911), p. 141; L. Patterson, *Mithraism and Christianity; a Study in Comparative Religion* (Cambridge, 1921), p. 46; R. Pettazzoni, *I Misteri; saggio di una teoria storico-religiosa* (Bologna, 1924), p. 262; L. Deubner in Chantepie de la Saussaye, *Lehrbuch der Religionsgeschichte*, 4te Aufl., II (Tübingen, 1925), p. 498; and Cornelius I. M. I. van Beek, "Ostenderunt Cryfios," in *Pisciculi; Studien zur Religion und Kultur des Altertums* (F. J. Dölger's *Festschrift* [Münster in Westfalen, 1939]), p. 53. (It is a pleasure to acknowledge that Professor A. D. Nock of Harvard kindly directed my attention to this important study by van Beek. My chief criticism of the article is that the author practically ignores the problem involved in *tradiderunt chryfios*. It is also appropriate to mention here that Professor Nock likewise courteously referred me to Cumont's contribution in Buckler's *Festschrift*, mentioned below in note 35.)

Forcellini²² and W. J. Phythian-Adams²³ maintain), or whether the word is to be derived from γρύψ, γρυπός (as Ernst Wüst²⁴ has recently argued, following a hint thrown out by Cumont²⁵), or whether, finally, the snake was really the second Mithraic degree under the title of κρύφιος (as K. Benz²⁶ and G. W. Elderkin²⁷ independently conjecture), it is not the purpose of this note to explore. It is sufficient to observe that objections more or less serious may be leveled against each proposal. With reference to the first, it must be taken into account that, whereas five grades of initiation in the Roman inscriptions are distinguished by neuter adjectives, it is difficult to understand the masculine *cryfios* (*chryfios*) as a stage of initiation in the same sense. *Cryfiaca* ought to have been used. Furthermore, although each of the other grades is the object of *tradere* (as is also *chryfios*), in inscription no. 751^a *cryfios* is the object of *ostendere*. These two considerations suggest that *cryfios* is not in the same category with the other words which clearly designate grades or stages of initiation.

Regarding the second interpretation, that the word refers to "hidden objects" which are revealed to devotees, one must acknowledge that the balance of probability is against the chance that a masculine noun should refer to objects. Again, this understanding of *cryfios* involves the lack of the name of the grade of initiation, which one would expect to find in connection with the citation of the four other grades.

Against the third proposal, that the Latin word represents

²² *Totius Latinitatis Lexicon*, s. v.

²³ *J. R. S.*, II (1912), pp. 56-64, where he makes the suggestion that perhaps the "hidden objects" were statues of the curious leontocephalous god; in his later and much more popular treatment (*Mithraism* [London, 1915], p. 77) he will not commit himself as to the nature of these "hidden objects."

²⁴ *Op. cit.*, col. 2142, and *Arch. f. Religionswiss.*, XXXII (1935), pp. 211-215. Before Wüst wrote (and apparently without his knowledge), W. Kroll offered the suggestion that the second grade of Mithraic initiation was that of the griffin (in Gunkel, Schiele, and Zscharnack's *Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*, V [1913], p. 1051).

²⁵ *Textes et Monuments*, II, p. 93, note added to inscription no. 9.

²⁶ "Die Mithrasmysterien," *Historisches Jahrbuch*, XXXIX (1918-1919), pp. 10 ff.

²⁷ George W. Elderkin, *Kantheros; Studies in Dionysiac and Kindred Cult* (Princeton, 1924), pp. 31 f. and 39.

γρύψ, γρυπός, is the total absence of griffins both in Mithraic art and in all other Mithraic sources.²⁸

The last mentioned interpretation, born no doubt of a desire to find a place in the hierarchy of initiations for the serpent which figures in almost every representation of the tauroctony, has no cogent evidence in its favor and must remain a conjecture.

If, however, there really was a grade of initiation called *cryfios* (*chryfios*), the significance of which eludes us, how should it be related to St. Jerome's testimony? It is possible that local congregations of Mithraists may have devised certain "heretical" grades of initiation and that *cryfios* is somehow to be understood as such a grade. Scholars customarily refer to Porphyry, *De abstinentia*, IV, 16, for evidence as to the existence of local or provincial grades of initiation other than the seven mentioned by St. Jerome. This writer makes the surprising assertions not only that there were initiates called *ἀετοί* and *ἱέρακες* but also that there was a female grade in the cult whose initiates he names *ῥαῖναι*.²⁹ It is, however, not at all clear that Porphyry's evidence can be trusted. In the first place, the immediate context is obviously corrupt and Nauck, the editor of the Teubner text, prints the passage with an indication of a lacuna.³⁰ In the second place, there is really no other evidence, whether documentary, epigraphical, or monumental, which gives the slightest hint that women took any part in the Mithraic cultus.³¹ Not

²⁸ Cf. Cumont, *Textes et Monuments*; Johannes Leipoldt, *Die Religion des Mithra* (= Hans Haas' *Bilderatlas zur Religionsgeschichte*, Lieferung XV [Leipzig, 1930]); and Fritz Saxl, *Mithras; typengeschichtliche Untersuchungen* (Berlin, 1931).

²⁹ This word is usually emended to *λέαιναι*. Accepting the emendation as valid, M. Clermont-Ganneau thought that he had discovered some evidence in North Africa which substantiated Porphyry's (emended) statement that women were called "lionesses" in the Mithraic cultus. (*C. R. Acad. Inscr.*, 1903, pp. 357-363). On the tombs of a man and his wife at Guigariche in Tripoli are the picture of a lion and the inscription (*qu*) *i leo iacet* and the picture of a lioness and the inscription *quae lea iacet*. Since, however, there is nothing which connects either person with the Mithraic religion, it must be concluded that the inscription on the woman's tomb is not germane to the argument.

³⁰ The text of Nauck (254, 6-9) is . . . ὡς τοὺς μὲν μετέχοντας τῶν αὐτῶν ὀργίων μύστας λέοντας καλεῖν, τὰς δὲ γυναῖκας λεαῖνας, τοὺς δὲ ὑπηρετοῦντας κόρακας, ἐπὶ τε τῶν πατέρων . . . ἀετοὶ γὰρ καὶ ἱέρακες οὗτοι προσαγορεύονται.

³¹ See note 29 above.

only has no woman left her name in the numerous records of Mithraic communities, but even when one should expect to find such a reference it is lacking. For instance, in an inscription³² which enumerates in parallel fashion the religious titles of a husband and wife, though both are said to have been initiated into several religions, it is only the man who is commemorated as having been a devotee of Mithra.³³ Likewise, the fact that very frequently a sanctuary of Cybele (Magna Mater) was built near or contiguous to a Mithraeum seems to have only one meaning, namely that women had no part or lot in the Persian cult.³⁴ Because, therefore, it is exceedingly difficult to place any credence in Porphyry's statement that women were initiated in Mithraism, it is correspondingly doubtful how much reliance can be placed on his testimony to the existence of the grades of "eagles" and "falcons."³⁵ It must be concluded, therefore,

³² *C. I. L.*, VI, 1779 (= Dessau, 1259).

³³ He was *sacratu*s *Libero et Eleusi[ni]s*; she was *sacrata Cereri et Eleusiniis*. Both were *tauroboliati*, a ceremony attached to the rite of Cybele. He was a hierophant, she a hierophantia (of the triple Hecate; see *C. I. L.*, VI, p. 398, line 28 [= Dessau, I, p. 279, line 28]). He was *pater patrum*, the highest grade in Mithraism, but she was not even *sacrata Mithrae*. The religious pedigree of each is given more fully in two other inscriptions (*C. I. L.*, VI, 1778 and 1780 [the latter is reproduced in Dessau, 1260]), but here too the woman's list is without Mithraic reference.

³⁴ Henri Graillet, *Le Culte de Cybèle, Mère des Dieux, à Rome et dans l'Empire romain* (Paris, 1912), pp. 192 f., goes so far as to say that "in almost all the localities where we find the Goddess, we find Mithra. . . . One complemented the other."

³⁵ No other evidence for the Mithraic grade of falcons is known. With regard to the grade of eagles, several scholars, beginning with Erwin Rohde in 1894 (*Psyche; Seelencult und Unsterblichkeitsglaube der Griechen*, 9te/10te Aufl., II [Leipzig, 1925], p. 392, Anm. 1 [Eng. trans. from 8th Germ. ed., London, 1925, p. 576, n. 153]), think that Porphyry's statement is corroborated by an inscription found on a sarcophagus at Derbe in Lycaonia. The inscription, published definitively in *Papers of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens*, III, pp. 26 f. (only part of the inscription is provided in *B. C. H.*, X [1886], p. 510), is as follows: [Α]ούκιος ἀνέστησε Τήλεφον καὶ Μάρκον καὶ Σέξτρο[ν καὶ] ἐαυτὸν ἀετὸν καὶ Ἀμμονκιν Βαβόον τὸν π[α | τέρα] ἀετὸν τειμῆς χάριν. At first Cumont refused to accept Rohde's proposed interpretation of the inscription, making a point of the total lack of Mithraic monuments and inscriptions in Lycaonia (*Textes et Monuments*, II, p. 173). But Dieterich (*Bonner Jahrbücher*, CVIII/CIX [1902], p. 37), with some degree of justice, sarcastically inquired how the fact that there were no (other) Mithraic remains in Lycaonia could prove that this inscription

that no certain and unequivocal evidence points to the presence of variations from the norm in Mithraic initiations, and the suggestion that *cryfios* (*chryfios*) be interpreted as involving such a "heretical" divergence must remain no more than a mere suggestion.

The one assured conclusion of this investigation is that, although there may or may not have been a grade of Mithraic initiation designated *cryfios* (*chryfios*), it will no longer be licit to emend St. Jerome's text to make him bear witness to its existence at the expense of eliminating from his text the grade *nymphus*.³⁶

BRUCE M. METZGER.

PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

was non-Mithraic. Later the discovery of a Mithraic bas-relief in Baris (Isbarta), Pisidia, seemed of sufficient significance to Cumont to decide that Rohde's interpretation was "very probable" (*Revue de l'histoire des religions*, LXII [1910], p. 146, n. 2; reprinted in Cumont's *Études syriennes* [Paris, 1917], p. 57, n. 3). Still later Cumont returned to his former opinion ("Mithra en Asie Mineure," in *Anatolian Studies Presented to William Hepburn Buckler* [Manchester, 1939], p. 71, n. 3). The plain fact is that absolutely nothing in the inscription except the point in dispute gives any warrant for regarding it as Mithraic, and Porphyry's statement, in a corrupt context, is still the only evidence for the Mithraic grade of eagles. The quotation that Franz Boll adduces (*Arch. f. Religionswiss.*, XIX [1916-19], pp. 553 f.) with so much confidence from the second Teukros text (edited by him in *Sphaera* [Leipzig, 1903], p. 50, lines 15-18: ὁ αἰτὸς [δηλοῖ] μύστας, φανταζομένους πρόσωπα βασιλικά, ἢ περὶ βασιλεῖς ὄντας) does not prove that the eagle was a Mithraic grade of initiation. Nor again is Dieterich's emendation at the beginning of the so-called Mithraic liturgy germane to the problem (*Eine Mithrasliturgie*, 3te Aufl., p. 2: ὅπως ἐγὼ μόνος αἰητὸς [MS αἰητης] οὐρανὸν βαίνω καὶ κατοπτρεύω πάντα, cf. also pp. 54 and 220. For other emendations equally appropriate in the context, see the critical apparatus in Karl Preisendanz, *Papyri graecae magicae*, I [Leipzig and Berlin, 1928], p. 89). On the paucity of Mithraic remains in Asia Minor, see Cumont, *Les Religions orientales dans le Paganisme romain*, 4^{me} ed. (Paris, 1929), pp. 132 f. and 274, n. 23; *idem*, *Die Mysterien des Mithra*, deutsche Ausg. von G. Gehrich, 3te Aufl. besorgt von K. Latte (Leipzig and Berlin, 1923), p. 229; and Wüst, *op. cit.*, col. 2151.

³⁶ As was mentioned above, the Roman Mithraic inscriptions do not refer to two of St. Jerome's seven grades, *miles* as well as *nymphus* not being found among them. By way of forestalling any proposal to revive Phythian-Adams' attempt (*opp. cit.*) to discredit St. Jerome's testimony regarding the existence of a separate grade of initiation called "the Soldier," it ought to be said that graffiti at Dura refer to στρατιώτης as a Mithraic grade of initiation (see the report cited in note 11 above).

THREE ATTIC INSCRIPTIONS.

I. AN EARLY EPHEBIC CATALOGUE.

Pierre Roussel has corrected my erroneous assumption that the lochagoi of the ephebic inscription recently published in *Hesperia* were the same as those described by Aristotle ('Αθ. Πολ., 61, 3).¹ These lochagoi were rather epheboi to whom the special designation was given and to whom undoubtedly special responsibility was assigned. In view of the parallelism in organization between the army and the ephebic corps, it would seem to me probable, nonetheless, that the taxiarch appointed these ephebic lochagoi just as Aristotle says he appointed those in regular service.

Roussel gives the evidence for these ephebic lochagoi from an inscription found at the Amphiareion and published by B. Leonardos in the 'Αρχαιολογική Έφημερίς of 1918 (pp. 73-100) and from a mutilated text published first by J. Kirchner in *Ath. Mitt.*, LII (1927), pp. 198-199,² and now republished as *I.G.*, II², 2976. He has made the shrewd and very acute observation that the names of the στρατηγὸς ἐπὶ τῇ χώρῃ, the στρατηγὸς ἐπὶ τῷ Πειραιεῖ, and the κοσμητής, who appear in *Hesperia*, IX, p. 62, Col. II, lines 9-13, may also be restored in *I.G.*, II², 2976, lines 8-10. In the text from *Hesperia* these names appeared as follows:

[στ]ρα[τ]η[γὸς ἐπὶ] τῷ Πειραι[εῖ Κόνω]
 10 ν Τιμοθέο Ἀναφλύστιος [στρατηγ]
 ὁς ἐπὶ τῇ χώρῃ Σώφιλ[ος Ἀριστο]
 τέλος Φυλάσιος κοσμη[τῆς . . .⁵ . . .]
 [. . .] Αἰνησιστράτου Ἀχ[αρνεύς . . .]

With a reversed order of the generalships, the names now appear as follows in *I.G.*, II², 2976:

[Σώφιλον Ἀριστ]οτέλους [Φυλάσ]ιον
 [Κόνωνα Τ]ιμοθέου [Ἀναφλ]ύστιον
 10 [----- Αἰνησιστρά]του Ἀχαρνέα

The date of both documents is now fixed in 333/2 B.C., and

¹ *Rev. Arch.*, XVIII (1941), pp. 222-226, commenting on the text published in *Hesperia*, IX (1940), pp. 59-66.

² With an excellent photograph facing p. 200.

since they belong to the same year, one might expect some further evidence of similarity between them.³ There are, in fact, many improvements that can be made in the text from the *Corpus*, and much can be done toward a better understanding of it. As given by Kirchner the document reads:

- δον
- ίδον *vac.*
- οφῶντος *vac.*
- Λυσίου *vac.*
vac.
- 5 - σῖλο ... οσοφ --
 - εφ ...⁷... ον --
 - ς Ἐλε[υσίνιον] --
 - οτέλους ...⁵... ιον *vac.*
 Τ]ιμοθέου [Ἀναφλ]ύστιον *vac.*
- 10 - του Ἀχαρνέα υ [Μν]ῆσον Ἀρ[ί]στω[νος]
 -- Πα]ιανιέα υ [Χ]α[ρί]αν Ἀρκέωνος
 - ο]υς Μυρρινούσιον *vac.*
 Πα]ιανιέα, λοχαγὸν Εὐκλέα *vac.*
 λοχαγ]ὸν Αἰσχύλον Πυθέου Παιαν[ιέα]
- 15 - Ὡαθεν, λοχαγὸν Ἐτεοκλέα *vac.*
 λοχαγ]ὸν Φανόστρατον Φανίου *vac.*
 - γίτου Παιανιέα *vac.*
 vac. 0,02

When one restores in lines 8-10 the names which Roussel has identified, and gives to them also their titles (which Roussel did not do) he finds that these three lines determine a left margin which can be plotted with some accuracy:⁴

- [στρατηγὸν ἐπὶ τῇ χώρῃ Σώφιλον Ἀριστ]οτέλους [Φυλάσ]ιον
[στρατηγὸν ἐπὶ τῷ Πειραιῇ Κόνωνα Τ]ιμοθέου [Ἀναφλ]ύστιον
10 [κοσμητὴν ---^{8 or 9}--- Αἰησιστρά]του Ἀχαρνέα υ [Μν]ῆσον
 Ἀρ[ί]στω[νος].

³ Kirchner dated *I.G.*, II², 2976 in the beginning of the third century, and if we had only the lettering from which to form a judgment I should agree with him. He records the inscription as E.M. 3590. The number on my squeeze is E.M. 3589, and I do not now know which is correct.

⁴ The disposition of the preserved letters can be seen in the photograph in *Ath. Mitt.*, LII (1927), Beilage XXIII, facing p. 200.

This tenth line comes closest to the right margin of the stone and represents what we may call the normal line of *ca.* 53 letters. There were six letter spaces (estimated from the photograph) uninscribed at the end of line 9, so that the entire line numbered 54 spaces. At the end of line 8 there were eight uninscribed spaces (again estimated), so the entire line numbered 55 spaces. This agreement in the lengths of three lines which can be restored with certainty is enough to fix the left margin and determine the original width of the stone. Eighteen letters (measured along line 10 on the squeeze in Princeton) amount to 0.12 m. One may calculate, therefore, an original width of the stele of something more than 0.36 m.⁵

In commenting on the other lines of this inscription Roussel wrote as follows (*loc. cit.*, pp. 224-225, note 2) :

Que les titres des personnages aient été mentionnés après leur nom, ou, comme on l'a admis pour les lochages, avant leur nom, il est assuré qu'un des deux individus de la l. 11 n'en avait aucun. Au début de la l. 14 et de la l. 16, J. Kirchner a complété λοχαγόν, ce qui est possible ; mais on peut avoir aussi la fin d'un démotique. Les lochages semblent avoir été mêlés avec les éphèbes, mais distingués par le titre. Quant à l'Ἐλε[υσίνιος] de la l. 7, je ne sais quelle charge il remplissait, pas plus que les personnages précédemment nommés (fonctionnaires ou éphèbes), dont les noms sont mutilés et les démotiques disparus. On remarquera que les l. 1-4 sont séparées par un blanc des suivantes (éphèbes d'une autre tribu?).

Our study will show that the length of line confirms Kirchner's restoration of λοχαγόν instead of a demotic at the beginnings of lines 14 and 16, that there are no epheboi other than lochagoi recorded below line 4, that the supposed Ἐλε[υσίνιος] in line 7 does not exist because the correct reading is ἐνε[κα],⁶ that the personages named in lines 5-6 were the taxiarch and the sophronistes, and that the names in lines 1-4 belong to the catalogue of the epheboi proper of Pandionis so disposed as to occupy two columns upon the stone. In addition, it will be found that

⁵ The stone was used at some late date, in an inverted position, to carry the outline of a human head in profile. There may have been more of the human form portrayed, but since we possess only the bottom of the stone we have also only the head of the body. It comes fairly well in the center for a stele of the width here indicated.

⁶ It may be seen on the photograph that the stone is uninscribed where the end of the restoration Ἐλε[υσίνιος] would have to be assumed.

the four names from the end of line 10 to the end of line 12 were neither lochagoi nor epheboi, and that consequently the lochagoi were not "mêlés avec les éphèbes."⁷

Beginning first with the names in lines 10 ff., one notices that the stonecutter divided no words at the ends of lines. At the end of line 12, however, there was room at least for an additional name of eleven letters. One can reconstruct this line in quite normal fashion by allowing ten letters for the demotic of Charias at the beginning, ten letters for the next name, eleven letters in all for his patronymic (the last 3 are preserved), counting the twelve letters of the demotic *Μυρρινούσιον*, and then adding the eleven uninscribed spaces for a total of 54. It would be possible to make room for the title *λοχαγόν* in the restored portion by shortening some of the names, but it is clear that Charias and the Myrrhinousian were not both lochagoi. The evidence of the unnecessary blank space at the end of line 12 indicates the end of a paragraph at that point, and since Roussel has already noted that at least one of the two men named in line 11 had no title it is a natural assumption that none of the four men following the *κοσμητής* was named with a title. Why no title was used I do not know. The text of lines 5-7 will show that they cannot have been simply epheboi, and I suspect that they were the *διδάσκαλοι τῆς φυλῆς*, who could be either Athenians or foreigners, and who—in this inscription and in *Hesperia*, IX (1940), no. 8—were, like the lochagoi, different from the officers of the same name described by Aristotle. In this year the tribe of Leontis had two; if my suggestion is correct the tribe of Pandionis had four, and I see no difficulty in the fact that two of them (at least) were members of the tribe.

Beginning with the new paragraph in line 13, reasons of space require the restoration of the title *λοχαγόν* with every name. Without it, name and patronymic in line 13 would require *ca.* 26

⁷ Roussel noted (*loc. cit.*, p. 225) that the five lochagoi of *Hesperia*, IX (1940), no. 8, were not listed with the other epheboi, and then with the demotics of the epheboi [*Ποτάμιοι*] *καθύπερθεν* and *Ποτάμιοι ὑπέ[νε]ρ-θ[εν]* in mind claimed that the lochagoi *Πανδαίτης Πασικλέος Ποτάμιος* and *Τιμοκράτης Τιμοκλέος Ποτάμιος* must have been, by a process of exclusion, *Ποτάμιοι Δειραδιῶται* (*loc. cit.*, p. 225, note 2). There is an error here, for if the lists of epheboi and lochagoi were in fact mutually exclusive there is no way of defining to what deme of Potamos the lochagoi belonged.

letters, patronymic and demotic in line 14 would require *ca.* 31 letters, and name and patronymic in line 17 would require *ca.* 26 letters. These figures are all too high, and are brought within reason only by prefixing each name with the title *λοχαγόν*. Line 17 was the last line of the inscription, and beneath it an uninscribed space of 0.02 m. intervenes above the original bottom of the stone.

Lines 5-7 give the heading for the list of names which follows. The letters near the end of line 5 yield clearly the restoration [— Πανδι]ονίδος καὶ ὁ σωφ[ρονιστής —]. The official who must be associated with the *σωφρονιστής* is of course the taxiarch, and these two are the officers who caused to be inscribed on the stele the names of the following officials. I restore: [ἐπὶ Νικοκράτους ἄρχοντος ὁ ταξίαρχος τῆς Πανδι]ονίδος καὶ ὁ σωφ[ρονισ]τῆς τοῦσδε ἀνέγραψαν στεφανωθέντας χρυσῶι σ[τ]εφ[άν]ωι [ὑπὸ τῶν] ἐφ[έ]βων ἀρε[τῆς εἰς ἑαυτοὺς καὶ εἰς τὴν φυλὴν καὶ σωφροσύνης] ἔνε[κα] *vac.*

The names of the epheboi were recorded above, presumably divided by demes, and within each division appearing with only the patronymic. This was the normal arrangement, and for this text it is proved valid by the names in lines 1-4. The width of this last column seems to have been about 0.18 m. If the total width, as calculated above, was something more than 0.36 m., it is evident that there were two columns of names. Furthermore, if the proportion of lochagoi to epheboi in the other lists may be taken as a guide, the list here should have had about 42 names, or 21 in each column.

I.G., II², 2976

333/2 B.C.

NON-ΣΤΟΙΧ.

The Epheboi of Pandionis

Col. I

Col. II

(lost)

[-----^{ca. 17}-----]δου
[-----^{ca. 14}-----]ίδου
[-----^{ca. 10}-----]οφῶντος
[-----]Λυσίου

two lines uninscribed

ὁ [ἐπὶ Νικοκράτους ἄρχοντος ὁ ταξίαρχος τῆς Πανδι]ονίδος καὶ ὁ σωφ[ρονισ]

- [τῆς τούσδε ἀνέγραψαν στεφανωθέντας χρυσῶι στ]εφ[άν]ωι [ὑπὸ
τῶν] ἐφῆ[βων ἀρε]
- [τῆς εἰς ἑαυτοὺς καὶ εἰς τὴν φυλὴν καὶ σωφροσύνης ἔνε[κα] vacat
[στρατηγὸν ἐπὶ τῇ χώρῃ Σώφιλον Ἀριστ]οτέλους [Φυλάσ]ιον vacat
[στρατηγὸν ἐπὶ τῷ Πειραιεῖ Κόνωνα Τ]ιμοθέον [Ἀναφλ]ύστιον vacat
- 10 [κοσμητὴν -----^{ca. 9}----- Αἰνησιστρά]τον Ἀχαρνέα ^v [Μν]ῆσον
Ἀρίστω[νος]
- [demotic ca. 9, name ca. 9 patronymic ca. 9 Π]αιανία,
^v [X]α[ρί]αν Ἀρκέωνος
- [demotic ca. 10, name ca. 10 patronymic 8]ους Μυρρι-
νούσιον vacat
- [λοχαγὸν name ca. 9 patronymic ca. 10 Παι]ανία, λοχαγὸν
Εὐκλεία vacat
- [patronymic ca. 12 demotic ca. 12, λοχαγ]ὸν Αἰσχύλον Πυθέον
Παιαν[ιέα],
- 15 [λοχαγὸν name ca. 11 patronymic ca. 11] Ὀθαθεν, λοχαγὸν
Ἐτεοκλέα ^v [v v v]
- [patronymic ca. 12 demotic ca. 12, λοχαγ]ὸν Φανόστρατον
Φανίου ^{v v} [v v v]
- [Παιανία, λοχαγὸν name ca. 9 ca. 5]γίτον Παιανία vacat
vacat

Above the list of epheboi there may have been a decree (now lost), as in *Hesperia*, IX (1940), no. 8, and perhaps the statement that the taxiarch and the sophronistes had made the dedication to Pandion.⁸

II. THE PRYTANY OF AIANTIS IN 319/8.

The text published by Kirchner as *I.G.*, II², 386, has been improved by the addition of a new fragment (E.M. 12564), which was identified by Adolf Wilhelm. He gives the reading now as follows:⁹

Θεοί

Π ο λ ι τ ε ί α Ἀ μ υ ν τ [...⁹.....]
ἐ[π]ὶ Ἀπολλοδώρου [ἄρχοντος ἐπὶ τῆς Α]
[ἐγ]ή[ιδος ἔκ]της π[ρυτανείας· γραμματ]
[εὺς] Α Ο - Ι

⁸ Cf. *Hesperia*, IX (1940), p. 62, lines 1-2.

⁹ "Vier Beschlüsse der Athener," *Abhandlungen der preussischen Akademie*, Jahrgang 1939, phil.-hist. Klasse, no. 22, pp. 22-23.

Wilhelm determined the width of the stone by doubling the distance from the left margin to the middle of the word $\Theta\epsilon\omicron\iota$, which he assumed to be properly centered.¹⁰ But Dinsmoor followed the architectural features of the stele and found its center in the axis of the gable and in the center of the shield inscribed therein. This center of the stele as determined by Dinsmoor coincided with the last letter of $\Theta\epsilon\omicron\iota$ and permitted a stoichedon line in the text below of 30 letters. This meant that the sixth prytany was either Aiantis or Leontis.¹¹

In his latest publication of the text Wilhelm has rejected Dinsmoor's criteria for the width of the stone because he believes that the name of the secretary in line 5, which he restores as $\Delta\omega\sigma\iota[\theta\epsilon\omicron\varsigma]$, again calls for only 29 letters in each line. My very good squeeze of this fragment enables me to read with confidence only Λ in this doubtful fifth line, though there is some probability in favor of $\Lambda..I$. I question the value of the evidence of this name, which seems to me still quite uncertain. On the other hand my squeeze shows before --- $\iota\delta\omicron\varsigma$ in line 4 a letter which I think may have been tau, but not eta. It is a high horizontal stroke, and favors Dinsmoor's reading of Aiantis or Leontis.

A new text from this same year published by Schweigert in *Hesperia*, IX (1940), pp. 345-348, offers an instructive parallel to the present document. The center of the stone as determined by the axis of the gable comes near the end of the word $\Theta\epsilon\omicron\iota$. In this disposition it is precisely like *I.G.*, II², 386. But here the entire stele is preserved and one can see at a glance (*loc. cit.*, photograph on p. 347) that it is the gable, not the word $\Theta\epsilon\omicron\iota$, which determines the true center. Otherwise also the similarity of these two stones is striking: they are both decrees of citizenship, and in both the name of the new citizen was cut in large letters in line 2 below the poorly centered $\Theta\epsilon\omicron\iota$.

This text from *Hesperia*, IX, is the one reported by M. Crosby in *Hesperia*, VII (1938), p. 479 (addendum), but it is not known whether the tribe in prytany was Aiantis or Leontis.

¹⁰ *Loc. cit.*, p. 22: Da in Z. 1 $\Theta\epsilon\omicron\iota$ in der Mitte stehen wird, kommen der Zeile, wie ich Jahreshäfte XI 84 f. in Ansehung des mir damals allein bekannten Bruchstückes mit Kirchners Zustimmung annahm, 29 Buchstaben zu, soviel als die kürzesten Phylenamen fordern, $\text{Α} \text{τ} \text{γ} \text{η} \text{]} \text{ι} \text{δ} \text{ος}$ oder $\text{Ο} \text{ι} \text{ν} \text{η} \text{]} \text{ι} \text{δ} \text{ος}$ ---. Since it is now generally conceded that Oineis belongs to the tenth prytany, Wilhelm restores Aigeis as Prytany VI.

¹¹ Dinsmoor, *Archons*, p. 22; M. Crosby, *Hesperia*, VII (1938), p. 478

These two tribes belonged to Prytanies IV and VI, but in what order still remains uncertain. I read *I.G.*, II², 386 as follows:

319/8 B.C.

ΣΤΟΙΧ. 30

Θεοί

π ο λ ι τ ε ί α ' Α μ ύ ν τ [α ι Μ α κ ε δ ό ν ι]

ἐ[π]ὶ Ἀπολλοδώρου [ἄρχοντος ἐπὶ τῆς . .]

[. ν] τίδος ἔκτης π[ρυτανείας· γραμματε]

[ὕς . .] Α[. .] [-----]

Wilhelm has suggested (*Jahreshefte*, XI [1908], p. 85) that the grant of citizenship was made to Amyntas, son of Alexander, and brother of Peukestas.¹² The indicated restoration is Ἀμύντ[αι Μακεδόνι], which is precisely of the right length to agree with the somewhat longer lines of thirty letters in the body of the text.

III. ATHENS AND RHODES IN 251/0.

Adolf Wilhelm has now published a new text of *I.G.*, II², 769, with restorations which refer to the "good will of the Rhodian Demos to the Demos of Athens and King Antigonos," to the "Peace made with the King,"¹³ and to the constant co-operation of Rhodes toward bringing about this Peace.¹⁴

It is true that the Rhodians are mentioned in the text (line 11), but it is impossible to restore anything about King Antigonos or the Peace which ended the Chremonidean War, because *I.G.*, II², 441 is part of the same monument with *I.G.*, II², 769, and provides quite a different text in the place of Wilhelm's restorations. It is the more remarkable that Wilhelm should have proposed his new text of *I.G.*, II², 769 without reference to *I.G.*, II², 441, for it was he who first noted that these two fragments belong together.¹⁵

The combined text reads as follows:

I.G., II², 769 + 441

251/0 B.C.

ΣΤΟΙΧ. 30

[ἐπ' Ἀντιμάχου] ἄρχοντος ὕ ἐ[πὶ τῇ]ς Αἰ[αν]

¹² See now H. Berve, *Das Alexanderreich*, II, p. 26, under 56. Ἀμύντας.

¹³ Wilhelm supposes this to be the Peace at the end of the Chremonidean War.

¹⁴ The publication is in Wilhelm's article "Vier Beschlüsse der Athener," in *Abhandlungen der preussischen Akademie*, Jahrgang 1939, phil.-hist. Klasse, no. 22, pp. 24-29.

¹⁵ *Ath. Mitt.*, XXXIX (1914), p. 266.

- [τίδος τετά]ρτης πρυτανεί[ας ἤ] Χαι[ρι]
 [γένης Χαι]ριγένου Μυρρι[νούσι]ος ἐ[γρ]
 [αμμάτευεν]· Πυανοφιῶνος [ἔκτ]ει μετ' εἰ
 5 [κάδας, πέμπ]τει καὶ εἰκοστῇ τῆς πρυτ
 [ανείας· ὃ ἐκκ]λησία κυρία· τῶν προέδρων
 [ν ἐπεψήφισεν ὃ Κ]τήσων Μενίππου Ἀχερ
 [δούσιος καὶ συμπρό]εδροι· ὃ ἔδοξεν τῇ
 [ι βουλῇ καὶ τῷ δήμῳ]· ὃ Λυκομήδης Δι
 10 [...⁸... Λ]ου[σιεὺς εἶπεν]· ὃ ἐπειδὴ δι
 [ατελεῖ εὖνο]υς [ὃν ὁ δῆμος ὁ τ]ῶν Ῥοδίων
 [τῇ βουλῇ κ]αὶ [τῷ δήμῳ τῷ] Ἀθηναίῳ
 [ν⁹.....]ρον[.....¹¹.....]καὶ ἐν α
 [.....¹⁰.....]υμε[.....¹¹..... κ]αὶ συν
 15 [.....¹⁰.....]νους [.....¹¹.....]εν ἣν ε
 [.....⁵... ἣ βουλ]ῇ καὶ οἱ [.....¹⁰.....] ὃ καὶ
 [ταῦτα ἀγγέλ]λουσιν οἱ [θεωροὶ ὑπ]έρ τ[ῆ]
 [ς πόλεως ὃ ἀγ]αθεὶ τύχε[ι δεδόχθαι] τῇ
 [βουλῇ τοὺς] προέδρου[ς οἱ ἂν λάχω]σιν
 20 [ἐν τῷ δήμῳ π]ροεδρεύ[ειν εἰς τῇ]ν πρῶ
 [τὴν ἐκκλησίαν προσαγαγείν τοὺς]θεω
 [ροὺς τοὺς ἡκοντας -----]ν[.]

I have given to the text the date which I believe to be correct for the archonship of Antimachos.¹⁶ Wilhelm recognized part of the word *θεωροί* at the end of line 21, and it seems probable that these are the subject of the verb in line 17. The motivation of the decree may perhaps be discovered with further study, though little is preserved in the critical lines. Mention is made of the good will of Rhodes toward Athens. The specific act of friendship which occasioned this decree was told in lines 13-16. It was something which theoroi had come to Athens to report to the Athenians on behalf of their city, and the news brought by the theoroi to the Council led the Council to decide to introduce them to the Demos (line 21). This was normal procedure. Unless more can be made out than I have succeeded in reconstructing here this text will have to be counted innocent of the far-reaching historical implications which Wilhelm proposed.

¹⁶ Pritchett and Meritt, *Chronology*, p. xxi.

ATHENIAN POLITICS, 510-486 B. C.

The closing years of the sixth century before Christ and the early ones of the fifth were momentous for Athens and all Greece, and it is obviously of the first importance that we understand them correctly. Though the evidence for Athenian politics during this period is unfortunately far from full, it hardly follows that the general outline, with all its tremendous implications, need not be reasonably clear and capable of well-nigh universal agreement. Recent studies have undertaken to interpret the extant evidence, and it is my intention now to examine the principal propositions of the latest paper on the subject, a stimulating article by Gomme, in the hope that we may ascertain the fundamentals of Athenian politics in the years before and after Marathon.¹

1. Political parties or, better, groups. After certain "preliminaries," which we shall notice as we proceed, Gomme says (p. 325) that "we can get a closer grip of the problem if we keep in mind one fact, which is commonly ignored, though McGregor² states it clearly: that Greek tyrants, at least of the

¹ The most recent studies are: C. A. Robinson, Jr., "The Struggle for Power at Athens in the Early Fifth Century," *A. J. P.*, LX (1939), pp. 232 f.; M. F. McGregor, "The Pro-Persian Party at Athens from 510 to 480 B. C.," *Athenian Studies presented to William Scott Ferguson, Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*, Suppl. I (1940), pp. 71 f.; C. A. Robinson, Jr., "Medizing Athenian Aristocrats," *C. W.*, XXXV (1941), pp. 39 f.; A. W. Gomme, "Athenian Notes. 1. Athenian Politics, 510-483 B. C.," *A. J. P.*, LXV (1944), pp. 321 f. I confess to considerable sympathy with the statement in T. R. Glover, *The Challenge of the Greek and Other Essays* (Cambridge, 1942), p. 20: "How much time, too, has been spent by moderns on actions and reactions in Athenian politics in the ten years before Marathon! And how slight the basis there for any conjecture!"

² So far as Gomme agrees with anyone, it is with McGregor. I rather thought that C. Bradford Welles summed it up rightly, in his review of the Ferguson *Festschrift* (*A. J. P.*, LXV [1944], p. 88), when he said that McGregor "comes to the estimable conclusion that there were no traitors and no party politics at Athens in war time." Actually, as will be seen, party strife was keen, and Thucydides' famous remark (IV, 86, 5) that enslavement to the opposite faction was "worse than the dominion of a foreigner" doubtless reflects Greek opinion of ca. 500 B. C. as accurately as that of 75 years later.

seventh and sixth centuries, rested on popular support,³ that the aristocrats were their normal enemies, and that this was as true in Athens as elsewhere; that therefore the democrats after 510 were in the main of the same party, or group of people, as had once supported tyranny, and Cleisthenes as head of the party was a successor of the Peisistratidae."⁴

It was inevitable that those who had supported the Peisistratidae should also support Cleisthenes. The tyrants' partisans had included the poorer classes and those of impure Athenian descent,⁵

³ I have always considered this and the next statement as among the most widely recognized facts of Greek history (cf. Robinson, "Greek Tyranny," *A. H. R.*, XLII [1936], pp. 68 f.).

⁴ Cleisthenes might be the successor of the Peisistratidae in the sense that he enjoyed the same mass support, but never in the sense that the old party now merely had a new head (see below). Was Ebert, the first President of the Weimar Republic, the "successor" of the Hohenzollerns? Gomme's next sentence is: "It is true there were exceptional features in the Athenian story: it was exceptional for a tyrant, and still more for his successor, to secure the coöperation of so many of the aristocrats; and above all it was exceptional for a democracy to succeed to a tyranny." As for the last statement, it would be more correct to say that it was exceptional for democracy to succeed to tyranny in the face of external circumstances. On the Corinthian Isthmus, for example, democracies were short-lived, because Sparta preferred that the states within her Peloponnesian League should be oligarchic; in Asia Minor Persia, as she advanced to the seaboard, found tyranny a convenient method of controlling the Greeks; and in the West there was the fear of Carthage. Gomme's statement, moreover, is dangerously loose, for it does not suggest that we must draw a sharp line between Greek tyranny, in its peculiar seventh-century sense, and the rule at Athens of Peisistratus. By the time of Peisistratus the Athenians had in fact already had a limited democracy under Solon and, in addition, civilization was so firmly entrenched that the problems associated with tyranny, as a peculiarly Greek institution, do not arise. The rule of Peisistratus, in other words, must be approached essentially as merely another example of illegal one-man government of the general type known to all ages, to which practically any form of government may normally succeed and where seventh-century "laws" do not apply. I have already covered the point in "The Development of Archaic Greek Sculpture," *A. J. A.*, XLII (1938), pp. 451 f. As for Gomme's statement that it was exceptional for a tyrant "to secure the coöperation of so many of the aristocrats," much of history from Cleisthenes of Sicily to Dionysius of Syracuse and on to Mussolini and Göring proves that there have always been plenty of aristocrats willing to grace a tyrant's court.

⁵ Plutarch, *Solon*, 29 f.; Aristotle, 'Aθ. Πολ., 13, 5; 14, 1; 16, 2.

and it was these very persons whom Isagoras⁶ as archon⁷ in 508/7 B. C. attacked. With Hippias in exile, and the aristocrats oppressive, the people turned to Cleisthenes, of the great Alcmaeonid family, as "their chief and popular leader."⁸ This is far from saying, however, that Cleisthenes' adherents included the tyrannists;⁹ indeed, this was impossible, for the Alcmaeonidae had taken the lead in abolishing tyranny,¹⁰ and Athens was not big enough for both Cleisthenes and Hippias.¹¹ And yet there is

⁶ Herodotus, V, 69, 2; Aristotle, *op. cit.*, 13, 5 (revision of the citizenship rolls).

⁷ Aristotle, *op. cit.*, 21, 1.

⁸ Aristotle, *op. cit.*, 20, 4; 21, 1; *Politics*, III, 1, 10 (1275b); Herodotus, V, 66, 2. In other words, the people supported Cleisthenes because he was their protagonist (as I stated in *A.J.P.*) and not because, as Gomme suggests, they had supported tyranny, whose normal enemies were the aristocrats. Cleisthenes was the people's leader against oppression; he was also (an essentially different point) a democrat, either by conviction or because he understood the times. As Gomme puts it (p. 325), "in the main we may say with McGregor, 'tyranny had rendered its service to the young city; politically Athens had grown up'," as I had already stated in *Hellenic History* (New York, 1939), p. 80: the Athenian artisans and others "had grown strong and prosperous under the tyranny. These beneficiaries of tyranny were in fact ready for democracy."

⁹ The tyrannists, now obviously a minority group, I would define as the big and little people who would profit immediately and directly by the restoration of tyranny. Herodotus (VI, 121, 1) tells us that the Alcmaeonidae hated the tyrants (and see below). Mass support, which could swing to either tyranny or democracy, was another matter, as Cleisthenes recognized when he introduced ostracism. It was this failure to differentiate between "tyrannists" and mass support that led McGregor to reason as follows (*loc. cit.*, pp. 88 f.): Isagoras disfranchised the poor (who had benefitted by tyranny) and was therefore the enemy of the tyrant's supporters; accordingly, we must call him (and the aristocrats) "hostile" (p. 90) to the tyrants (and consequently anti-Persian, "decidedly so after 510," p. 72). But, as I have already stated, Isagoras' reforms were simply anti-democratic, and it was this which drove the masses into the arms of Cleisthenes.

¹⁰ "The Alcmaeonidae were perhaps the chief cause of the expulsion of the tyrants, and for the greater part of their rule were at perpetual war with them" (Aristotle, *Ἀθ. Πολ.*, 20, 4); cf. Aristotle, *op. cit.*, 19; Herodotus, V, 62-65.

¹¹ The incredible alliance (or identity, as Gomme would have it) of Alcmaeonidae and tyrannists, natural enemies if there ever were any,

no doubt, as the quotation above shows, that Gomme believes the tyrannists not only supported ¹² Cleisthenes but had actually disappeared as an independent group. He says (p. 327), "Hipparchus stayed on in Athens and was elected archon because he was with the democrats, not because he was a relation of Hippias. There were *two* parties or groups in Athens ('right and left,' 'rich and poor,' or 'oligarchs and democrats'), not three." And again (p. 328), "Nothing that has been said above is to be taken as meaning that there were no 'friends of the tyrants' in Athens after 510. . . . But this is very different from a 'tyrants' party.'" It would be against human nature, and above all against the nature of the Greeks, were an important political group to disappear overnight, and I think it safe to say that Gomme's "friends of the tyrants" were numerous enough (and in any case, determined enough) to form a "tyrants' party"—can anyone imagine "friends" in ancient Greece who were not partisan? ¹³ Incidentally, does not Cleomenes' proposal to restore Hippias

was argued by E. M. Walker, *C. A. H.*, IV, p. 265, which I discussed in *A. J. P.*

¹² Or vied with him for popular support. "Nor have I said anything inconsistent with the statement in Aristotle that the device of ostracism was originally aimed by Cleisthenes at would-be tyrants and at Hipparchus in particular. Hipparchus was a rival leader of the democrats; Cleisthenes may well have regarded him as an obstacle to his own ambition to be the first man in Athens, or have honestly thought that, if he became too powerful as democratic leader, he would, like Peisistratus, make himself tyrant" (p. 328). Gomme gives the gist of Aristotle (*op. cit.*, 22) correctly, that Cleisthenes aimed ostracism at would-be tyrants in general and at Hipparchus in particular (indeed, it is all in the same sentence); and in the next sentence but one, Aristotle lists other friends of the tyrants who were ostracized. Still, "Hipparchus was a rival leader of the democrats," which Cleisthenes guessed easily, even if Aristotle could not.

¹³ After the overthrow of the tyranny, according to Aristotle (*op. cit.*, 20, 1), the rivals were Isagoras and Cleisthenes, and "Cleisthenes was beaten in the political clubs"; every faction in Athens had its own clubs, and it is to be inferred from Aristophanes, *Lysis.*, 1153 (where Hippias' partisans are called *ἐταῖροι* rather than *φίλοι*), that the tyrannists were no exception (nor does Aristotle's remark exclude the possibility). The subject of G. M. Calhoun's early and important monograph, *Athenian Clubs in Politics and Litigation* (Austin, 1913), has not received the further exhaustive study it requires.

(see below), and Hippias' later return to Marathon with the Persians, suggest the existence of a welcoming committee of a somewhat more formal nature than a group of friends? Proof, however, is to be found, first, in the statement of Aristotle¹⁴ that "the Athenians, with the usual leniency of the democracy, allowed all the friends of the tyrants, who had not joined in their evil deeds in the time of the troubles, to remain in the city; and the chief and leader of these was Hipparchus." Secondly, it is a fact that this Hipparchus, son of Charmus, was archon in 496/5 B.C.¹⁵ and it has been suggested¹⁶ that Peisistratus, son of Hippias, was archon in 497/6 B.C. Meritt's penetrating study is of fundamental importance and shows that the Athenians, after their disastrous defeat by the Persians at Ephesus (498 B.C.), entered upon a "policy of appeasement toward Persia" by electing tyrannists to office.

Actually, the tyrannists on occasion supported the aristocrats, whose political complexion, particularly as regards Persia, we must now examine. I am not sure exactly where Gomme stands on this point, for he begins (p. 321) by suggesting that friendship for Persia had no political connotations: In this period "Medism (i.e. a desire to be friendly with Persia) was not a crime in an individual if his state was not at war with Persia, nor a treaty with the King wrong in a Greek state—certainly not, unless Persia was attacking neighbouring Greek states at the time." This may be correct in a strictly narrow sense—a treaty, by the way, might be expedient and yet have nothing to do with friendship—but Greek history (that of Thebes, for example) indicates that Medism (so different from a treaty or an embassy¹⁷) was a hallmark of oligarchy. Gomme continues

¹⁴ *Op. cit.*, 22, 4.

¹⁵ Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Antiquitates Romanae*, V, 77, 6; VI, 1, 1.

¹⁶ B. D. Meritt, "An Early Archon List," *Hesperia*, VIII (1939), pp. 59 f. See, however, Gomme (*loc. cit.*, p. 327) and Wade-Gery, *B. S. A.*, XXXVII (1936-37; published 1940), p. 263, n. 1, who is persuaded by Thucydides, VI, 54, 6 that the younger Peisistratus was archon during the tyranny. Even if Meritt's proposed date for Peisistratus should be incorrect, the archonship of Hipparchus, and Aristotle's statement just quoted, are sufficient for my point.

¹⁷ The Athenian embassy to Sardis is discussed by Meritt, *loc. cit.*, p. 63.

(p. 322): "It is true that the nobles of the sixth and early fifth centuries were more 'panhellenic' than the masses; but this does not mean that they were in favour of a national front against Persia, but that, chiefly owing to their greater wealth and opportunities, they were less confined to their own states and had a wider social, though hardly a wider political, outlook." We are chiefly interested, of course, in the political outlook, though I find it difficult to believe that many Greeks could be "social" to the exclusion of the "political." Nevertheless, Gomme's sentence seems to mean that the aristocrats did not favor opposing Persia, for it was merely an accident that Miltiades "was both panhellenic in this sense and a national leader against Persia in 490; but the combination in him was accidental, the result of external circumstances." We then come to this statement (p. 329): "The orthodox view that Miltiades, on his return to Athens in 493, put himself at the head of the nobles,¹⁸ is probable enough; but his own career shows as well as anything that it is wrong to label his party or the individuals in it as consistently¹⁹ anti-Persian or pro-Spartan, or even always opposed to the tyranny."²⁰ Gomme, then, seems to say that the aristocrats, who were not anti-Persian, flocked to the support of a notorious anti-Persian.

Though Gomme is convinced that the aristocrats were not anti-Persian, he nowhere argues that they were pro-Persian; indeed, by 490 B. C., he believes, the aristocrats were as patriotic as anyone, and while there may not have been unanimity, "there

¹⁸ This was impossible, I believe, but I have nothing to add to what I have already said (see note 1) concerning the first trial of Miltiades: in spite of aristocrats and tyrannists, Athenian democracy had advanced to the point where the struggle for power could be fought out within the various factions of the masses; the trial, then, was primarily a domestic struggle (the three parties to it being anti-Persian), in which the Alcmaeonidae tried to crush their new democratic rivals, Themistocles and Miltiades, who had found partnership at this time convenient.

¹⁹ The word "consistently" obscures the issue, for the question is whether the aristocrats during the period under discussion found it expedient to be pro-Persian.

²⁰ The last statement about the aristocrats is true, for, as I pointed out in *A. J. P.*, "there was plenty of room in Athens for Hippias and the nobles, many of whom, indeed, had prospered under the Peisistratidae."

is no reason to suppose that the division of opinion was on party lines" (p. 329).²¹ I have believed,²² on the other hand, and still do, that the aristocrats were pro-Persian. Meritt has shown²³ that soon after the death of Peisistratus the sons of the tyrant and the Alcmaeonidae were reconciled, and that Hippias proved his good faith by allowing Cleisthenes, the famous reformer of a later day, to be archon in 525/4 B. C. The Alcmaeonidae were probably banished again after the murder of Hipparchus, when the tyranny of Hippias became harsher, "and if this is correct it must have been the party of Kleisthenes rather than the party of Isagoras that was most opposed to the tyranny. Since Isagoras and his followers remained in Athens after 514/3, one should lay greater emphasis on their tolerant attitude toward the house of Peisistratos than has generally been the case." Meritt then calls attention to Aristotle's remark²⁴ that Isagoras was a friend (*φίλος*) of the tyrants, and says, "Certainly, it is clear that the political attitudes of Kleisthenes and Isagoras differed on the issue of the tyranny after 514/3 if not before." McGregor,²⁵ however, argues that aristocratic history in the sixth century²⁶ warns that Aristotle's remark "is not to be construed as connoting a political sympathy with tyranny, especially after 510 B. C." Since Isagoras' brief appearance on the Athenian stage was nothing if not political, it is sufficient to reply at this point that such an interpretation of Aristotle's comment on a Greek political leader is unjustified.²⁷

Aristocratic friendship for the tyrannists, moreover, was coupled at this time with a friendly attitude toward Sparta. Though Sparta had aided the Alcmaeonidae in the overthrow of Hippias in 510 B. C.,²⁸ it was impossible for them to work together and they soon fell out. Thus, during the strife in 508/7 B. C.

²¹ Cf. Welles' opinion above (note 2).

²² My *A. J. P.* article and Meritt's appeared practically simultaneously, so that I did not have the benefit of his study of the new inscription from the Agora.

²³ *Loc. cit.*, pp. 61-62.

²⁵ *Loc. cit.*, p. 90.

²⁴ *Op. cit.*, 20, 1.

²⁶ But see above (note 20).

²⁷ Since the Greeks were never able to keep domestic and foreign issues in water-tight compartments, the point of view shared by tyrannists and aristocrats must have included foreign policy (see below).

²⁸ Aristotle, *op. cit.*, 19; Herodotus, V, 62-65.

between Isagoras and Cleisthenes, Isagoras "invited Cleomenes, who was united to him by ties of hospitality, to return to Athens,"²⁹ but the excesses of the Spartan king contributed to the triumph of Cleisthenes. This led Sparta, in her desire to insure a friendly government at Athens, to propose to a congress held in her city in 504 B. C. the restoration of Hippias.³⁰ As already explained above, the Alcmaeonidae would have feared this as much as the tyrannists would have welcomed it. Hippias, as is commonly known,³¹ had spent the years of exile, within the Persian empire and at Sparta in 504 B. C., plotting his return to Athens, and this was earnestly desired by Persia.³² Since it is clear from the preceding that the aristocrats were at this time friends of the tyrants and of Sparta and that Sparta shared Persia's feelings about the restoration of Hippias, it follows that the aristocrats, in addition to being pro-tyrannist and pro-Spartan, were also pro-Persian. Or, if one prefers (though it comes to the same thing), the aristocrats had one thing in common with Persia: a desire for, or a willingness to accept, the restoration of Hippias, a policy that would mean the overthrow of the democratic constitution.

It was, moreover, politically expedient and highly advantageous for aristocrats and tyrannists to join forces during this period. After Isagoras' revision of the citizenship rolls, and after Cleisthenes' democratic reforms, where else in Athens could the aristocrats hope to find support? The action on aid to the Ionian Revolt, furthermore, confirms this natural grouping, though Gomme refuses (p. 326) "to identify the arguments and hesitations with particular parties"; instead, he seems to believe that each man, regardless of background, thought it out for himself and tells us how individual Athenians may have communed with themselves. It is reasonable to suppose, however, that the democrats were in favor of aiding the Ionians, not only because the Alcmaeonidae had every reason to fear a Persian triumph first

²⁹ Aristotle, *op. cit.*, 20, 2; cf. Herodotus, V, 70 and 72; Thucydides, I, 126, 12.

³⁰ Herodotus, V, 91-94.

³¹ McGregor, *loc. cit.*, p. 73, n. 6, gives the details of Hippias' movements during his exile.

³² Herodotus, V, 96, 2.

in Ionia and then in Greece, but also because among the masses there were many who actually came from Ionia and still others with Ionian connections (thanks largely to Solon's reforms).³³ Besides, since aid was in the first instance voted and since the Alcmaeonidae were the leading group at Athens, it is sensible to think of them as determining the vote. As already explained, the tyrannists (and aristocrats) would have voted in opposition; and the failure of the expedition, as Meritt has shown (see above), resulted immediately in Athenian appeasement of Persia.

The discussion thus far, then, has brought out that in the years around 500 B. C. there were three political groups in Athens: the democrats (anti-Spartan and anti-Persian); the aristocrats (pro-Spartan and pro-Persian); and the tyrannists (pro-Spartan and pro-Persian).

2. The attack on the archonship. Marathon spelled the doom of the tyrannist party at Athens, and the following years witnessed the growing power of the masses. Ostracism, which was now used for the first time, was employed³⁴ against tyrannists and Alcmaeonidae: Hipparchus (488/7 B. C.), Megacles (487/6 B. C.),³⁵ Xanthippus (485/4 B. C.), and Aristides (483/2 B. C.). Since Miltiades was dead, and in view of Themistocles' driving ambition, it is tempting to connect the great radical with the ostracism of his natural opponents; indeed, in company with others, I have tried elsewhere³⁶ to make (reasonable) conjectures concerning Themistocles' career in the 80's—"in happy disregard of the enormity of the offence," as Gomme expresses it (p. 324)—but I do not develop the subject here, for it is of secondary importance. The great fact of Athenian politics in

³³ And Athens was regarded as the metropolis of the Ionians (Herodotus, V, 97, 2); nor should commercial relations be overlooked.

³⁴ Aristotle, *op. cit.*, 22, 3-8; Plutarch, *Aristides*, 7, 2.

³⁵ Aristotle (*loc. cit.*) places Megacles among the friends of the tyrants. If this is not a slip, then Gomme is correct (p. 324) in warning (rather needlessly, I think) against an assumption that the Alcmaeonid family was "so close-knit that every member of it, and everyone connected with it, must be a member of the same party and all always work together."

³⁶ See note 1, above, for a discussion of Themistocles' enmity for the tyrannists (the friends of Persia) and the Alcmaeonidae, whom he tried to supplant as leader of the masses.

the 80's, it seems to me, is the attack on the archonship which was carried through in 487/6 B. C. By throwing the archonship open to the lot,³⁷ the Athenians not only changed immediately the character of their chief office, but indirectly that of the Areopagus as well, since the venerable Council was made up of former archons. How could the Athenians bring themselves to attack their two ancient institutions? The details escape us, but the heart of the answer must be that they were ready to alter the character of two institutions which had long been associated with aristocracy. In this they must have had leadership, although it does not follow that the leader necessarily shared the democratic sentiments of the people; it is as likely that he was governed by selfish considerations. I imagine, therefore, that Themistocles or some other radical, who had already held the archonship or who foresaw that one year in office would not satisfy him (reëlection being forbidden), played on the prejudices of the masses. The result for him would be that the archonship, now occupied by average people thanks to the lot, would lose its importance, and leadership would pass to the board of ten strategoi where reëlection was allowed. Thus it happened at Athens that the democratic constitution made possible one-man power.³⁸

³⁷ Aristotle, *op. cit.*, 22, 5.

³⁸ ἐγίγνετό τε λόγω μὲν δημοκρατία, ἔργῳ δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ πρώτου ἀνδρὸς ἀρχή (Thucydides, II, 65, 9, with which one would contrast II, 37, 1 and much else for a full appraisal of Periclean democracy, but there can be no doubt about the possibilities of the chief executive office). Though Walker (*C. A. H.*, IV, p. 155) saw that the creation of the board of ten strategoi gave an opportunity for one-man power, he did not understand, as I pointed out in *A. J. P.*, that "this opportunity would never have come, had not the archonship been thrown open to the lot" and been reduced thereby in importance (that is to say, an archon of ability, far more common in the days before the reform than after, could be more powerful than a strategos, no matter how often the latter might be reëlected). Walker (p. 156), accordingly, did not examine the possibility of political strife in connection with the reform, which was merely "a democratic device for equalizing the chances of rich and poor. . . . The application of the lot to the archonship in 487 B. C. affords conclusive evidence that by that time the office had lost its importance," to which one reply is that the Areopagus, which had not lost its importance, was also, though indirectly, attacked. Gomme (p. 323, n. 13) suggests that the archonship may have "lost its political importance" before Miltiades' triumphant return to Athens.

Gomme (p. 324, n. 14) does "not follow the argument" that the change in the position of the archons "made possible, and was intended to make possible, 'the rule of one man.' The chief archonship, in the right hands, could be much more powerful than membership in the board of ten strategoi, even though a man might be several times strategos, and on occasion and for a particular purpose might be given precedence over one or more of his colleagues."³⁹ Let us grant Gomme's position at once,⁴⁰ but the point is that, in the days before the reform, no matter how well you had performed your duties as archon or how powerful you had been, you could never again be archon. You could, however, if you yearned for power, destroy the importance of the archonship, so that leadership in the state would inevitably pass to another and by now greater office where reëlection was allowed.

Finally, for the sake of completeness, we may note that the democratic masses of Athens resumed their attack on aristocracy in 462/1 B. C., when the Areopagus was deprived of all its powers

³⁹ Gomme's next sentence is: "The change in the political value of the archonship meant a weakening of the Areopagus." This is true, but for the sake of a full understanding we should add the following: There was a safeguard, known as *prokrisis*, whereby the nine archons were chosen by lot from 500 names previously selected by the demes (Aristotle, *op. cit.*, 22, 5), and these 500 names were limited to men of the two top census classes (Aristotle, *op. cit.*, 26, 2). In other words, the attack on the archonship had been direct and pretty complete, but the Athenians had not yet dared to attack the Areopagus frontally. Gomme concludes his note as follows: "A *strategos autokrator* did not hold a particular post, but was a strategos given special powers for a special purpose, just as an ambassador might be, to decide the number of troops required for an expedition or to conclude an agreement with another state without further reference to the ecclesia." In *Hellenic History*, p. 112, n. 1, I said: "In a crisis the people occasionally gave unusual power—comparable to that of the Roman Dictator—to the tenth general, who was then called *strategos autocrator*; Pericles, for example, received such power at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War." I emphasize this, because Walker (*op. cit.*, p. 154) considers the office of *strategos autokrator* as a regular, independent magistracy (the usual view), without which perhaps (p. 156) Athens might not have "created, organized, and held, a great empire."

⁴⁰ It was my position in *A. J. P.*, where I said, however, that the point would not be valid in the days after the reform (see note 38, above).

except those relating to homicide.⁴¹ Even the archonship ⁴² was stripped of all trace of aristocratic influence, for in 457/6 B. C. it was thrown open to the *zeugitai*, and shortly afterward the preliminary selection of candidates was made by lot.

C. A. ROBINSON, JR.

BROWN UNIVERSITY.

A NOTE ON *I.G.*, I², 87.

My colleague L. A. Post writes to me that the use of the aorist with *ἕως ἄν* in *Hesperia*, XIV (1945), p. 102, lines 16-17, gives an impossible construction, or one at least with a meaning different from that required. I quite agree with him, and accept as a happy solution his suggested restoration *ἕως ἄν ἡο πόλ[εμος] μ[έλει, εἰρένες δὲ γενομένης --- κτλ. ---]*. The sense desired is clear, even though the precise words may be in doubt.

BENJAMIN D. MERITT.

INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STUDY.

⁴¹ Aristotle, *op. cit.*, 25, 1.

⁴² Aristotle, *op. cit.*, 26, 2. But Aristotle says earlier (7, 4) that the thetes "were not eligible for any office. Hence it is that even at the present day, when a candidate for any office is asked to what class he belongs, no one would think of saying that he belonged to the thetes." It is possible, then, that even the poorest citizens attained the archonship through a legal fiction.

THE TEXT OF GRATIAN'S *DECRETUM* II, 32, 4, 5.

Shortly before his death the late Hermann Kantorowicz published a book of extracts from "newly discovered juristic writings" of the twelfth or thirteenth century as contained in the Royal Manuscript 11 B XIV of the British Museum.¹ In this manuscript he finds a phrase containing an unintelligible form, *uceniens*, for which he can give no satisfactory interpretation. Thus in his description of the contents of this manuscript the author says: ² "The last series, *Notes G*, (of Master G), is obviously composed by a churchman. Many of them are puzzling in some way or other. . . . The next paragraph, 'Omnis *uceniens* (*sic*) amator proprie ³ uxoris adulter est,' makes sense if we have the courage to read 'nesciens' and would then be a radical example either of a punishable attempt of an impossible act or of an inexcusable *error in persona*."

The emendation of Kantorowicz, proposing *nesciens* for *uceniens*, a non-existent word, seems to make nonsense rather than sense, and it is palaeographically improbable.

The solution of the difficulty seems to be simple. If instead of *uceniens* we read *veemens*, that is *ve(h)emens*, the reading is palaeographically explicable and the sense is the one required.

This manuscript is in a twelfth or thirteenth century script,⁴ apparently written in France or England and forming part of a larger legal manuscript that seems to have been written in northern Italy or southern France. As can be seen from the photostatic reproduction of a page of it, published as the frontispiece of Kantorowicz's book, the shapes of the letters are such that *uceniens* and *veemens* would be practically identical in form and it would not be impossible or improbable for one to be read for the other. Thus, to take these two words letter by letter: the first letter (*u*, *v*) is always of the same form in Latin manuscripts and inscriptions; the second letters (*e*, *c*) are so nearly alike in this manuscript that either may easily be mis-

¹ *Studies in the Glossators of the Roman Law* (Cambridge, 1938). For convenience we shall hereafter call it the London Manuscript.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 22.

³ Medieval form for *propriae*.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, pp. 9, 14, and 23. Compare the photostat of the frontispiece.

taken for the other; the third letter (*e*) in each of these two words is again the same; *m*, the fourth letter of *veemens* is often written in exactly the same form as the *ni* of *uceniens*, as may be seen from the plate mentioned above;⁵ the last three letters (*ens*) in each of these two words are identical.

It is easy to see how the *h* of *vehemens* was lost in this case and how the resultant form arose. At the time when this manuscript was written, the letter *h* in Latin had long since been dead as a sound and it was freely added or omitted, in a more or less haphazard way, as can be seen from practically all Latin manuscripts of this age. This loss or addition of *h* is exceedingly common in Latin manuscripts of all periods. It is found sporadically throughout the whole history of the Latin language,⁶ and after the first century of our era it becomes increasingly frequent in inscriptions which give many thousands of such examples of the addition or loss of an *h*. This omission or addition of *h* occurs even more frequently in manuscripts than it does in inscriptions, and in fact the very form *veemens* is found in two ninth century manuscripts of Horace, twice in one and once in the other.⁷ The same form is also found in the *De Orthographia* of Cassiodorus,⁸ while *veementius* is found in a manuscript of Quintus Curtius Rufus.⁹

⁵ See especially *simul*, lines 19 and 21, which would certainly be read as *siniul* in both cases, if there were such a Latin word and the word *simul* did not exist. On page 271, 16, of his book, Kantorowicz indicates that the London Manuscript reads *meius* instead of *in eius*, while on page 293, line 7, the manuscript reads *casum* for *casu in*. These would make exact parallels of the confusion of *m* with *in* or *ni*, and they are found in this same manuscript. Many manuscripts of Horace have *nimum* for *minimum* in *Od.*, II, 6, 19, and they vary between *nimio* and *mimo* in *Epistles*, II, 1, 198. Additional examples may be found in L. Havet's *Manuel de Critique Verbale* (Paris, 1911), nos. 631, 655, 813.

⁶ Cf. F. Sommer, *Handbuch der lat. Laut- und Formenlehre*² (Heidelberg, 1914), pp. 192-5; L. Havet, *op. cit.*, nos. 1072, 1076. Stolz-Schmalz, *Lateinische Grammatik*⁵ (Munich, 1928), pp. 138-9.

⁷ *Epistles*, II, 2, 28 and 120, in *Codex Harleianus* 2725, usually designated as *δ*; and *Epistles*, II, 2, 28 only in *Codex Harleianus* 2688, usually designated as *d*. This form (*veemens*) is found also in the lemma to Porphyrio on *Ep.*, II, 2, 28.

⁸ P. 153 K of *Codex B*.

⁹ VIII, 10, 7, *Codex Leidensis*. Cf. Otto Keller, *Epilegomena zu Horaz* (Leipzig, 1879), p. 717.

In the material from the *Notes G* of Master G, in which Kantorowicz finds this form *uceniens* or *veemens*, there are two examples of the omission of *h*, even in the very brief selections of only 19 lines published by him in his edition.¹⁰ In his inadequate list of the characteristics of this manuscript Kantorowicz cites further evidence that should have served as clues to lead to the solution of this problem. Thus he says:¹¹ "The most remarkable of his (i. e., Master G's) abbreviations is the simple dropping of letters, without even indicating the omission. Thus Master G very often drops initial *s* before another consonant, even before capitals: (s)ciencia, (s)ciri, (s)cribendi, (S)Tellionis; one of two vowels: Christi(a)na, contrar(i)um, sang(u)ine; the last letter: qui(d), unicu(s), au(t), and other letters: I(n)duc-tum, f(r)aterna, (s)ta(t)uerit. On the whole his spelling is correct, there is perhaps one misspelt word in ten." Kantorowicz should have also observed that *h* receives its usual treatment in manuscripts of this period, in that very often it is unaccountably added or omitted *ad libitum*.

Entirely unknown to Kantorowicz and apparently unsuspected by him, this sentence, which he finds puzzling, is a direct quotation, derived from the Γνωμαί of Sextus, and it may be found in the *Decretum* of Gratian as embodied in the *Corpus Juris Canonici*.¹² The passage is as follows:

Nichil fedius est quam amare uxorem quasi adulteram.

Item Ieronimus (Contra Iovinianum, Lib. 1).

1. III Pars. Origo quidem honesta erat amoris sed magni-
2. tudo deformis. # 1. Nichil autem interest ex qua honesta
causa
3. quis insaniat. Unde et Sextus in Sentenciis: "Adulter est"
4. inquit "in suam uxorem amator ardentior." In aliena
quippe uxo-
5. re omnis amor turpis est, in sua nimius. Sapiens iudicio
debet

¹⁰ *eribicio* and *anatema*, pp. 231, 19, and 232, 1.

¹¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 13-14.

¹² The *Decretum* of Gratian, II, 32, 4, 5. I employ the simplified philological system of citation, such as that finally adopted by Roman law scholars for the *Corpus Juris Civilis*. The old, medieval method of citation, still found at times, is wasteful and annoying.

6. amare coniugem, non affectu. Non regnat in eo impetus volup-
7. tatis nec preceps fertur ad coitum. Nichil est fedius quam
8. uxorem amare quasi adulteram. # 2. Certe qui dicunt se causa
9. rei publicae et generis humani uxoribus iungi et filios procreare,
10. imitentur saltem pecudes et post quam venter uxoris intumuerit
11. non perdant filios nec amatores se uxoribus exhibeant sed maritos.

NOTES.

There are no textual variants¹³ of any importance except the following:

2. autem: *deest. EGH.* quam ex: *Editio Romana.*
3. Xistus: *Editio Romana*; Sixtus: *C. add. Pythagoricus: EGH, Edd. coll. o. pr. Bas. Papa: EG. ait: EGH, Edd. coll. o. pr. Bas. (et).*
4. sua uxore: *EGH.*
5. amator: *Edd. coll. o. pr. Lugdd. II, III.* Sapiens vir: *Ed. Romana.*
6. Rege impetus: *Ed. Rom.* Non regnet in eo: *Edd. coll. o. regat: orig. reget: Codd. orig. add. effectus vel: EGH.*
7. feretur: *Ed. Rom.*; feratur: *Edd. coll. o. in: Ed. Rom.*
9. coniungi: *EGH, Edd. coll. o. liberos tollere: orig.*
10. uxorum: *orig.*
11. praebeant: *CD Edd. coll. o.*

In the third line, Xistus, sometimes spelled Xystus, and Papa, seem to have developed from independent glosses, possibly of the scribes, and apparently unconnected with the *glossa ordinaria*. Apparently the authors of these glosses represent a tendency to identify Sextus with Pope Sixtus, whose name is sometimes

¹³ The most important critical editions of the *Corpus Juris Canonici* are:

1. A. L. Friedberg (Leipzig, 1879-1881). This is the standard critical edition and it is the best, but it is far from satisfactory, since the editor has not been able to study and evaluate the whole of the manuscript tradition: see his edition, p. xciv.
2. A. L. Richter (Leipzig, 1739).
3. J. H. Boehmer (Halle, 1747).
4. P. Lancelotti (Lyons, 1591).
5. C. H. Freiesleben (*alias* Ferromontanus) (Prague, Altenburg, and Leipzig, 1728).
6. P. and F. Pithoeus (Pithou) (brothers), revised by C. Peletier (Paris, 1695).
7. *Editio Romana*, edited by a papal committee (Rome, 1582).

spelled Xistus or Xystus, a tendency already found in Rufinus, though Jerome corrects this.¹⁴ The gloss Pythagoricus on the other hand is evidently from the hand of an independent scribe or glossator, who recognized this passage as coming from Sextus the Cynic philosopher. He thus contradicts the glosses Xistus, Sixtus, and Papa. Even in his own day Sextus and his Cynic colleagues were often called Pythagorean, since to many their doctrines seemed to derive from Pythagoras.

In the fifth line *Sapiens* (vir), *the wise man*, meaning the truly wise man, was a favorite phrase with Sextus, and it became practically a technical term for the Philosopher.

The remaining notes are not important for our purpose, except as they show the somewhat unsettled condition of the text.

Furthermore, the *glossa ordinaria*¹⁵ on this passage reads *vehemens* for *ardentior* in line 4, and this evidence is important, as will be shown later.

A careful study of the whole passage in the *Decretum* seems to indicate that *vehemens* is much more appropriate for the following argument than is *ardentior*. In this connection *vehemens* in this passage may be translated as *violently impetuous, irrestrainable*. Thus it would fit perfectly with the argument and phraseology of 6 ff., where it is echoed by the words *impetus, preceps, fertur*, as well as by the whole thought conveyed in # 2.

This passage in the *Corpus Juris Canonici*, taken from Jerome, was used by him in a heated controversy with Jovinian.¹⁶ Jovinian had maintained¹⁷ that there is no surpassing virtue in

¹⁴ In his *Commentary on Jeremiah*, 4, 22; *Ad Ctesiph.*, 133, 3; *Comm.* 6 on Ezekiel 10, 5.

¹⁵ Developed and compiled by a group of canon law scholars from the middle of the twelfth to the middle of the thirteenth century, at the same period as the London Manuscript and representing the same tradition. Compare J. F. von Schulte, *Die Glosse zum Decret Gratians* (Wien, 1872) and Stephan Kuttner, *Repertorium der Kanonistik* (Città del Vaticano, 1937), pp. 1-122.

¹⁶ *Adversus Jovinianum*, published about 394.

¹⁷ In works that are now lost. Compare Jerome's statements in Migne, *Patrologia Latina*, XXIII, p. 214: "Dicit (Jovinianus) virgines, viduas, et maritatas, quae semel in Christo lotae sunt, si non discrepent ceteris operibus, eiusdem esse meriti. Nititur approbare eos qui plena fide in baptisate renati sunt a diabolo non posse subverti."

celibatic chastity and that a married woman or a married man could be as virtuous as a nun or a monk. This claim stirred Jerome deeply and he entered the fray to prove once for all that married persons cannot hope to be fully virtuous but that marriage at best must be employed as a solemn duty for the sole purpose of propagating the species and that otherwise it is merely a questionable expedient, to be used, as a last resort, to avoid fornication. There are a few scriptural passages that may be cited in support of this doctrine and Jerome quoted Scripture freely to establish his point. He found very helpful various quotations from Matthew and Paul's letters,¹⁸ and a number of other texts that were interpreted as either allowing or commanding asceticism.

But in this controversy with Jovinian, although Jerome did search the Scriptures, and very diligently too, he failed to find a passage fully adequate to his purpose. For none of these scriptural texts advocates anything that could equal the stern austerity of life and especially the sexual self-abnegation that was widely preached and sometimes practiced by the Cynic philosophers of the first three centuries of the Christian era whose doctrine on asceticism is fairly represented by the writings of Sextus and his school. So in this extremity Jerome discovered what he needed in the *Sententiae* of Sextus,¹⁹ an author whose identity is obscure and whose exact affinities are doubtful. Owing to the variance in the tradition, as represented by the manuscript readings of this passage in the *Corpus Juris Canonici*, Sextus has been variously identified as a Christian and a pagan, one of the Popes and a Cynic philosopher. As a philosopher he was sometimes classed as a Pythagorean on account of his pronounced asceticism, an asceticism surpassing anything to be found even in Christian doctrine. Most scholars identify him with one of the Cynic philosophers, a certain Sextus, about whom very little is known and whose date is uncertain. Whoever he was, he and his school seem to have preached the sort of

¹⁸ Cf. Matthew 5, 28; 19, 12; and 10, 38; Corinthians 1, 7, 34 and 38; and 1, 9, 27; Galatians 5, 16-17 and 24.

¹⁹ In the Greek original the title was Γνώμαι Σέξτου. Compare R.-E., s. v. "Sextus," no. 5, and M. Schanz, *Gesch. der röm. Literatur*² (Müller's *Handbuch*, VIII, 2, 1), pp. 497-503.

doctrine that theologians like Jerome and St. Augustine found acceptable, the doctrine that became dominant in many prominent circles of early Christianity and the one that seems to have been the ultimate source for much of the severely ascetic teachings of the early Church.

The exaggerated asceticism of the Cynics was formerly attributed to the teachings of Pythagoras, and Sextus was called a Pythagorean.²⁰ Though some of this doctrine of the Cynics may derive from Pythagoras, it seems to have been based ultimately on a perverted and fanatical interpretation of Plato, with his doctrine of the world of idea as being perfect and good and the world of seeming or material substance as being imperfect and evil. In fact much of the teaching of the New Testament seems to go back to a distorted development of this fundamental Platonic conception.²¹

An interesting problem, or rather complex of problems, is presented by the fact that the various Latin translations of this passage from Sextus differ slightly, though the differences are unimportant and no more than are to be expected in quotations made in the Middle Ages. Such variations in citation were not unusual in medieval times, as well as earlier and later. The passion for accuracy in such matters is a mark of more recent scholarship. The original Greek of Sextus and the various Latin translations are:

1. Μοιχὸς τῆς ἑαυτοῦ γυναικὸς πᾶς ὁ ἀκόλαστος—Sextus.
2. Adulter etiam propriae uxoris omnis impudicus—Rufinus.
3. Adulter in suam uxorem amator ardentior—Jerome, *Adv. Jov.*, I, 49.
4. Adulter est uxoris propriae amator ardentior—Jerome, *Ezech. Com.*, VI, 18, 5.
5. Adulter est in suam uxorem amator ardentior—Jerome, *C. J. C.*, II, 32, 4, 5.
6. Omnis veemens amator proprie uxoris adulter est—London MS.

The form of the quotation appearing in the *Decretum* of Gratian is interesting for other reasons also. The *glossa ordi-*

²⁰ Cf. *R.-E.* and Schanz, *loc. cit.*

²¹ Compare especially the Fourth Gospel.

naria on this passage apparently read *vehemens* instead of *ardentior*, although the latter reading appears in the text of all the manuscripts of Gratian, so far as they are cited in the various critical editions. As it appears in our present text of the *Decretum*, the gloss to *amator* in this sentence reads: *Amator: vehemens amator dicitur qui tantum uxorem diligit ut apud se disponat quod si ipsa esset forte uxor alterius non minus carnaliter se cum ea commisceret*. On the basis of this gloss it is practically certain that the glossator in his text of the *Decretum* had before him *vehemens* and not *ardentior*.²²

It is interesting and possibly profitable to speculate on how the texts of the glossators apparently had *vehemens* while all the manuscripts of the text of the *Decretum* so far as cited in the critical editions read *ardentior*. In the first place *vehemens* was a very uncommon word in twelfth and thirteenth century Latin. In fact it became comparatively rare much earlier. It is not inherited by any Romance language from the Latin, and so in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries it must have been a foreign word to most writers, including the copyists and the scholars who studied the *Decretum*. In the writings of Jerome in the fourth and fifth centuries *vehemens* is common enough. In the Vulgate as composed by Jerome it appears nineteen times while the adverb *vehementer* occurs sixty times. The various quotations from Jerome, as found in his treatise *Against Jovinian*, his *Commentary on Ezekiel*, and in the citation in the *Corpus Juris Canonici*, all read *amator ardentior*. On the other hand the *glossa ordinaria* and the London Manuscript²³ read *ve(h)emens amator*. This would seem to imply that *vehemens* was an early authentic reading. This may mean that Jerome submitted this passage to a revision, or it may be that the form *ardentior* originated as a gloss on *vehemens*, and that, since *ardentior* was the more common word, it found its way into the text. This would be comparatively easy, since *ardentior* was so very commonly used while *vehemens* was rare

²² The gloss on *peiores* of the *Corpus Juris Canonici*, II, 27, 1, 21, seems to represent a conflation of the two traditions in that it reads both *vehementior* and *ardentior*. This gloss reads: *Peiores: . . . Nam, cum quis ardet in uxorem propriam, velut adulteram, reatu adulter est. Nam adulter est in propria uxore vehementior amator et ardentior*.

²³ According to my conjecture.

and had a foreign sound and appearance. In fact if *vehemens* in the *Decretum* lost its *h* and became *veemens*, as it may easily have done,²⁴ this may be and probably is the origin of the form *veemens* or *uceniens*, read by Kantorowicz, as found in the London Manuscript, and it is quite possible that because of their great similarity, amounting almost to an identity in appearance, Kantorowicz misread the strange looking *veemens* as *uceniens*. At least this reading should be carefully verified by a competent palaeographer and the manuscript should be reëxamined as soon as practicable.²⁵ Even though a careful examination of the manuscript should disclose that *uceniens* is the unmistakable reading, the logical explanation seems to be that this corrupt form is ultimately derived from *veemens*, that is, *vehemens*, that some copyist failed to recognize this strange looking word, and that the easy corruption into *uceniens* followed. So the final result is the same, and, since some emendation of this corrupt form *uceniens* is necessary, we should read *ve(h)emens*, on the strength of the evidence presented above.

Much of the text of the *Corpus Juris Canonici* is far from satisfactory and there are many difficult problems. Hence it is remarkable that of all the more or less critical editions of the *Corpus Juris Canonici*, not one mentions this gloss *vehemens*. Apparently it has not been evaluated in the textual criticism of the *Corpus Juris Canonici*, and in general the various editors seem to have ignored practically all of the glosses in their attempts, not always successful, to establish a satisfactory text. In this connection it is to be hoped that future editors of the *Corpus Juris Canonici* will make a thorough study of all the glosses, so far as they may be of value in the establishment of the text.

Had Kantorowicz recognized the source of this quotation in the *Corpus Juris Canonici*, he would have realized that there was no puzzling juridical problem involved and that this is not "a radical example of a punishable attempt," as he calls it.²⁶ For the *Corpus Juris Canonici* is a somewhat conglomerate mass of disparate material, partially positive law, in the ordinary

²⁴ Witness the London Manuscript!

²⁵ Apparently this will be impossible for some time.

²⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 22.

sense, with definite penalties to be executed by the courts, either ecclesiastical or secular; but much of it is a body of rules that might be called the Moral Law, and under the jurisdiction of no earthly tribunal.²⁷ This estimate of the nature of the material in the *Decretum* was recognized from the time when it was promulgated, and the *glossa ordinaria* on the passage we have been discussing goes on to say of this case of "adultery": "*Adulter: . . . Hic 'adulter' talis dicitur non reatu criminis illius capitalis sed similitudine adulterinae libidinis. Sicut enim adulter in adulteram ardet, ita iste in propriam, et quod non peccet mortaliter patet in fine, nam ibi dissuadetur ad quod evitandum non tenetur.*"²⁸

Thus "adultery" in this passage is to be defined as a sin rather than as a crime that is punishable by the courts. Though a sin of a very different character, as part of the Moral Law it may be compared with the "adultery" of the sort described in Matthew 5, 28: "But I say unto you that whosoever looketh on a woman to lust after her hath committed adultery with her already in his heart." There is another passage in the *Decretum*,²⁹ again by Jerome, which may serve as a further illustration of this point of view. This passage is:

C. II. *Non coniuges sed adulteri vocantur qui non secundum precepta Christi iunguntur.*

Sicut non omnis congregatio hereticorum Ecclesia Christi dici potest, . . . sic non omne matrimonium, quo non viro suo secundum precepta Christi coniungitur, rite coniugium appellari potest sed magis adulterium.

²⁷ This point of view is unmistakably indicated by Gratian himself in the opening words of the *Decretum*: "Humanum genus duobus regitur, naturali videlicet iure et moribus. Ius naturae est quod in lege et Evangelio continetur. . . ." Compare also J. P. Lancelotti, *Institutiones Juris Canonici* (Perugia, 1580).

²⁸ In this gloss on *adulter*, *Decretum* II, 32, 4, 5. It should be observed that *ardet* is used in the third line of this gloss. Possibly, but not necessarily, this may mean that this gloss is later than the gloss following (*Vehemens amator dicitur . . .*), and that this gloss represents the present form of the text of Gratian which reads "*amator ardentior*," while the gloss "*Vehemens amator dicitur*" represents the earlier form.

²⁹ II, 32, 2, 2.

It should be evident that such cases of "adultery" cannot fall within the jurisdiction of any mundane court and that they do not belong to the world of earthly jurisprudence. Thus Kantorowicz seems to have gone completely astray in his endeavor to interpret the canon law material in the London Manuscript.³⁰ His apparent unfamiliarity with canon law would account for his failure to recognize either the setting or the significance of this quotation from Gratian's *Decretum*.*

CLYDE PHARR.

VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY.

³⁰ For Kantorowicz's misinterpretation of other important canon law passages in the London Manuscript, see Clyde Pharr, "A Thirteenth Century Formula of Anathema," *A.J.P.*, LXVI (1945), pp. 135-50.

* After this article was in type, I learned from Dr. Stephan Kuttner that he also suggests the reading *veemens* for *uceniens* which was read by Kantorowicz. It is gratifying to find this independent conclusion by a canonist and palaeographer of Dr. Kuttner's competence. Dr. Kuttner's article did not discuss the other problems that I have raised in this paper. His suggestion as to the reading may be found in his article entitled, "Zur neuesten Glossatorenforschung," in *Studia et Documenta Historiae et Iuris*, Fasc. II, no. 6 (1940), p. 280.

THE FIRST CHAPTER OF THE *POETICS*.

In a recent number of this *Journal*¹ Seymour M. Pitcher proposes a new analysis of the first chapter of Aristotle's *Poetics*, his main points being: 1) the retention of *ἐποποιία* in 1447 a 28, 2) the reinterpretation of the word here and in 1447 a 13 to include mimetic prose and verse without musical accompaniment, and 3) that Aristotle makes a primary division of poetry into that with and that without musical accompaniment, which is basic to a proper understanding of the chapter. I should like to mention certain relevant facts that do not appear clearly in Pitcher's article.

I

Pitcher places a great deal of weight on a new interpretation of the particle *δῆ* in 1447 a 13.² He says it "may very well have served to indicate an unfamiliar, technical, or even ironical usage of the word. I should, accordingly, there translate: 'Epic, as I here define it'." In support of this rendering, he cites Denniston³ to the effect that "*δῆ*, without a verb of saying, thinking, etc., often denotes that words are not to be taken at their face value, objectively, but express something merely believed, or ironically supposed to be true. Hence *δῆ* often gives the effect of inverted commas." Now in fact both this statement and the examples which Denniston provides show plainly that the use here described is the well-known meaning of *δῆ* which may be rendered "forsooth," "so-called," "ostensibly," "supposed," or the like, which attributes the word, *used in its ordinary sense*, to the statement, opinion, or pretense of some person other than the speaker or writer. It never suggests that the word is being used in a special, technical, or otherwise novel sense.

Furthermore, the use discussed by Denniston belongs to the *intensive particle δῆ*, whereas in this passage of the *Poetics* *δῆ* is

¹ LXV (1944), pp. 340-53.

² See pp. 343, n. 12; 345 and note 22; 349-50 and n. 38; 352, n. 43; and the title, "Epic, as I here define it."

³ J. D. Denniston, *The Greek Particles* (Oxford, 1934), p. 234.

the *conjunction*, treated only briefly by Denniston (*op. cit.*, pp. 236-40). The particular use found is not discussed by Denniston, but is well treated by both Eucken⁴ and Bonitz.⁵ Eucken observes (p. 37) that Aristotle does not use emphatic *δή* except in fixed combinations with certain other particles (*καί, οὐδέ, γάρ, τε*, relatives, *εἰ, δέ, μέν, ὥς*). The only passage where he finds in the manuscripts a possible example of *δή* emphasizing a noun is at *Politics* 1258 b 40 *οἷον Χάρητι δὴ τῷ Παρίῳ*, which he considers corrupt (modern editors read *Χαρητίδῃ*, on the authority of the Medieval Latin versions), and one emphasizing a verb (also noted as the only example by Bonitz, but called temporal by him), *χαλεπαίνει δὴ εὐθύς* in *Nicomachean Ethics* 1149 a 34, which appears to be actually an example of apodotic *δή* after a participial clause, treated by Denniston on page 225. Apparently Aristotle never uses free emphatic *δή*.

On page 38 Eucken remarks, "Sed multo saepius *δή* totam enuntiationem efficit, . . . ut rem vel sententiam, quam scriptor profert, manifestam esse indicet." Similarly Bonitz, at the beginning of his article on *δή*, says, "admodum frequens apud Aristotelem usus particulae vi determinativa ad significanda ea quae certa sint et manifesta . . . in proponendis definitionibus tamquam concessis ac comprobatis." And further on, discussing his first use of *δή* (to which he assigns the passage we are now considering), he says, "particula *δή* inserta enunciationi quae pro fundamento ponitur proximae argumentationis, eam vel ex communi opinione vel ex argumentis alibi allatis firmam et evidentem esse significat." The passages cited by Bonitz and Eucken are in every respect parallel to this one from the *Poetics*, and include most of those mentioned by Pitcher (note 22, p. 346) in support of his statement that "Aristotle frequently employs *δή* in definitions, thus calling attention to the somewhat arbitrary usage characteristic of his terminology." It is hardly necessary to point out the contrast between "unfamiliar," "technical," "arbitrary," and "manifestam," "certa," "concessis ac comprobatis," "firmam et evidentem." And, indeed, it is generally known that Aristotle's definitions are characteristically the reverse of arbitrary.

⁴ Rudolf Eucken, *De Aristotelis dicendi ratione, Pars I* (Diss. Göttingen, 1866), pp. 37-49.

⁵ Hermann Bonitz, *Index Aristotelicus* (Berlin, 1870).

We might note briefly the principal recurrent features of this use of $\delta\eta$. In all cases, as Bonitz and Eucken say, it marks the basic statement in a new line of discussion, one which is considered clear and acceptable to everyone. Furthermore, in about three-fourths of the examples cited by Bonitz, the preceding sentence, to which $\delta\eta$ supplies the connection, contains a preliminary announcement of the new problem, in one of three forms: "let us now discuss such-and-such," with $\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\omega\mu\epsilon\nu$ or some other hortatory subjunctive;⁶ "we must now consider such-and-such," with $\sigma\kappa\epsilon\pi\tau\acute{\epsilon}\omicron\nu$ or some similar verbal;⁷ or "this will become clear from the following."⁸ In similar contexts I have noted three other conjunctions used by Aristotle. These are: $\gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho$, the so-called explanatory use, discussed by Denniston (*op. cit.*, pp. 58-9);⁹ $\omicron\upsilon\nu$ (especially $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu \omicron\upsilon\nu$), a use closely analogous to this one of $\delta\eta$, but not treated by Denniston;¹⁰ and $\delta\acute{\epsilon}$, a use mentioned by Denniston (*op. cit.*, pp. 170-1) as equivalent to $\omicron\upsilon\nu$ or $\delta\eta$, "marking the transition from the introduction to a speech to the speech proper."¹¹ In spite of diligent search, however,

⁶ So, e. g., in *Rhetoric*, I, 13, 1373 b 2; 2, 1355 b 26; II, 2, 1378 a 31; 4, 1380 b 35; 5, 1382 b 29; 8, 1385 b 13; 19, 1392 a 9; *Politics*, IV, 14, 1297 b 37; *Nicomachean Ethics*, I, 12, 1101 b 12; IV, 13, 1127 a 21; *Posterior Analytics*, II, 13, 96 a 24; *Sophistic Elenchi*, 165 a 38, 165 b 11; *Gait of Animals*, III, 705 a 4; and in the *Poetics*, besides the present passage, there are two places where very plausible emendations give $\delta\eta$ for $\delta\acute{\epsilon}$, Bywater's at VII, 1450 b 22, and Spengel's at XIV, 1453 b 15.

⁷ So in the *Rhetoric* at I, 6, 1362 a 21; 7, 1363 b 7; III, 11, 1411 b 25; *Politics*, V, 2, 1302 a 18; VIII, 15, 1334 b 6; III, 1, 1275 a 32; *Nicomachean Ethics*, I, 8, 1098 b 12.

⁸ So in *Rhetoric*, II, 5, 1382 a 21; 6, 1383 b 13; 7, 1385 a 17; 21, 1394 b 7.

⁹ Found after hortatory subjunctives at *Nicomachean Ethics*, I, 5, 1097 a 16; *Meteorology*, I, 2, 339 a 11; 340 a 1, 340 b 6; *Parts of Animals*, II, 10, 655 b 29; *Politics*, IV, 4, 1290 b 24; after a "will become clear" expression in *Poetics*, XXV, 1460 b 8; *Rhetoric*, II, 11, 1388 a 30.

¹⁰ Found after hortatory subjunctives at *Sophistic Elenchi*, 164 a 23; *On the Heavens*, IV, 4, 311 a 16; *Meteorology*, I, 6, 342 b 27; *Parts of Animals*, III, 2, 663 b 24; *Generation of Animals*, V, 1, 778 b 20; *On Sense*, 439 a 18; *Nicomachean Ethics*, VI, 2, 1139 a 3; *Poetics*, VI, 1449 b 24; *Rhetoric*, II, 15, 1390 b 16; 22, 1395 b 22; after a verbal in $\text{-}\tau\acute{\epsilon}\omicron\nu$ at *Poetics*, XIII, 1452 b 31; *Nicomachean Ethics*, II, 4, 1105 b 19; 7, 1107 a 33.

¹¹ Found after hortatory subjunctives at *Rhetoric*, I, 3, 1358 a 36;

I am unable to find any examples of asyndeton in such a context in Aristotle (as Pitcher's explanation would require). Furthermore, a comparison of all the passages cited in notes 6, 7, and 8, above, as well as those cited by Pitcher,¹² gives not the slightest warrant for his interpretation; nor can I find $\delta\eta$ so used in any Greek author.

The $\delta\eta$ in the second sentence of the *Poetics*, then, is a conjunction, a variety of inferential $\delta\eta$ connecting a previous exhortation with the first sentence of the discussion proper, and marking that sentence, as a whole (not the first word or any single word), as a certain and solidly acceptable basis for further discussion. This use is in literary English best left untranslated (as in most of the translations criticized by Pitcher); in colloquial English it might perhaps be rendered by the connecting particle "now."

II

Let us next examine the pattern of sentence-connection in Chapter I of the *Poetics* as a basis for criticizing the analysis given by Pitcher (*loc. cit.*, p. 251). The first sentence states in general the subject of the whole treatise. The second, marked by $\delta\eta$, gives the fundamental principle for the discussion of the first three chapters. The third, introduced by $\gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho$ in 1447 a 18, begins the discussion proper of these three chapters, the end of which is marked by $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu$ $\omicron\upsilon\upsilon$ at 1448 b 2. This $\gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho$ is continued by $\delta\acute{\epsilon}$ at the beginning of Chapter II, and by $\xi\tau\iota$ $\delta\acute{\epsilon}$ at the beginning of Chapter III. This third sentence itself, however, picks up and explains the phrase $\tau\tilde{\omega}$ $\acute{\epsilon}\nu$ $\acute{\epsilon}\tau\acute{\epsilon}\rho\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ of the preceding

II, 12, 1388 b 33; 20, 1393 a 27; 23, 1397 a 7; *Politics*, II, 1, 1200 b 26; and after an expression meaning "such-and-such remains to be discussed" ($\lambda\omicron\iota\pi\omicron\nu$ $\epsilon\lambda\pi\epsilon\iota\nu$, $\acute{\epsilon}\chi\omicron\mu\epsilon\nu\omicron\nu$ $\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\iota$ $\epsilon\lambda\pi\epsilon\iota\nu$) in *Rhetoric*, II, 20, 1393 a 23; 25, 1402 a 31; III, 13, 1414 a 30. In some of the passages after hortatory subjunctives, perhaps $\delta\eta$ should be read.

¹² In *Rhetoric*, II, 1378 a 33 the $\delta\eta$ is in the combination $\epsilon\iota$ $\delta\eta$, and is mainly inferential; in *Nicomachean Ethics*, VIII, 1162 b 25 it marks a fundamental sentence, but without any of the above-mentioned locutions in the preceding sentence; in *Politics*, III, 1275 a 32, the second $\delta\eta$ is inferential. His other examples are included in mine.

The $\delta\eta$ in Plato's *Laws* 810 B (Pitcher, *loc. cit.*, p. 352) taken by Pitcher as another example of his special use ("as I define it"), is an instance of $\delta\acute{\epsilon}$ $\delta\eta$ (see Denniston, *op. cit.*, p. 259) in which $\delta\eta$ emphasizes the adversative force of $\delta\acute{\epsilon}$.

sentence. The next sentence, introduced by *οἷον*, begins a series of illustrations of the phrase *ἡ χωρὶς ἡ μεμιγμένοις* which occupies the rest of the chapter. The end of the series is marked by *μὲν οὖν* at 1447 b 28. There are only four illustrations, not the seven which might have been expected (since neither "speech" nor "music" is ever found in art separate from "rhythm"), and they are marked by a *μὲν . . . δέ . . . δέ . . . δέ . . .* series. The first illustration (*μὲν* in 1447 a 24) is of the "tone-rhythm" combination, the second (*δέ* in 1447 a 26) "rhythm" alone, the third (*δέ* in 1447 a 28) the "speech-rhythm" combination, and the fourth (*δέ* in 1447 b 24) the combination of all three media. Of these four illustrations, the third is followed by a long explanation of the phrase *ἀνώνυμος τυγχάνουσα* (or whatever the correct reading may be), which in itself is sufficient to guarantee some form of *ἀνώνυμος*. This explanation is introduced by *γάρ* and concluded by *μὲν οὖν* in 1447 b 23.

This outline, which cannot be altered without first altering the text (since it is marked by the particles just as clearly as we might do it by letters and numbers), may be presented schematically as follows (omitting the first sentence).

I (*δη*). The dynamic mimetic arts (probably all "poetic" for Aristotle) belong to the genus of mimetic arts, and may be subdivided by the criteria of medium, matter, and manner.

A (*γάρ*). Analogous to the media of the static mimetic arts are those of dynamic, which occur either separately or combined. For example (*οἷον*):

- 1 (*μὲν*). Pure instrumental music.
- 2 (*δέ*). The dance.
- 3 (*δέ*). Types of mimetic literature without singing. These have no names.
 - a (*γάρ*). Examples of known, but unnamed, genres under this heading.
 - b (*πλήν*). The only common type of genre-name is based on an erroneous principle, since it separates similar works merely on the basis of metrical difference.¹³

¹³ The fact that *ἐποποιός* (and consequently *ἐποποιία*) is one of the names criticized makes it seem hardly probable that Aristotle chose it as a general name for this class of literature.

- i (καὶ γάρ). And because it includes non-mimetic literature written in verse.
- ii (ὁμοίως δέ). And likewise because, even with this principle, one type of verse literature cannot be named.

4 (δέ). Mimetic literature with singing.¹⁴

This is the outline, which, in its essentials, could be made with only the first three words of each sentence, and which many previous scholars have correctly apprehended. So Pitcher's attempt to find a dichotomy based on the presence or absence of "musical accompaniment,"¹⁵ and to create from this a new outline, is impossible. Whether or not the second sentence implies a definition of ποιητική (and I think it does), the subject of this chapter and the next, the type of art there defined, is dynamic mimesis. By this I mean those arts which represent a temporal succession of events by an analogous temporal succession, as opposed to those arts which depict an isolated state, form, quality, or event by a single, usually spatial, unchanging representation. This is Aristotle's basic dichotomy of the arts, and I believe ποιητική in his use applies to all dynamic mimesis.¹⁶

The second sentence of the *Poetics* is a definition by examples, and the choice of individual arts there enumerated is determined by two considerations: they must have fairly well-established and unequivocal names (to avoid periphrasis, explanation, and qualification), and they must give an indication of the scope of the genus. Of all the species which Aristotle later mentions as using speech and rhythm, epic comes closest to satisfying these requirements. While ἐποποιία could refer to any kind of literature in hexameter verse, so much of such literature was actually

¹⁴ The four classes of dynamic mimesis (based on the media) are again listed, in the same order, in 1448 a 9-18, where Aristotle's use of the phrase *περὶ τοὺς λόγους καὶ τὴν ψιλομετρίαν* for the third class seems conclusive against keeping ἐποποιία in 1447 a 29.

¹⁵ This phrase is certainly badly chosen, since it suggests instrumental accompaniment, which is never the criterion. Only the presence or absence of song is involved. Instrumental accompaniment is irrelevant and unimportant; usually present, for instance, in mimetic dancing, which is nevertheless *χωρὶς ἁρμονίας*.

¹⁶ If Aristotle intended to limit ποιητική to literature (which is quite possible) he nowhere defines it, nor is it the subject of this chapter.

epic that he could with fair safety use the term. Likewise *αὐλητική* and *κιθαριστική* were so normally used of pure instrumental music,¹⁷ as opposed to *αὐλῳδία* and *κιθαρωδία*, that he could hardly have foreseen a misunderstanding here. Dancing was probably omitted because of the lack of a clear, familiar name for the type which is pure and mimetic. Tragedy, however, and comedy and dithyramb were all clearly defined genres in Aristotle's day.

In no sense is this basic sentence (*ἐποποιῖα δὲ*, etc.) a complete prospectus of the chapter. It is, as we have said, a definition, indicating the genus with which Aristotle is concerned by a list of different familiar and clearly defined species. The next sentence gives the possible criteria by which the genus may be subdivided, and the rest of Chapter I presents the four subgenera determined by the criterion of artistic media.

All of the four subgenera are in ordinary Greek nameless, nor does Aristotle either remark on this or coin a name for the first two or the last one. Furthermore, the explanation he gives in the case of the third variety is entirely concerned with the lack or inadequacy of names for individual arts or species under this sub-genus. We may therefore suspect the need of further emendation.

III

What are the probabilities as to the correct text of the sentence *ἡ δὲ ἐποποιῖα*, etc.? If we retain the noun, its verb is naturally

¹⁷ Which was largely mimetic, program-music. See *R.-E.*, s. vv. "Sakadas," "Auletike," "Saiteninstrumente," "Agones" (col. 840). Most Greek festivals which had any musical contests had events for *αὐληταί* and *κιθαρισταί*. The music of the latter (as opposed to the *κιθαρωδοί*) was apparently always purely instrumental; the former either played alone (the Pythian style) or, far from accompanying others, had a chorus as background for their performance. The music at Alexander's celebration described by Athenaeus (XIV, 538 e-f) illustrates the usual types. Aristotle (*Nicomachean Ethics*, X, 5, 1175 b 3-5) mentions the flute-music fanatic (hardly a man with a passion for accompaniments) as a familiar type, and uniformly refers to *αὐληταί* and *αὐλητική* in such a way as to show that pure instrumental music is meant (e.g. *Rhetoric*, III, 14, 1414 b 19-25; *Poetics*, XXVI, 1461 b 30-32). To suppose that Aristotle is using the terms one way here and another in 1447 a 24 is almost as unlikely as the "epexegetic *καί*" interpretation proposed by Pitcher here (*loc. cit.*, p. 350, and, even worse, p. 351, n. 42).

supplied from *ποιούνται τὴν μέμνησιν* (1447 a 21) in the sentence introducing these four sub-genera, and the retention of *τυγχάνουσα* (with Pitcher) is grammatically possible. But, unfortunately, the contrast between the use of a generic name and the statement that there is none is too strong to be merely implied by a dangling circumstantial participle.¹⁸ If *ἐποποιία* is to be retained, then, we must read *ἀνώνυμος δὲ τυγχάνει οὕσα*, which, incidentally, conforms closely to Aristotle's practice in similar passages.¹⁹ In other cases, however, where he mentions the lack of a name and redefines a common word for this purpose, he adopts it because he needs it and uses it in his discussion.²⁰ But *ἐποποιία* in the sense of "recited, not sung, mimetic literature" is not clearly redefined here, nor does Aristotle ever again use the word in this way.²¹

Four arguments seem to me decisive against retaining *ἐποποιία* here: 1) It is totally unnecessary from Aristotle's point of view. This is not a real genus, but a chance collection of literary forms which have in common only the negative fact that they do not involve singing. If he did give this group a name, it would imply a unity (e. g., of Socratic dialogue and elegy) into a single

¹⁸ Pitcher's remarks on *μέχρι τοῦ νῦν* (*loc. cit.*, pp. 340-1, n. 3) are somewhat curious. I take it he wishes the phrase to be exclusive, meaning "up until the present, but not now any longer." This, he seems to feel, would soften the contrast. To support this interpretation he cites Bonitz's *Index*. Bonitz lists seven occurrences of this or a variant phrase. Of these, all but two (*Meteorology* 345 b 30 and *Metaphysics*, II, 2, 994 a 18) are unquestionably inclusive, and even these are more naturally taken so, "up to the present and even now," as Eucken says, exactly *ἔτι καὶ νῦν*. But even if the exclusive interpretation is possible, this does not at all eliminate the strong opposition.

¹⁹ E. g., *On the Soul*, II, 7, 418 a 28.

²⁰ E. g., *φωρά* in *Physics*, V, 2, 226 a 33.

²¹ Pitcher's suggestion of an anticipatory use in the second sentence of the *Poetics* is impossible. As for his etymological speculations on pages 341-2, if "word-composing" means "coining of words" it is pointless, and if it means "the composing (of literary works) using words (but not musical accompaniment)," as he seems to intend, it is impossible. All Greek compounds of the form noun-stem plus *-ποιός* or *-ποιία* known to me treat the noun-stem as the direct object of the "making" in the second part. In Aristotle's day the possible etymological senses would be "versification," "composition of hexameters," and "composition of epic poetry." Aristotle in 1447 b 15 shows that he considers the second of these correct.

art, which Aristotle surely could not have believed in. It seems absurd to say that there are many arts of instrumental music, for example, but only one art of unsung literature. 2) If he had used the word, for whatever reason, he would surely have explained more clearly that he is giving it an abnormal significance, and his reasons for so doing.²² 3) If he had taken the trouble to introduce a new and special term for this group of literary forms, why does he not use it again in 1448 a 10-11, the only other place where he ever has occasion to speak of this group? 4) The word belongs to a group of formations which Aristotle specifically censures as inaccurate and misleading terms immediately below (1447 b 14).

Without *ἐποποιῖα*, if no other change is made, *ἡ δέ* would nominalize the following participial phrase (through *τῶν μέτρων* in 1447 b 9) and require a verb different from *ποιοῦνται τὴν μίμησιν*. Consequently, unless we assumed a larger lacuna, we would have to read *τυγχάνει οὔσα* with Suckow.

But we have already observed that Aristotle explains and discusses, not the lack of a general name for song-less literature, but the lack of a name for dialogue, the lack of a name for any type of imitation in iambic trimeters or the like, etc. Nor is this surprising, since in the other illustrations of arts grouped together by similarity of media, he merely lists the individual arts. Here he is unable to do this, and quite naturally comments on the fact.

To eliminate this inconsistency, it is only necessary to alter *ἡ δέ* to *αἱ δέ*, *τυγχάνουσα* to *τυγχάνουσι*, and pluralize the two participles. The singular forms are conditioned by the noun; once it is gone we must restore the plural. This seems quite clear on purely internal grounds, but it has further the support of the Arabic version.²³ This version suggests also the insertion

²² As he does, e.g., in the passage cited above, note 20.

²³ I wish here to acknowledge the assistance of Professor Arthur Jeffery, who translated for me, and discussed with me, the relevant passages. His rendering of this sentence is: "Some do it in prose form, simple for the most part, or by measures; and they themselves imitate these things, either in mixed form or making use of one kind; and by measures which are without any name to this day." The general stupidity of this Arabic version is obvious even from a very few lines; but that fact gives it a special value. Both the Arabic translator and

of αὐτοῖς μιμούμεναι after τοῖς μέτροις, which, although not demanded by sense and grammar, certainly improves the sentence: αἱ δὲ μόνον τοῖς λόγοις ψιλοῖς ἢ τοῖς μέτροις αὐτοῖς μιμούμεναι, καὶ τούτοις εἴτε μὴ γινώσκειν μετ' ἀλλήλων εἶθ' ἐνὶ τινὶ γένει χρώμεναι τῶν μέτρων, ἀνώνυμοι τυγχάνουσι μέχρι τοῦ νῦν.²⁴ The whole connection of thought is now simple, straightforward, and logical.

IV

There remain a number of minor points in which Pitcher seems to have misinterpreted the Greek.

On page 350 τὸ σύνολον is rendered "in their entirety." This adverbial phrase regularly in Greek and always in Aristotle²⁵ means "generally speaking," "in general," and is one familiar way of qualifying a generalization which would otherwise be too sweeping.

On pages 346-7 he takes ἅπασαι μὲν ποιοῦνται τὴν μέμνησιν ἐν ῥυθμῷ καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἁρμονίᾳ, τούτοις δ' ἢ χωρὶς ἢ μεμιγμένοις to mean that every "poetic art" in Aristotle's sense uses all three media. To do this, he has to ignore the μὲν . . . δὲ . . . opposition contained here, ignore χωρὶς or give it some sense which I cannot divine, limit Aristotle's ποιητικὴ to literature, treat as digressions the examples of instrumental music and dancing, and stretch the meaning of ἁρμονία to include the intonation of ordinary speech and the phenomena of the Greek accent. This seems to me incredible.²⁶ To justify the exclusion of instrumental music and

his Syriac predecessor were more interested in translating Aristotle's words than his meaning. Professor Jeffery points out that Syriac favors participial constructions, while Arabic prefers finite verbs.

²⁴ In some ways it would be simpler to read ἡ δὲ μόνον τοῖς λόγοις ψιλοῖς <καὶ> ἢ τοῖς μέτροις αὐτοῖς μιμουμένη, with the participles all singular. This does not agree with the Arabic, but both it and our Greek MSS could be explained on the basis of an archetype in which καὶ ἡ became ἡ, the differences being due to different ways of restoring concord. This reading, however, has the disadvantage of making Aristotle unify all narrative poetry as a single art, whereas he almost surely considered epic as distinct from iambic or elegiac. He does not even regard comedy and tragedy as the same art.

²⁵ See Bonitz's *Index* for the examples.

²⁶ The passage he cites from the *Laws* (665 A), apparently to justify applying ἁρμονία to spoken intonation, actually refers to singing, as one element of choral dance, and ῥυθμός there refers to dancing, not speech-

dancing, he merely says (p. 347) that "Aristotle would not classify these arts as poetic." Further, in his note 31, he says, "that this (*sc.* pure instrumental music) is a deviation from the regular practice is suggested by the circumstantial participle *χρώμεναι*." The logic is hard to follow, but perhaps arises from a notion that a circumstantial participle is one translated with "when." The participle in this case, of course, is one of manner, and merely serves to make it quite plain that *ἁρμονία* and *ῥυθμῷ* are instrumental datives. Aristotle does not qualify his statement in any way because the normal and regular implication of *αὐλητική* and *κιθαριστική* is pure instrumental music. The passages from Plato merely prove the popularity of such music and Plato's dislike of it.

There is nothing in Aristotle to warrant the word "sometimes" which Pitcher (p. 347, n. 31) prefixes to "used alone by the arts of the flute and the lyre." Further on in note 31 he says that the "plain sense of *μιμῶνται . . . οἱ τῶν ὀρχηστῶν*" is "some dancers imitate by rhythm itself without tone." Of course *οἱ τῶν ὀρχηστῶν* is not Greek for "some dancers," nor in this context is it possible Greek at all. There can hardly be any doubt that *ἡ τῶν ὀρχηστῶν* is correct and that *μιμῶνται* must be deleted. Instrumental accompaniment is irrelevant, and dancers *qua* dancers do not sing.

From his translation (p. 340, with note 3, and p. 348, with note 32) we might infer that Pitcher analyzes *τοῖς λόγοις ψιλοῖς ἢ τοῖς μέτροις* as being a subordinative endocentric phrase composed of *τοῖς λόγοις* ("spoken words . . . without musical accompaniment") with two alternative modifiers, *ψιλοῖς* ("prose") and *τοῖς μέτροις* ("verse"). This is of course grammatically impossible, and perhaps Pitcher is only paraphrasing. In any case, the correct analysis is as a co-ordinative endocentric phrase composed of two alternatives, *τοῖς λόγοις ψιλοῖς* and *τοῖς μέτροις*,

rhythm. What troubles Pitcher, apparently, is the use of *καὶ* here to connect the three media. Since the Greeks had no particle equivalent to our "and/or," Aristotle could express his meaning here in only two ways; either "rhythm or speech or music or any combination of two of these or all three combined," which would be both cumbersome and inaccurate, or "rhythm and speech and music, either (one or two of these) separately or (all three) combined," which is shorter, simpler, and more precise.

in which τοῖς λόγοις means "prose" and ψιλοῖς "pure" is added to avoid any possible misunderstanding, while τοῖς μέτροις means "verse." This use of λόγος is found in the singular commonly meaning "a prose work, e. g. fable, narrative, history, speech, dialogue," and in the plural, as here, meaning "prose" in general, as well as "prose works." It is found again in the *Poetics* at 1448 a 11 and 1450 b 15; and in the *Rhetoric* at 1404 b 33 we have the phrase ψιλοὶ λόγοι for the same thing. The parallel with 1448 a 11, τοὺς λόγους καὶ τὴν ψιλομετρίαν, is very close, and led Vahlen to transpose ψιλοῖς here so as to modify μέτροις, in which case it would mean "not sung." Finally, this phrase, "prose and verse," is intended as a dichotomy equivalent to λόγῳ in 1447 a 22, specifically excluding ἁρμονία, and including ῥυθμός only by implication. When Aristotle in 1447 b 25 repeats the three media, he substitutes μέλος for ἁρμονία and μέτρον for λόγος because, of the two types of each, only song (not instrumental music) and only verse (not prose) is relevant for the group containing the drama, dithyramb, and nome. But both prose and verse (separately) may occur in the song-less type of ποιητική. The word μόνον here is parallel to that in 1447 a 24 and to αὐτῷ in 1447 a 26, and like them shows that not all three media are used by arts of this group. In short, λόγος, as used in 1447 a 22, is equivalent to οἱ λόγοι ψιλοί plus τὰ μέτρα, and this phrase in 1447 a 29 is another way of saying μόνον τῷ λόγῳ, which, as Pitcher correctly observes, could not for Aristotle exclude ῥυθμός, since all speech is rhythmical.

Finally, Pitcher remarks (p. 347, n. 29) that reading for Aristotle "perhaps implied reading aloud." It is well known that, normally, all reading was reading aloud in antiquity.²⁷

V

To sum up: Pitcher's interpretation of δὴ in 1447 a 13 must be rejected, since it assumes for the particle a force totally unlike any which the word has anywhere in extant Greek literature; and ἐποποιΐα at that point means "the art of epic poetry" in the sense in which Aristotle everywhere else uses the word.

²⁷ Cf. J. Balogh, "Voces Paginarum" in *Philologus*, LXXXII (1927), pp. 202-40, and G. L. Hendrickson, "Ancient Reading" in *C. J.*, XXV (1929), pp. 182-96.

Pitcher's attempts to explain away Aristotle's references to pure instrumental music are unsuccessful, and ignore the great popularity of this art (especially flute-music) in Aristotle's day. His new outline of the chapter contradicts the outline plainly marked by Aristotle with his connecting particles. On the positive side, there is a great deal of evidence to show the undesirability or impossibility of retaining *ἐποποιῖα* at 1447 a 28, and we have suggested that the best reading is one which we may translate: "Thirdly, the imitative arts which make use of prose only, or of verse by itself, whether combining various meters or using only one, are unfortunately still nameless."

FRED W. HOUSEHOLDER, JR.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.

SPITZER'S GRAIL ETYMOLOGY.

To the various interpretations of OF *graal*, Professor Spitzer (*A. J. P.*, LXV [1944], p. 360) adds a new one. Let me quote his own words:

A **cratalis-e* can, accordingly, be derived from Lat. *crātis-ēs* "something woyen, plaited, interlaced"—compare the derivation of *cratis*, *craticius*, *craticula* in Romance (*R. E. W.*, 2302-4): one will note the use of "osier," of the withe rod, the flexible material, par excellence, for such baskets. The most primitive receptacle must have been the basket made of flexible branches of "withe rod"; later the word was transferred to bowls of wood (the Morvan stage), tin (the *grelet* of Fribourg), still later of silver and other precious materials—and it is in this latter reference that it appears in Chrestien, in Robert de Boron, and in Helinandus.

This explanation, to say the least, is ingenious. But, in order to give it precedence over the prevailing etymology from *crātēr-ēris*, *cratēra* (Greek *κρατήρ*), Spitzer is compelled to rule out of existence ML *cratus* and *gradalis*—which are the props on which the latter etymology rests.

He begins with ML *gradalis* employed by Helinand of Froidmont in a well-known passage which I quoted in full (*M. P.*, XIII [1916], p. 185) in support of the etymology propounded by Diez, sustained in 1921 by Hebeisen (*Bezeichnungen für Geschirr*, etc., p. 47), and listed as such (*gradalis*) in Meyer-Lübke, *R. E. W.*³. The argument is that Helinand was a medieval ("theocratic") etymologizer: witness his explanation of *gradalis* by *gradatim*¹ and of *graal* by *grata et acceptabilis*. So much every scholar is ready to grant. But it does not follow that Helinand's "etymological lore is negligible." Nor is it true that *gradalis* "is nothing but a reconstruction on the part of

¹ There is, of course, a post-classical adj. *gradalis* "step by step" which may have a bearing on the question. Since, in any case, we have to start with *crat-*, the analogy of *camin-us*, from which *caminata* and *caminalis(e)* were derived, suggests itself. In Chrétien (*Conte del graal*, vs. 3100) *caminalis* appears as *cheminal* "fire-dog"; cf. Paul Benoit, "Die Bezeichnungen für Feuerbock," *Z. R. Ph.*, XLIV (1924), pp. 417 ff., and *N. E. D.*, s. v. "Chimney."

Helinandus destined to 'give an etymology' to the OF form *graäl*." In short, Helinand did not, as Spitzer wrongly assumes, invent the word *gradalis*; for the simple reason that it is recorded for the year 1010 (two centuries before Helinand) in Append. Marcae Hisp., col. 973—to wit: *gradales duas de argento* by the side of *anapos duos de argento*. If Spitzer had taken the pains to read to the end of my article, he would have realized that *gradalis* had an independent existence and that OF *graal* and Prov. *grazal* may well be separate derivatives of it; cf. **credentare* > OF *graanter* and *laudare* > NW. Prov. *lauzar*. But what makes the eleventh-century occurrence significant is that the "two grails of silver" mentioned have a counterpart in the Pseudo-Wauchier *Continuation* (vv. 16760 ff.) of Chrétien:

An une loige par devant
Vit sus *graaus d'argent* ester
Plus de cent testes de sengler²

which shows that in these early references *graal* seems to mean "dish" or "platter," a meaning preserved in the *dyscyl* of the Welsh *Peredur*. It would take me too far afield to trace the steps whereby, through the intermediary of Robert de Boron and the Holy Blood legend at Bruges (ca. 1150) and Fécamp (ca. 1171), Chrétien's "dish" (Helinand's *scutella*, the *catinus* of Mark 14, 20, the *paropsis* of Matt. 26, 23) became the "cup" (*calix*) of the Last Supper, etc. Suffice it to say that MS C of the *Prose Joseph* (not, as Hertz, *Parz*². 424, says, the *Didot-Perceval*) states categorically: *graal, c'est à dire . . . lou caalice* (Hucher, I, p. 227). This and other matters I must defer until the publication of my *Critical Survey of Arthurian Documents*.³

² Reading of MS *E*, fol. 107b, supported by MSS *A*, *L*, *Q*, *T*, *U*. Potvin's text, which follows MS *P*, stands alone in reading "grailles."

³ If, however, I may anticipate my discussion briefly here, it is to point out that in the Byzantine Mass (Burdach, *Gral*, chap. IX) the "host" is carried in a *diskos*, a "broad & deep vessel resting on one foot,"—just as in Chrétien's *graal* (wherefore Hilka, ed. *Conte del graal*, p. 680, thinks of Chrétien's use of the word as "ciborium"). If this is true, then our whole attitude toward Philip of Flanders' *livre* is subject to change: it may, in that case, have contained an account of the Byzantine ritual, brought back by Philip from the Orient, which further would explain the "procession" in the *Conte del graal* lacking in Celtic analogues and in the romances following the Robert, not the

As for *gradus*—the word on which Diez laid stress, since it occurs in the tenth-century *Ecbasis captivi*—Spitzer's reasons for declaring it "non-existent" [*sic*] are best given in his own words:

"*Nec biberam cratum* pecudis de sanguine tinctum." It seems to me evident that *cratum* is equivalent, not to *κρατήρ* (is "to drink a cup tinged with blood" a natural expression?) but to *ἀκρατον* "the unmixed, pure, unadulterated wine": *bibera*[*m*] *acratum* could be metrically correct, since prevocalic *-m* is subject to elision in Latin verse: the *a-* may have been dropped because of a fusion with the *-a* of *bibera*[*m*].

Obviously, Spitzer *hopes* it was dropped. But was it? And, did it ever exist in the passage quoted? How, then, can he assert that *cratus* = *κρατήρ* "is non-existent."

As my old friend Karl Pietsch used to say: "Etymologien beweist man nicht"; that is etymologies, in order to be acceptable, have a transparent, *prime-sautier* character which carries conviction or, at least, probability. Although Spitzer has expressed himself similarly in "Aus der Werkstatt des Etymologen" (*Jahrb. f. Philologie*, I [1925], pp. 129 ff.), his derivation of OF *graal* seems to me too devious to meet that condition.

WILLIAM A. NITZE.

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
AT LOS ANGELES.

Chrétien, tradition. Into this account, then, Chrétien wove his Perceval-Fisher King story, derived from Welsh and Breton sources. My critique of Burdach, *M. P.*, XXXVII (1940), pp. 315-20, would have to be modified accordingly; and my recent article, supporting Baist, in *M. L. N.*, LIX (1944), pp. 559 ff., as well. Here would be another case of conflation. But more of this in my forthcoming book.

THE *NUMQUID VIS* FORMULA IN ROMAN COMEDY.

The expression *numquid vis*, or any of its variants, was a polite formula whereby one might gracefully indicate a desire to terminate a conversation and withdraw. A typical, and probably the most widely known, example in Latin literature is in Horace's encounter with the bore (*Sat.*, I, 9, 6), while the function of the formula is described by Donatus¹ in comment upon an example in Terence, *Eun.* 341.

That this formula derived ultimately from a genuine question to which a genuine answer was given is axiomatic, but the fifty-three examples from Plautus and Terence show us, without Donatus' help, that in the second century B. C. it was already a well-recognized formula familiar to ordinary conversation. In some instances it is treated as such, with either no reply at all or some brief indication of a negative; in others the reply consists of what appears to be a very poor joke until one realizes that the joke consists not only in the answer, but in the fact that it is an answer to a question which expects only the completion of the formula. As in the case of any formulaic expression when interpreted literally, the humor lies largely in the distortion of the convention, not in the joke itself.²

Though the variant forms in which the question appears do not in themselves attest its formulaic character, the elliptical forms in which it sometimes appears do, e. g., *numquid me*, and the omission of *aliud*, *ceterum*, or *amplius* in more than half the cases, especially in the most common form, *numquid vis*, and the omission of any verb in eight instances.³ Formalism, how-

¹ *Significo me abire; nam abituri, ne id dure facerent, "numquid vis" dicebant his, quibuscum constitissent. Quid est ergo "rogo numquid velit"? hoc est: dico quod abeuntes solent.*

² Cf. *quid agis* (how do you do?) interpreted and answered as if it were "What are you doing?"

³ Plautus: *numquid vis*, 14; *numquid aliud*, 5; *numquid me vis*, 3 (once with *nunciam*); *numquippiam aliud me vis*, 2; *numquid ceterum me voltis*, 2; *nisi quid vis*, 3; *numquid aliud vis* + infinitive, 2; each of the following once: *nq aliud me vis*, *nq me*, *nq ceterum voltis*, *nq amplius*, *nq vis quin*, etc., *nq me vis quin*, etc., *nq aliud me morare*, *nq est ceterum quod morae sit*, *nq priusquam abeo me rogaturus*, *nisi*

ever, does not prevent elaboration, as may be seen in several phrases in the list, especially in the dependence of various complementary infinitives on the verb *vis*, or the substitution of another verb entirely (*numquid aliud imperas*, *Eun.* 213), or in the casting of the whole question into conditional form with *nisi*.⁴ Although no orthographic change is apparent in the manuscripts, the expression may well have suffered in oral use by the loss of various sounds, as in English "D'ja do?" for "How do you do?". The necessity of preserving metrical rhythm in drama may have helped preserve the full sounds, however. But formulaic shortening is obvious where a reply is not even awaited (*Aul.* 579), or, if given, is cast in such a form as not to take cognizance of the question (*Cas.* 750).⁵

An entirely different use with altered emphasis may be seen in some examples in which the original force of the question can still be felt. Sometimes a person who is receiving a set of instructions will inquire, before departing, *numquid vis*? Under such circumstances it is a good deal more than merely a leave-taking formula. Slaves, since they would be responsible for carrying out orders, would naturally wish to have full instructions, and, though with proper deference they may indicate their desire to be on their way, the *numquid vis* has a more genuine ring (e. g., *Merc.* 282). In other cases the questioner may be really anxious for more information, such as a lovelorn *adulescens* yearning for help in winning his girl (e. g. *Bacch.* 757). Even though in these cases the reply may be a joke, the *numquid vis* retains some of its original force simply because it was employed in a situation (before the joke) in which information was desired. The fact that the author's purpose may have been primarily the introduction of the joke is of no importance in determining whether

quid me vis, nisi quid aliud vis, nisi quid me aliud vis. Terence: *nq vis*, 3; each of the following once: *nq nos vis, nq vis aliud, nq aliud me vis, nq me aliud, nq imperas, nq vis quin*, etc., *nq est quod mea opera opus vobis sit*.

⁴ English has as many variants of the same formula. The main difference between English and Latin is the low cost of retaining *me* in Latin, whereas in English it is more often omitted because it usually requires a preposition with it.

⁵ All line references are to the Oxford texts of W. M. Lindsay, 1903 (Plautus) and R. Kauer and W. M. Lindsay, 1926 (Terence).

the *numquid vis* was also a genuine question.⁶ Another type with qualities of reality is the sarcastic *numquid vis*, used under readily recognizable circumstances of mock seriousness. *Trin.* 198 is an amused inquiry from a character who has been twice, and for no apparent reason, called back from his intended departure which was indicated by another *numquid vis* six lines earlier. Conversely, in *Epid.* 512, when the *fidicina* has already done enough to upset Periphanes' composure by disclosing the trick of which he was the victim, her *numquid me vis ceterum* (with, we may be sure, a coyly malicious inflection on the *ceterum*) makes her meaning unmistakable.

Between these two extremes, the genuine question and the almost meaningless formula, lies the great mass of the Plautine examples (Terence's are more evenly divided). They sound natural enough, especially when one sees from other evidence in the dialogue that the speaker will leave shortly, yet the nature of the conversation does not permit the categorical statement that no more information is desired. They have qualities which belong to both groups, and as such are representative of the stage through which the expression must have passed on its way to becoming a formula (*Bacch.* 604, *Persa* 692). The presence of these degrees of formalism in the plays of Roman Comedy proves that this expression, like all formulae in spoken language, existed as a formula and as a real question, and in various intermediate stages, simultaneously. The growth of the formula has without doubt limited, but it has not eliminated, occasions for and employment of the original form from which it developed. All forms, from real question to formula, and all kinds of answers, from serious additions to instructions, brief jokes, or no answer at all, stand side by side in Roman Comedy.

With so many variant forms available the comic writers were guided in the choice probably as much by metrical considerations as anything else. This does not mean that any particular form is restricted to any one metrical scheme, for the simplest forms are found frequently in both iambs and trochaics, and such is the flexibility of comic verse that they can begin in either thesis or arsis of either foot.⁷ The futility of any hope of discovering

⁶ It will, however, be of great importance in a later phase of this investigation.

⁷ *Numquid vis* begins the iambic foot five times, the trochaic, eight;

a metrical principle guiding the choice of form can be quickly demonstrated.

By far the most common position is at the beginning of the line, but *numquid vis* begins also at the start of the 3rd and the 6th trochaic foot, the 5th iambic foot, and in the arsis of the 4th trochaic. *Numquid me vis* begins in the 1st and 4th trochaic, and in the arsis of the 3rd trochaic, and in the 2nd iambic thesis. *Numquid aliud* begins in the 1st, the 4th, and the 5th trochaic foot and in the 1st and 3rd iambic. *Numquid ceterum* begins twice in the 4th thesis of the senarius and once in a Glyconic canticum. The conditional forms beginning with *nisi* fall in six different positions. The longer and more elaborate forms, as well as the short forms which occur only once, exhibit a great variety of position.

Neither is there any consistency in the simple or resolved foot or in the position of similar syllables under the accent. Obvious trochaic patterns such as *númquid vís*, *númquid àliud vís*, are common, but *numquíd vis* is also used. The irregularity is well illustrated by *Cist.* 117: *númquid mè vis* beginning the line, but two lines later *nùmquid mé vis* appears, beginning in the thesis of the fourth foot. The great variety may be seen in the following table in which all parts of all types of form in all meters are broken down:

	Principal accent (')	Secondary (")		Principal accent	Secondary
<i>num</i>	P 16; T 2	P 9; T 2	<i>ceterum</i>	P 3	P 4
<i>quid</i>	P 11; T 4	P 1; T 1	<i>núnciam</i>	P 1	P 1
<i>me (nos)</i>	P 5; T 2	P 3	<i>quíppiam</i>	P 2	
<i>aliud</i>	P 1; T 2	P 11; T 2	<i>aliúd</i>		P 1
<i>vis</i>	P 9	P 6	<i>nisi</i>	P 2	P 1
<i>amplius</i>	P 1				

The real choice of form quite obviously lay in control not by any specific material but by a combination of factors affecting metrical convenience (e.g., *Phorm.* 151 where *numquíd aliud me vis* is impossible in iambic verse, but the insertion of *Geta* elided before *aliud* permits it^a) and the author's own wish to

numquid me vis, the iambic twice, the trochaic ten times; *numquid aliud*, the iambic six, the trochaic, eight.

^a Another easy change is the lengthening of *quid* by insertion of *me* after it, *Trin.* 458.

preserve a certain number of feet or syllables to be available for other words in the same line (e. g. *Cist.* 119 where *numquid me vis* could just as well have been *numquid vis*, but Plautus evidently wished to have two and a half feet remaining). There will be as many explanations as there are examples. Any determination of a principle of selection is impossible beyond the obvious, but practical, observation that the playwright chose a particular form because it suited the meter and it left space for what he wished to say before and after the formula.

Much more fruitful observations may be made on other aspects of the formula. Natural as it may sound in any context, it obtrudes sufficiently upon the consciousness of the reader to cause him to wonder why it was employed at all. Obviously it is never necessary; just as obviously in many cases it does not add anything to the general effect of the dialogue. The very best one can say for it is that it reflects common speech, and therefore imparts naturalness to the stage. But this does not explain why it appears in so obviously a controlled dialogue as that of drama, for, in the case of formulaic use with a negative answer, it is colorless; whereas when the question is emphasized and a real affirmative answer given, the passage does not gain any qualities that could not have been gained in the first place, without the use of the formula. Why then, do the comic writers use it at all?

When this question is once asked, there are three observations which immediately assume considerable importance in the quest for an answer. 1) Natural as it may be in the speech of all languages, the formula does not appear in the fragments of Greek New Comedy. Though it must be admitted that the formula is not the type of line that lends itself to citation by grammarians or other New Comedy testimonia, one might have expected to find it at least once in the longer fragments of Menander. 2) The answer, if not merely conventional, is set apart from whatever went before the question, and by this means achieves a certain emphasis which it could not have had, were it merely one more piece of information in a series of instructions or similar material. Undoubtedly some physical movement or gesture would accompany the question, suggesting the intended departure, and with that the audience would sense also a psychological shift which would draw its attention to the reply. The reply could thus be given a dramatic frame created by virtue of its being an unex-

pected affirmative statement where none at all was expected. Even the most inexperienced stage director could easily effect this setting, and would. 3) The majority of the examples from Plautus and Terence, when judged by the answers given, exhibit certain marked features which effectively preclude their dismissal as mere insignificant uses of an accepted formula. The study of these features and the setting given them will constitute the remainder of this investigation. Full analysis of all examples will be made first, and the features will be pointed out from which conclusions will be drawn later.

For the purposes of this analysis the examples will be divided according to classifications already suggested: first, formalistic uses; second, those which introduce distinct replies; the second group will include those which retain the force of the original question and produce genuine affirmative replies, and those which introduce jokes or other material.

The formal convention is employed seventeen times by Plautus, and four times by Terence, with no suggestion from the context of any complicating factor. In five of these no answer is even offered. *Aul.* 579 is probably the most stereotyped *numquid vis* in all Roman Comedy. Megaronides and Euclio have been carrying on an unimportant though amusing conversation; dramatic planning necessitates removing Megaronides from the scene. The exit is motivated by his desire to bathe and offer sacrifice, a natural enough reason since he was to be married that day. The departure is manipulated by the formula in this form: *ego, nisi quid me vis, eo lavatum ut sacrificem*, to which Euclio does not reply and his next words show Megaronides to have left the stage. *Trin.* 458 gives us a very formal and frigid example when Lesbonicus haughtily refuses Philto's offer of marriage without a dowry with: *nisi quid me aliud vis, Philto, respondi tibi*. Philto's reply is merely a renewal of his attempt to persuade him. Similarly Sannio's threat to leave at *Adel.* 247 is answered only by more pleas. Slightly different is *Pseud.* 370 where Ballio sarcastically remarks *numquid aliud etiam voltis dicere* after Calidorus and Pseudolus have been indulging in a long series of insults to him. They reply here with another fling. In *Cas.* 750 Olympio's *numquid est ceterum quod morae sit*, though not directly answered, receives implied confirmation by Lysidamus' timid remarks suggesting a reason for not going indoors. This example serves as a

transition to a larger group in which the conventional formula is followed by an equally conventional reply.

Of these there are sixteen, colorless, meaningless, and just as described by Donatus. No one would argue that there is either humor or any other dramatic value in situation, form of question, or form of reply. They are:

<i>Asin.</i>	108	answer: <i>ambula</i> ⁹
<i>Aul.</i>	175	<i>vale</i>
	263	<i>istuc i et vale</i>
<i>Capt.</i>	191	<i>venias temperi</i>
<i>Cist.</i>	119	<i>ut valeas</i>
<i>Curc.</i>	516	<i>bene vale</i>
	522	<i>vale atque salve</i>
<i>Merc.</i>	282	<i>tantumst</i>
	325	<i>vale</i>
<i>Pers.</i>	708	<i>vale</i>
<i>Poen.</i>	911	<i>valeas, beneque ut tibi sit</i>
<i>Rud.</i>	403	<i>eas</i>
<i>Truc.</i>	883	<i>fac valeas</i>
<i>Eun.</i>	341	<i>recte</i>
<i>Hec.</i>	272	<i>eo tecum una</i>
<i>Phorm.</i>	151	<i>ut bene sit tibi</i>

Here is formula *qua* formula, with no vestige of pun, joke, or anything other than pure convention. Not one is necessary to the development of the dialogue, neither does any contribute the least color to the conversation save the naturalness of reflecting real speech. Although this may be reason enough for writers to have used them, it is probable that in some examples at least the main purpose is rather the filling out of an unfinished line in the easiest and most convenient way. Of a total of eight examples in Plautus and Terence in which the formula, answer, and all occupy the last half of a last line of dialogue, four are in this list.¹⁰ That such a minor and purely mechanical function should appear in these conventional usages only increases their meaninglessness. Neither is it surprising that among the twenty-one examples so far discussed there should be a rather high

⁹ . . . nisi quid vis. fietne? *DE. ambula.* Lindsay, codd.

. . . nisi quid vis. *DE. ei. bene ambula.* Fleckeisen, Goetz-Schoell.

¹⁰ *Aul.* 175, 263, *Cist.* 119, *Merc.* 325. The other four (*Amph.* 542, *Mil.* 575, 1195, *Phorm.* 458) also have this purpose, though other factors are involved as well. The same purpose, extended to a line and a half, is less obviously held in *Asin.* 108 and *Hec.* 272.

proportion of very short forms,¹¹ probably because of the fact that less emphasis is to be given them than others we shall observe later.

The remaining thirty-two examples are provided with answers of various sorts other than conventional replies. The question may be slipped in quite naturally and thus perform the conventional function, but the replies contain material which has some definite dramatic value of its own. These values are of three types: 1) affirmative replies containing instructions supplementing others given before the formula; 2) a reply which distorts the conventional answer or in some similar way calls attention consciously to the fact of formulaic usage, thus destroying the formulaic neutrality;¹² 3) formulaic answers which lead to further continuation of the dialogue.

In the first group there are seven passages; they preserve the original force of the question and betray the origin of the formula.¹³ In each case the answer adds instructions of a perfectly serious and reasonable nature. They could have been given without the stimulus of the *numquid vis* question, but by this means vividness is gained for the natural curiosity of the questioner and emphasis is obtained for the reply. In four cases (*Capt.* 400, *Mil.* 185, *Most.* 404, *Poen.* 801) it is very important that the added material receive this emphasis, for it plays an important part in the plot, and by this means wins the audience's full attention.

In the second group are twenty-one passages¹⁴ in which the answers given contain instructions, but with such humorous

¹¹ Of 27 two- or three-word forms, 13 appear in these 21 examples: they constitute 49% of all examples, but 62% of this conventional type.

¹² Cf. above, note 2.

¹³ *Amph.* 970 sums up previous instructions; *Capt.* 400 further instructions for trip; *Mil.* 185 serious instructions; *Most.* 404 instructions to lock house; *Poen.* 801 orders to change costume after impersonation; *Eun.* 213 summary; *Phorm.* 563 summary and dismissal. The passage in the *Miles* has a humorous aspect which is not part of the play; it will be discussed later.

¹⁴ *Amph.* 542, 544; *Bacch.* 604, 757; *Capt.* 448; *Curc.* 525; *Epid.* 512; *Men.* 328, 548; *Mil.* 259, 575, 1085, 1195; *Pers.* 735; *Pseud.* 665; *Trin.* 192, 198; *Truc.* 432; *Adel.* 432; *Eun.* 191; *Phorm.* 458. The details of these replies will be found discussed fully below, pp. 294, 295, 299 f., 301.

twists that it is obvious that the question was asked, not for conventional or real purposes, but merely in order to motivate the witty reply. A typical example is *Bacch.* 757 in which the instructions given are unexpectedly pleasurable where work instead would be more normal. Further instructions of which the humor consists in comic exasperation appear in *Epid.* 512 and *Men.* 328. The exasperation may be in the question itself, as in *Trin.* 198. Others derive their humor from a negative reply, but one which nevertheless incorporates elements of humor (*Pers.* 735, *Pseud.* 665). In two special cases, *Amph.* 544 and *Capt.* 448, the replies seem to be conventional to some characters, but because of the special situation (impersonation) they have a different and deeper meaning to others and to the audience. All degrees of humor appear in this category; the one thing which they have in common is that the dramatic values of the formulaic question consist in the humorous answer elicited and in the very fact that the convention is satirized by being broken. There is a marked similarity between this technique and the humor of extra-dramatic allusions in which the joke is based upon the breaking of the dramatic illusion.¹⁵

In the third group, a small number of passages show the introduction of some humorous material, but in some other form than an answer. On *Cist.* 117 and *Poen.* 190, in fact, there is, technically, no answer at all, for the questioner continues speaking without awaiting a reply. This brings about a continuance of the dialogue, usually on another tack, and consequent abandonment of the intended departure until some later time desired by the author. In the *Cistellaria* the delay lasts only two lines, when another *numquid vis* formula is used; in the *Poenulus* the shift, being a gratuitous explanation as to why Agorastocles wishes to go, initiates an argument by Milphio to prevent his going, to which he yields after five lines. In *Pers.* 692 the answer is "What's your hurry," which in turn introduces a new subject prolonging the conversation until another formula terminates it at line 708. In *Eun.* 363 a somewhat similar answer, *quo nunc is?*, results in the discussion of a wholly new theme which occupies the attention of all on stage for nearly thirty lines.

¹⁵ Cf. Hough, "Miscellanea Plautina," *T. A. P. A.*, LXXI (1940), pp. 191-4.

The foregoing summary of the use of the *numquid vis* formula by Plautus and Terence may be tabulated thus:

	Formulaic Use		Original Force No humor in reply	Joke in reply	Other material	Totals
	No answer	Conventional answer				
Plautus	4	13	5	18	3	43
Terence	1	3	2	3	1	10
	<hr/> 21		<hr/> 7	<hr/> 25		<hr/> 53

There is not much difference between the two authors in their choice of technique. Both employ the conventional type about 40% of the time; Plautus lays a little more emphasis, as might be expected, on the jokes, nearly 50% to Terence's 40%; the original force appears 20% in Terence, and only 11% in Plautus. Such a slight variation, especially in view of Terence's small total number, is hardly significant, but in the discussion to follow a marked difference between the two authors will become apparent and the real nature of Plautus' purpose in employing this device will be clear.

The material contained in or introduced by these fifty-three passages, especially by the thirty-two non-conventional passages just discussed, is considerably more significant than the mere captions of the classification indicate. First, there will be found a liberal sprinkling of Roman references, puns possible only in Latin, which prove Roman authorship rather than Greek. The material may be a continuation or expansion of what went before the formula, but more often there is a harsh break in the train of thought; new material is thrown in for its own sake because it is the sort of thing the Roman audience liked, gathering a brief laugh before ending the scene or returning to the main subject. Secondly, where the material itself is less surely Roman, by virtue of the lack of any proof-giving phrase, a number of passages will leave a very definite impression of Roman origin, especially with those readers familiar with Plautus and with the general results of the investigations of Leo, Fraenkel, and Jachmann. Thirdly, some passages are so near the borderline of subjective decision that it would be hazardous to state even that they were probably Roman, yet most readers will have that impression from even the most casual glance. It will be safe to say that they quite possibly could be Plautine or Terentian addi-

tions. Fourthly, there are fourteen conventional formulae which obviously exist merely as formulae and nothing else; about these no further comment need be made.¹⁶ They will all be found in our previous conventional list, but by no means all the passages there listed will be thus simply dismissed. The reason for this apparent paradox may be readily seen by noting the technical aspects of this device.

By its very definition, it brings a conversation to a close, and therefore it may bring a Roman addition to a close just as effectively as a normal dialogue taken from the Greek original. In such cases the question appears quite natural, and indeed it is so, but it is nonetheless intimately associated with the techniques of insertion. As the end of an addition it is similar to the "enough of this" formula common in Plautus,¹⁷ and at the beginning it resembles the *sed quid ais, audin etiam*, or other attention getting devices which so frequently alter the course of the dialogue. In a few cases the *numquid vis* appears both at the beginning and at the end of the same section.

Insertions, or suspected insertions, may vary in length from a single phrase to a passage of considerable length. They may cause a single laugh or they may be intended to help a transition over a joint between two Greek originals, or other type of adaptation deriving from a Roman source. Such instances, having to do with the dramatic structure of the play, will appear only in the second and third groups, because their dependence upon various theories of contamination lends to them a degree of uncertainty.

A word of caution is necessary before discussing the individual passages. By no means is it to be understood that in all cases the entire passage after the *numquid vis* is necessarily Plautine. There may be Greek material therein, but it has been augmented by Plautine additions. The ending of the original scene may have been retained after the formula in addition to the Plautine material there inserted because it was a convenient

¹⁶ *Amph.* 970; *Aul.* 263, 579; *Merc.* 282, 325; *Most.* 404 (instructions but no humor); *Rud.* 403; *Trin.* 458; *Truc.* 883; *Adel.* 247 (threat); *Eun.* 341; *Hec.* 272; *Phorm.* 151, 563.

¹⁷ Used to end Plautine insertions, especially of joking nature; cf. *Asin.* 307, *Bacch.* 158, *Capt.* 125, *Epid.* 39, and Fraenkel, *Plautinisches im Plautus* (Berlin, 1922), p. 143.

spot. It relieves the author of having to invent a more logical connection between the original and his new material. Such opportunity suits well Plautine workmanship since his genius does not concern itself deeply with closely interwoven transitions. This device makes any such shift seem much more natural than it really is because the formula is itself conventional. In some cases the following passages are the same as those which I have previously discussed as delayed exits¹⁸ in which Plautine additions are common, for the *numquid vis* formula is one of the easiest methods of delaying a departure and providing opportunity for expansion.

GROUP I. *Plautine additions*.¹⁹ Probably the finest example is *Pers.* 692-709 because it illustrates both the Roman content and the use of the formula at both ends of the insertion. The *numquid vis* is answered by *quid tam properas*, which leads to an absolutely irrelevant but extremely humorous conversation about an imaginary twin brother who has nothing whatsoever to do with the play. The train of thought is broken completely; the material is indubitably Roman in the "contorted" name puns; the second formula returns us to the thread broken at 692. Read the *vale* of 709 after the *voltis* of 693 and there results a smooth ending uninterrupted by Roman horseplay. No student of Plautus could mistake so glaring an example of his workmanship both in content and technique.

At *Pseud.* 370 a conventional use appears at the conclusion of a twelve line name-calling *flagitio* which is certainly expanded, if not entirely written, by Plautus, and made thoroughly Italian with typical Plautine compounds (*bustirape*, *furcifer*, *socio-fraude*, *legirupa*).²⁰ This example shares with the next the

¹⁸ Cf. Hough, "Plautine Technique in Delayed Exits," *Class. Phil.*, XXXV (1940), pp. 39-48. The two classes are not identical because there are other uses for the delayed exits as well as for the *numquid vis* formulae. Of fifteen passages discussed in both articles, the eight following are handled for identical reasons: *Bacch.* 757, *Cist.* 117-119, *Curc.* 516-526, *Epid.* 512, *Persa* 692-709, *Poen.* 911, *Eun.* 213.

¹⁹ The basic material for the remainder of this paper was assembled and classified in an unpublished thesis by Dorothea G. Welling, Ohio State University, 1943.

²⁰ According to Usener, *Rh. M.*, LVI (1900), p. 24, it was not in the Greek original. Leo (*Plautinische Forschungen* [2nd ed., Berlin, 1912],

added dramatic effect of biting sarcasm. In *Epid.* 512 the *fidicina*, having completed the discomfiture of Periphanes by revealing how he has been deceived, coyly asks *numquid me vis ceterum?* The reply is an explosion: *malo cruciatu ut pereas atque abeas cito*, a curse doubly effective because given as an unexpected and affirmative answer. This in turn elicits her request for the return of her *fides*, to which he replies *neque fides neque tibus*, a pun possible only in Latin,²¹ based upon his loss of faith both in her whom he believes to be Acropolistis and in Acropolistis whom he believes to be his daughter.²² The formula at *Bacch.* 604 produces a mild answer, but the questioner retorts with *vale, dentifrangibule*, an indisputably Plautine contribution. The formula, however, is also the conclusion to a longer Plautine section, introduced by *quid ais* in 601, containing vulgar jokes certainly his. Another Roman extension will be found ended by a *numquid vis* in *Capt.* 183-191, marked by a series of Latin puns. The formula at *Poen.* 911 introduces a number of minor dramatic devices, otherwise unmotivated, cast in alliterative form, the cumulative effect of which leaves no doubt of their Roman origin.²³ The cryptic and irrelevant answer given to the formula in *Mil.* 185 paves the way for a set of instructions, which are wholly unnecessary and could not possibly be carried with any accuracy to Philocomasium. They are an extremely clever description of feminine deception, sprinkled with alliteration, anaphora, and Plautine *hapax legomena*, the most casual glance at which shows that they stand in the text for their own value, not as part of the plot, and are undoubtedly from Plautus' hand.

p. 104) and Fraenkel (*Plaut. in Plaut.*, p. 401, anh. 3) see a reflection of Old Comedy (*Clouds* 909, 1328). Fraenkel admits the possibility that Plautus expanded at greater length than the original.

²¹ The fact that *fides*, faith, would normally be in the singular form does not destroy the pun.

²² It is not accidental that in *Epid.* 512 and *Pseud.* 370, where the sarcasm is so strong (ironic in one case, malicious in the other), the fuller form with *aliud* and *ceterum* is used. Under similar circumstances we, too, would emphasize the "else."

²³ "Two proverbs for neither of which is a Greek counterpart known (cf. Otto, *Spichwörter der Römer* [Leipzig, 1890], p. 65), a sarcastic joke, comment on the delay itself (cf. *Ps.* 1230), and alliteration throughout" (Hough, *Class. Phil.*, XXXV [1940], p. 46, n. 33).

GROUP II. *Probably Roman.* The reader familiar with Plautine studies will be sorely tempted to include in the previous group eight other passages, whose form and content so strongly suggest Roman authorship that only the accident that they contain no specifically Roman reference necessitates handling them separately.

At *Amph.* 542, Jupiter (as *Amphitryo*) leaves *Alcmena*, who resents his departure so soon after his return from war. His *numquid vis* seems natural enough, but her answer, *ut quom absim me ames, me tuam te absente tamen*, has all the earmarks of a Roman alliterative popular saying. The impression of purposeful Plautine interference is strengthened by a second formula two lines later, again conventional, but answered by *etiam ut acututum advenias*. This reply may be stereotyped enough ("Come back soon") but the *etiam* so emphasizes it as an affirmative that it seems almost like a joke. Furthermore, it enables Jupiter to reply *licet, prius tua opinione hic adero*, which, because of the impersonation, has quite a different meaning to the audience from that which it has to *Alcmena*. The entire complex of the two formulae, clever replies, alliterative proverbial saying, and double meaning, renders Plautine authorship extremely likely.

Bacch. 757 is followed by a real answer with instructions, but they are given special emphasis by this position, and for good reason, for they are quite unexpected. The young men hardly expect that their part in the trick to win the girls will be merely to go in and dine with them to their hearts' content. The unexpected answer elicits further remarks which contain strong Roman flavor: *O imperatorem probum*, alliteration, official pomposity of line 760, comic haste in *fugimus*.²⁴

To the *numquid vis* in *Men.* 328 *Sosicles* replies: "Yes, you can go to the devil." The unexpected turn of the retort to this common Plautine expression is the purpose for which the question was asked; *ire hercle meliust te interim atque*, which seems to lead toward simple repetition of *i in malam crucem*, but suddenly shifts to—*accumbere*. The reference to fire as *Volcani violentiam* has also a very Roman sound.²⁵

²⁴ Fritzsche for the unmetrical *fugiamus*. The comic present is used as in *Men.* 225 and *Bacch.* 1052.

²⁵ Cf. *Lucilius*, *apud Nonium*, p. 528, 10. It sounds like a parody on tragic style.

Cas. 750, apparently an extremely natural use without even a direct reply, is really employed in order to introduce some of the most typical horseplay to be found in comedy. The knowledge that *Casina* has a sword with which to butcher them leads Olympio and Lysidamus each to try, verbally and no doubt physically, to shove the other in first. Lysidamus' last reply, *si tu iubēs, em ibitur tecum*, has an unexpected twist in the last word similar to that just cited from the *Menaechmi*.

The five remaining formulae in this group are connected with the dramatic structure of the plays. The delayed exit at *Asin.* 108-118 and the link monologue 118-126 following the *numquid vis* at 108 were all probably devised by Plautus to get rid of Libanus who, I think, in the Greek original did not depart to the forum but remained on stage to take part in a following scene, which Plautus omitted. The full argument I have presented elsewhere;²⁶ suffice it to point out here that the *numquid vis* formula, though conventionally answered, in coöperation with the *atque audin etiam?* is here employed to cover up the change in exits which has resulted in an extremely awkward and unique situation in which two persons, going to the same destination, for no reason leave eight lines apart.

Capt. 400-448, framed by two formulae, is a wholly unnecessary explanation and rehash of instructions given "Philocrates" by "Tyndarus" for his trip home. It consists mainly of pious chatter emphasizing the friendship and loyalty of master and slave, pointing the unusual nature of this strange play. Though no specific evidence of its Plautine origin is apparent, it is wholly irrelevant to the plot to escape and serves no purpose other than to impress Hegio with the honor and honesty of his captives, a function already amply performed by the previous one hundred and fifty lines of this scene (251-400). The second formula at 448 not only ends this extremely probable insertion,²⁷

²⁶ "The Structure of the *Asinaria*," *A. J. P.*, LVIII (1937), pp. 19-37, especially pp. 23-24. Actually this whole scene complex follows an *atque audin etiam?* after the *numquid vis* has been conventionally answered. But the use of the *numquid vis* seems to point the place for the insertion of the other formula to begin the machinery of transition.

²⁷ This insertion is the longest of many sections which I believe Plautus threw into the *Captivi*, but it is not in any way connected with the main structural problems centering around the Ergasilus motif

but introduces a double entendre previously discussed and quite probably Plautine.

Two passages in the *Poenulus* are intimately bound up with the intricate construction of this puzzling play. At *Poen.* 190 Milphio has suggested a scheme for outwitting the pimp; Agorastocles agrees, but implies he is too busy at the moment. Saying *nisi quid vis*, he prepares to leave for the temple of Venus. Milphio insists, however, that they go into the house instead and instruct Collybiscus in his part in the trick. But only Agorastocles goes in, and he is almost immediately called out when Milphio spies the girls. The *nisi quid vis* seems to be used here to enable Agorastocles to change his destination without loss of motivation, for he must be near by when the girls come on stage at line 210. In 445 we learn that while inside Agorastocles did give Collybiscus the money he was to need in the trick, but this could just as well have been done at line 409, after the scene with the girls. According to Leo's theory of the structure of the *Poenulus*,²⁸ the exposition of two plays is being joined at 190-210, and if this is true the *numquid vis* formula was certainly utilized as a convenient tool of adaptation.

Less elaborate, but equally involved with the construction of the play, is *Poen.* 801. Collybiscus, after completing his part of the deception, asks to go,—*numquid vis*. He is briefly told to leave and change his clothes, but his rejoinder is *dum lenonis familia Dormitat, extis sum satur factus probe*. According to Leo's theory this mention of *exta*, instead of *vasa*, was a Plautine joke carefully prepared for.²⁹

These two groups, Roman, and probably Roman, comprise fifteen Plautine passages and eighteen *numquid vis* formulae. They illustrate very vividly his use of this device both in the expansion and the adapting of the Greek plays for the Roman audience.

which I believe to be from a source other than that of the *Captivi* proper. Cf. "The Structure of the *Captivi*," *A. J. P.*, LXIII (1942), pp. 26-37, especially note 32.

²⁸ *Plaut. Forsch.*², pp. 177-8.

²⁹ *Plaut. Forsch.*², pp. 170-5. Cf. also Fraenkel, *Plaut. im Plaut.*, pp. 239 and 262, and Hough, *Class. Phil.*, XXXV (1940), p. 43. In the original only *vasa* was used in reference to the sacrifice (456, 491, 617, 847, 863); Plautus changed *vasa* to *exta* in certain lines (456, 491, 617) preceding this passage, preparing the way for this joke.

GROUP III. *Possibly Roman.* In this remaining group there are seventeen passages and twenty-one formulae, sixteen in Plautus and five in Terence. The material and the tone are similar to the preceding, but they cannot be as strongly suggested as Roman. They can be described briefly; the jokes, witty retorts, pithy remarks speak for themselves. Each reader of Plautus or Terence must himself make the subjective decision as to their ultimate source, especially in the light of the passages heretofore discussed. In any case, they are neatly set off and cleverly emphasized by the use of the formula. This is true both of the short passages and the longer sections which, as before, will be possibly associated with contaminated or adapted dramatic structure.

Aul. 175. The question and answer are quite conventional. The situation is, however, one in which it is at least worth suggesting the possibility of Plautine curtailment. Megadorus, having rejected his sister's suggestion that he should get married to some suitable girl, feels sure that she will object when he reveals that the real object of his desire is the poor girl, Phaedria. He cuts off all argument with the statement that his mind is made up and there is no use in making a fuss. Eunomia resignedly wishes him good luck and leaves with the formulaic device. It is barely possible that Plautus has here cut short a longer discussion of the suitability of Phaedria; the situation is one which is in considerable danger of becoming serious and earnest, something that Plautus, unlike Terence, does not like.

Cist. 117-119. Gymnasium asks *numquid me vis*, but immediately continues with *ecastor mihi Visa amare*, referring to Selenium. Syra's drunken reply, *istoc ergo auris graviter obtundo tuas, Ne quem ames*, has at the end a quick twist reminiscent of *Men.* 328 and *Cas.* 750 discussed above. This clever quip is then framed by the second formula and line-filling conventional reply.

Curc. 516-525. This is an unusual passage in which the formula is used three times. Curculio, about to leave at 516, says *numquid vis?* to Lyco, receives a conventional answer but is called back by Cappadox who makes some irrelevant remarks the purpose of which is to create a joke on him (518-9), to which he curses: *malum*; on this word Curculio makes a Latin pun which confounds the pimp further. Now Lyco uses the

formula, this time to Curculio, is politely answered and thanked, repeats it to Cappadox who humorously reminds him of the payment due. Lyco then departs, Curculio having also gone, with Planesium, at some point between 523 and 525. The entire complex is very unusual; this is the only place in Plautus in which the formula is used twice by different characters in a three-way conversation. The tone of the whole, as well as the joke on *malum*, would almost justify placing this passage in Group II.

Men. 548, maid to Sosicles after giving him the bracelet. Sosicles replies with a natural enough assurance *haec me curaturum dicito*, to be relayed to Erotium, but adds an *ut*-clause inaudible to the maid, which because of its grammatical connection with the *curaturum*, takes an unexpected and humorous turn: *ut quantum possint quique liceant veneant*.

Mil. 259. The answer, *intro ut abeas*. *Abeo* is a joke only in that it is an unexpected reply where none is needed. The formula concludes a long passage (185-259) in which the twin sister trick is devised after emergency instructions had been given for the present situation in 182-4. These instructions, however, prolonged by the *numquid vis* of 185 (see above in Group I) were never carried out because Periplectomenus, struck by Palaestrio's histrionic thinking of 195-230, employed still another delaying formula, *sed quid est?* (195), and remained on stage to interpret Palaestrio's gesticulations. Though the material of 230-259 is obviously necessary to the Greek original, it is given a Roman flavor by the Plautine introduction in 185-195, by the extensive infusion of Roman material in 200-230, and by the use of the double delaying formulae, 185 and 195. The *numquid aliud* at 259 now returns us to the main action.³⁰

Mil. 575. Reply: *ne me noveris*.

Mil. 1085. Milphidippa receives from the vain soldier this answer: *ne magis sim pulcher quam sum, Ita me mea forma habet sollicitum*. The last two examples speak for themselves.

Mil. 1195. Reply: *haec ut memineris*. Unexpected affirmative.

³⁰ In this connection it is immaterial whether it be the one Greek original (so Fraenkel, Baehrens, Krysiniel, Duckworth, Haywood) or the first of two Greek originals (so Leo, Jachmann). For discussion and bibliography, see G. E. Duckworth, *Class. Phil.*, XXX (1935), pp. 228-46 and R. M. Haywood, *A. J. P.*, LXV (1944), pp. 382-96.

Pers. 735. Reply: *ut bene sit tibi*. Conventional, but made basis of joke in next line.

Pseud. 665. Harpax has decided to go off and take a nap until he can find Ballio. To his formula Pseudolus (posing as Ballio's servant) replies: *dormitum abeas*, which is understood both by the audience and Pseudolus to refer to the prospective swindling of Harpax while he sleeps.

Trin. 192-198. The answer to the first formula (192), *cures tuam fidem*, may be quite conventional; possibly it has some of the humorous qualities of the unexpected affirmative. In any case, Callicles is then twice recalled before his final and slightly exasperated, *numquid vis* (198). The entire passage is planned to derive its humor mainly from the repeated delays. The information which Megaronides extracts from Callicles in the interim (that the annex to the house is unsold and that Charmides' daughter is staying with Callicles), though not essential to the understanding of the plot, is a comforting assurance to questions that would certainly occur to any thoughtful spectator. These details are conveniently disposed of by the formulaic device.

Truc. 432. The reply, *ut quando otium tibi sit ad me revisas et valeas*, from the girl whom Diniarchus so desperately wants, yet who is playing him off against two other men, is tantalizingly emphasized to the young lover by being thus casually given instead of a conventional reply.

Adel. 432. Reply: *mentem vobis meliorem dari*. Unexpected and angry affirmative.

Eun. 191. Reply: *egone quid velim?* Then follow five lines of hopeless instructions to love him while she is in the arms of another man. This is as pathetic as the *Truc.* 432 is tantalizing.

Eun. 213. One question in a long series of humorous questions and answers, parodying a simple dismissal; the humor depends upon the mock haste and repeated delays. The answer to the formula is an order given off-stage, now repeated for the benefit of the audience, though of no particular importance.

Eun. 363. The entire basis of the play, the impersonation of the eunuch, is introduced in a chance remark motivated by the *numquid me aliud* formula. Terence's skill in thus employing this casual device for the introduction of important material is faintly reflected in *Mil.* 185-259 discussed above.

Phorm. 458. *Fecistis probe* is a very sarcastic reply, since Demipho's friends have actually been of no help whatsoever.

The examples in this third group show the formula employed mainly in order to introduce an unexpected affirmative answer, deriving its humor partly from the nature of the answer and partly from the fact that such answers make a joke out of the formula itself. Some examples are quite strongly Roman in their flavor, especially the clever retort (*Cist.* 119, *Men.* 548) and the jokes (*Curc.* 519, *Mil.* 1085). Others give scarcely any other reason to suspect Roman authorship (especially the Terentian examples in the *Eunuchus*, and Plautus, *Mil.* 1195, *Pers.* 735). Only two passages in Terence suggest the familiar Plautine pattern, the annoyed retort in *Adel.* 432 and the sarcastic reply in *Phormio* 458. All the examples, however, share the dramatic emphasis which their position gives them.

In summary: *Numquid vis* is by no means merely a conventional leave-taking formula in Roman Comedy. It always performs this function, or attempts to, but of fifty-three examples only fourteen (nine in Plautus and five in Terence) are limited to this function alone. In all other cases it either 1) introduces humorous, pithy, clever, or striking replies, 2) introduces an answer which makes the formula itself humorous, or 3) affects the dramatic structure of the play in such a way as to suggest that it was inserted to smooth over a transition between changes in the original or originals.

Some passages perform more than one of these functions simultaneously. Seven of them are clearly Plautine; eight more look very suspiciously so; the remainder may well be. In all cases, but especially where the train of thought is harshly broken, the purpose of the formula is obvious. It lends itself to the continuation of a dying conversation or to the sudden shift of subject without necessitating the slightest motivation, yet at the same time it makes the change more natural than it could be without the use of the formula. It would be accompanied by gesture or movement suggestive of departure so that an effective psychological separation is obtained which would emphasize the passage for the audience. This is particularly true in those cases in which the course of the plot, by extended Plautine expansion or contamination, is involved. In many instances the formula

plays a part similar to that played by the delayed exit technique; in a few cases both formulaic and delayed techniques are employed in the same passage. In a few others, both conventional and humorous, the main purpose seems to be merely the easy filling out of an unfinished line.

These various functions give us a vivid glimpse into the workshop of the playwright. Whether this playwright was Greek or Roman, Plautus or Terence, may in some cases be impossible to determine, but the evidence submitted in this paper clearly points to Plautus as the man who developed the formula as a humorous device. The familiar triangular pattern of New Comedy, Plautus, and Terence shows itself again in this study. Not existing in New Comedy, and appearing in Terence in purely conventional form five times out of ten, three other times with straightforward humorous answer, and only twice with anything approaching the Plautine joke form, its use in Plautus' hands is quite different. Eight examples are involved in passages certainly original with him; ten others in passages almost surely his; sixteen others exist for the sake of their jokes or their part in the dramatic planning; only nine are purely conventional. Terence's technique follows more closely on that of New Comedy, as it usually does, eschewing verbal humor and horseplay; Plautus has developed an otherwise colorless device so that it contributes positively to the humor of his plays, and in many cases simultaneously acts as a convenient tool in the process of adaptation from the Greek.

JOHN N. HOUGH.

OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY.

A DEFINITIVE NOTE ON THE ENTHYMEME.

The modern logician distinguishes the enthymeme from the syllogism on the basis of form; the enthymeme is defined as a syllogism with one (or more) premises missing.¹ The modern rhetorician distinguishes the enthymeme from the syllogism on the basis of the nature of their matter; the enthymeme belongs to the dialectic syllogism, whereas the syllogism belongs to the province of apodeixis.²

It would be unfair to assume that either is inquiring into the interpretative problem. They are not defining an Aristotelian enthymeme; they are giving a definition to fit their own logical or rhetorical schemes. The logician is impatient with the dichotomy of certainty and probability as conceived in any syllogistic system, let alone two distinct systems of syllogisms; the rhetorician is eager to find a logical unit which will fit into his patterns of controversy and debate with especial relevancy. Thus, they have reached different conclusions.

McBurney, who searched for Aristotle's signification of the term, has taken a middle ground between these two views, with a slight leaning toward the rhetorical; he recognizes Aristotle's enthymeme "with one or more of its propositions suppressed," but "it seems equally clear that there is no justification in interpreting him to mean that this is a necessary characteristic of the enthymeme. A syllogism drawn from probable causes and signs is an enthymeme without regard to the omission of a proposition."³

When we think of the premises of the enthymeme as probable causes (*εἰκότα*) and signs (*σημεῖα*), we must not forget that Aristotle's classification is a fourfold one: probabilities, infal-

¹ L. S. Stebbing, *A Modern Introduction to Logic*, p. 83; this theory is immediately derived from J. S. Mill and other logicians of the nineteenth century.

² R. C. Jebb, *Attic Orators*, II, pp. 289-90; this theory originates in writers such as DeQuincey and other rhetoricians of the early nineteenth century.

³ J. H. McBurney, *The Place of the Enthymeme in Rhetorical Theory* (*Speech Monographs*, III, p. 67). He finds his prototype in Sir William Hamilton.

lible and fallible signs, and example. Let us in no way undervalue McBurney's excellent contribution in identifying Aristotle's causes and signs as *ratio essendi* and *ratio cognoscendi* respectively, although the theory of the enthymeme as a syllogism dealing only with probabilities is somewhat difficult to accept. The inclusion of the infallible sign proves that the enthymeme does sometimes start from sure premises and does have formal validity.

This would seem to indicate that even the enthymeme partakes of the apodeictic syllogism. Such a belief does not imply that Aristotle's notions are inconsistent; the underlying propositions in rhetoric (the more frequently used premises) are probable (causes and signs of the second and third figures); whereas some less frequently used premises, which can be regarded as very rarely employed to prove the major proposition in question, are certain (signs of the first figure).

The enthymeme is therefore a term which is used only in the realm of rhetoric but which finds its patterns of operation in the apodeictic as well as in the dialectic syllogism; a sham enthymeme is a fallacy found in the rhetorical process, therefore, and as we have just learned it may be an error due to invalidity in inference as well as to mere probability in the premises.

But Aristotle's discussion of these fallacies appears in a context of "topoi." The relationship of the enthymeme to the "topoi" in the *Rhetoric* is, at the moment, a subject of bitter controversy.⁴ McBurney's topical explanation of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* commands attention. Except for II, 19 this theory holds beautifully. The discussion in II, 19 pertains to four kinds of topics: the possible, past fact, future fact, and size or

⁴ F. Solmsen ("The Aristotelian Tradition in Ancient Rhetoric," *A.J.P.*, LXII [1941], pp. 39-42), opposes the ingenious topical reorganization of the *Rhetoric* which McBurney had prepared. The source of the controversy is the fact that Solmsen perceives in the topoi a remnant of the earlier logic: whereas McBurney envisages the topoi as part of the whole Aristotelian Rhetoric and as sensible parts of the enthymeme, Solmsen deems the enthymeme, when considered as a syllogism drawn from probable causes and signs, to be a later development of Aristotelian logic. This controversy bears historical implications as well as implications on the unity, authenticity, worth, temporal order, and comprehension of Aristotle's works and his signification of the term, "enthymeme."

degree. Although they can be readily correlated respectively with the epideictic, forensic, deliberative, and the three branches of oratory taken collectively, they are not material topics; they are formal, in that they present "lines of argument." Even, if we admit this exception, the systematization remains essentially the same. For these four "lines of argument" precede the discussion of special formal topoi and can therefore be considered as general formal topoi and can also provide a natural transition from the special material topoi to the special formal topoi. We can then agree with McBurney that the enumeration of the twenty-eight valid and nine sham enthymemes was intended by Aristotle to be "correlated, roughly at least, with the causes, signs and examples which he discusses in another connection,"⁵ and add that they ought also to be correlated with the four general formal topoi of II, 19.

The theory of Solmsen with respect to the dualism of the enthymeme idea and his criticism of attempts to press systems within Aristotle still confront us.⁶ A study of the nine sham enthymemes will aid us in refuting this theory of change and growth in the *Rhetoric*. These fallacies appear in an order and illustration similar to the thirteen fallacies in the "sophistical confutations" moving from diction to non-diction fallacies in a highly corresponding fashion. This remarkable similarity would seem to indicate one authorship and one period of authorship. Unless, then, we are to disregard the many observable bonds and links which unify the *Rhetoric*, and unless we are to regard the material on fallacies both in the *Rhetoric* and in the *Organon* to be a reflection of Aristotle's earlier logic and the remainder of the discussion of the enthymeme in the *Rhetoric* and the discussion of the syllogism in the *Organon* to be representative of his later logic, we must infer that both his statements of fallacies are typical of his final contributions to the two fields of study.

An investigation into the temporal order of the writings helps in the confirmation of this view.

It seems to be the prevailing opinion that, "after finishing his 'Later Analytics,' Aristotle seems to have taken up *Rhetoric*,

⁵ McBurney, *op. cit.*, p. 61.

⁶ Solmsen, *Die Entwicklung der Aristotelischen Logik und Rhetorik*, p. 17.

and to have written the main parts of his treatise on that subject. He then reverted to Dialectic, and completed his exposition of it by writing his book on 'Sophistical Confutations,' which now stands as the conclusion of the 'Organon.'"⁷

Yet from the number and the kinds of citation in the *Rhetoric*, it would appear that it was written after the *Topics*.⁸ This belief is not inconsistent with the theory that the *Sophistic Elenchi* portion of the *Organon* was completed after the *Rhetoric*. No mention at all is found in the *Rhetoric* of either *Topics*, IX or the *Sophistic Elenchi*.

Since the *Sophistic Elenchi* is a later writing, the nine sham enthymematic topoi, which were found to correspond so closely to the accounts of fallacies in the *Sophistic Elenchi*, do not appear to be representative of some earlier Aristotelian idea of the enthymeme.

There is still the possibility that the twenty-eight valid enthymemes can be differentiated in idea-development and time-order from the nine sham enthymemes. I am not inclined, however, to accept this view. Aristotle's discussion of the valid enthymemes, in including two references to the *Topics* and one to *Rhetoric*, II, 19, indicates that it too is of a later development.⁹

The Aristotelian idea of the enthymeme, therefore, retains consistency with its four main classes of probabilities, infallible and fallible signs, and example. Both the twenty-eight valid enthymematic topoi and the nine sham enthymematic topoi represent practical illustrations of these classes.

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY.

SOLOMON SIMONSON.

⁷ A. Grant, *Aristotle*, p. 73; for further discussion of the order of the writings, see R. C. Jebb, *Greek Literature*, pp. 131-2; J. E. Sandys, Introduction to Jebb's Edition, *The Rhetoric of Aristotle*, pp. xix-xx; R. Shute, *On the history of the process by which the Aristotelian writings arrived at their present form*, pp. 60, 67, 176-8; E. Wallace, *Psychology of Aristotle*, pp. xx-xxi.

A different view is expressed by Ross: "Four references to the *Analytics* occur in the *Topics* and the *Sophistic Elenchi*. But four references the other way also occur, and the *Analytics* are obviously more mature than the *Topics*" (W. D. Ross, *Aristotle*, p. 18, n. 9). But this opinion does not contradict the probability that the *Sophistic Elenchi* appeared after the *Analytics*.

⁸ Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, I, 1, 1355a; I, 2, 1356b, 1358a; II, 22, 1396b; II, 23, 1398a, 1399a; II, 25, 1402a; II, 26, 1403a.

⁹ *Ibid.*, II, 23, 1398a, 1399a.

TWO LATIN INSCRIPTIONS AT INDIANA UNIVERSITY.

There are in the possession of the Department of Latin and Greek at Indiana University three Latin inscriptions, two of which are unpublished. The third is *C. I. L.*, VI, 38630, which was purchased by Dr. S. E. Stout from the late Dr. Ralph Magoffin, who exhibited it for a time in the museum at the Johns Hopkins University.

I.

Prof. Lillian G. Berry acquired from a dealer in Rome an inscription measuring 0.485 m. in width, 0.352 m. in height, and 0.058 m. in thickness, with the following legend:

D M
A · FABIVS
 ONESIMVS
FECIT · SIBI · ET · SVIS
LIBERTIS · LIBERTABVSQ
POSTERISQVE · EORVM

The sides and back of the stone are not dressed, and the sides are beveled inwards. These facts point to the conclusion that the inscription was designed for a columbarium. The provenience is unknown. On the basis of letter forms a date early in the third century seems most probable.¹

An interesting feature of the inscription is the moulding which surrounds the legend. Around the stone there is a smooth flat margin averaging about 0.025 m. in width. Inside this outer border is a moulding apparently designed to be of uniform width but which varies from 0.015 m. to 0.019 m., probably because of the hardness of the medium in which the stone cutter was working or else because of his lack of skill. The moulding itself is an imitation of a wooden frame since there are lines in

¹ The M, I, V, S, E are similar to those letters in Hübner (*Exempla Scripturae Epigraphicae Latinae* [Berlin, 1885]), no. 527 (196 A. D.); T, C, R, Q, O, to those letters in no. 535 (*puto aetatis esse Severi et Caracallae*); P, C, O, to those letters in no. 546 (196 A. D.); B, R, P, O, A, to those letters in no. 554 (206 A. D.).

all four corners imitating a mitre joint. I have not discovered a name for this particular type of moulding, which is possibly a variation of what the *Encyclopedia Britannica* (s.v. "Moulding") calls a quirked ogee.² The moulding is badly rubbed down in some places. The surface on which the letters are incised is from 0.002 to 0.003 m. lower than the outside margin.

The letters, handsomely cut throughout the inscription, form a beautiful example of the stone cutter's art. In certain portions of the stone there are traces of guide lines. The spacing of the letters in some of the lines, however, is poor, particularly in the next to the last line where the tail of the Q is cut into the moulding and the last two letters of -QUE are omitted for lack of space.

Fabius Onesimus as a combination of nomen and cognomen occurs not uncommonly, but there is only one other example of that combination with Aulus as the praenomen. That is *C. I. L.*, XI, 176 (provenience, Ravenna; not dated):

D M
A · FABIVS · ONESIMVS
V · F · SIBI · ET
MARCIÆ · NYMPHÆ
CON · OPT

The fact that this combination of names is extremely rare may point to some connection between the two persons named A. Fabius Onesimus.

II.

Prof. Berry obtained a second inscription measuring 0.21 m. in width, 0.263 m. in height, and 0.035 m. in thickness. It reads:

D · M · S
M · IULIO
M · F · SECUNDO
MIL · COH · VI · VIG
H · B · M · F

²I do not find a parallel in L. Shoe, *Profiles of Greek Mouldings* (Cambridge, 1936). Prof. Otto Brendel informs me that he would call this type of moulding *ein profilierter Rahmen*. I am also indebted to Prof. V. B. Schuman for several suggestions.

The central portion of the top margin is rounded off in a semi-circular manner, leaving two small lobular ears protruding, one on either side. In the center of this abortive semi-circle is a single wreath, the very top of which is broken off. From the bottom of the wreath an undulating tendril branches off in either direction to terminate in an inverted heart-shaped leaf which fills the space of the ear. The legend is enclosed by a single groove which serves as a frame. There is distinctly visible a set of guide lines for each row of letters. That the height of the stone was originally greater is evident from the angular fracture at the bottom which, to judge from the fresh appearance of the marble, occurred in recent times. The fact that the back of the stone shows but moderate signs of weathering would suggest that it had been placed against a protective surface. The top of the stone is beveled inwards, and there are possibly remnants of plaster or lime adhering to the sides and top. These considerations make it probable that the stone was originally placed in a columbarium. Because of the reference to the sixth *cohors vigilum* we may assume that the inscription is from Rome or the vicinity. The letter forms have certain characteristics similar to those found on inscriptions of the first half of the third century.³

There is nothing distinctive about the name M. Julius Secundus; it is rather his branch of military service which attracts one's attention. The *cohortes vigilum* were established by Augustus as an organization to police Rome and to serve as firemen.⁴ There were seven such cohorts, each one serving two of the fourteen districts into which the city was divided. Archaeological investigations and the discovery of inscriptions *in situ* have revealed the sites of several of the *stationes* or headquarters of the cohorts, but not that of the sixth,⁵ which was in the eighth district according to the *Notitia*, the early regionary catalogue.

³ B, O, E, F, G, C, L, V are similar to those letters in Hübner, no. 483 (*post* 206 A. D.); E, C, G, to those letters in no. 494 (*aetate Severiana*); G, to that in no. 574 (213 or 222 A. D.); M, to that in no. 465 (203 A. D.), no. 468 (212/13 A. D.), and no. 561 (260 A. D.).

⁴ Mommsen, *Staatsrecht* (3rd ed., Leipzig, 1887), II, pp. 1054-8.

⁵ Platner and Ashby, *Topographical Dictionary of Ancient Rome* (Oxford, 1929), s. v. *Cohortium vigilum stationes*. There are references to all seven cohorts in the inscriptions.

Almost two hundred inscriptions have been found, many in the excavated *stationes*, which pertain to or were presumably written by soldiers of the *cohortes vigilum*.⁶ Several *latercula cohortium vigilum* have been preserved, and *C. I. L.*, VI, 1058 (4, 120) lists one M. Julius Secundus as a soldier in the century of Verinus in the fifth cohort. This inscription was dedicated in July, 210 A. D. Was the M. Julius Secundus therein listed the same individual whose tombstone we have? An examination of *C. I. L.*, VI, 1057 and 1058 together with a consideration of Mommsen's commentary will show that men occasionally shifted from one century to another and probably from one cohort to another. If the dating of our inscription in the first half of the third century of our era on the basis of letter forms is acceptable, we may have the tombstone of M. Julius Secundus of *C. I. L.*, VI, 1058 or possibly of someone else in his family.

DONALD W. PRAKKEN.

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY.

BRIEF NOTES ON "THE VERNACULAR PROVERB IN MEDIAEVAL LATIN PROSE."

An occasional source or parallel to a very few of the proverbs listed in the valuable collection by the late lamented Arpad Steiner, published in *A. J. P.*, LXV (1944), pp. 49-68, may not be out of place, especially when he has not called attention to them. The numbers given here are those in Steiner's list.

8. *Beatius est dare quam accipere*. This simple and only slightly garbled quotation from Acts 20, 35: *meminisse verbi Domini Iesu, quoniam ipse dixit: Beatius est magis dare, quam accipere*, I should hesitate to call a proverb at all, with no more introduction than the words *Prout dicitur*; otherwise, where should one stop in listing citations from the Bible? And if mere *dicitur*, or some such expression, be regarded as always sufficient to indicate a proverb, then I should like to see recorded somewhere the fine word of the Venerable Hildebert of Le Mans (*Serm.* 22, in *Patr. Lat.*, CLXXI, col. 442 B): *Diffidens dicitur peccare in Spiritum Sanctum*.

* The bulk of these is in *C. I. L.*, VI, X, and XIV. See indices *s. v.* *Res Militares*.

13. *Bona interiora, sicut sunt virtutes vel gratia, non possunt auferri, ut vulgo dicitur, nec vento, nec gelu.* It seems not unlikely that there survives here some remote echo of the material in the fable of Boreas and Phoebus (Avianus, 4 and elsewhere), in which Boreas with wind and cold (*impulsus ventis circumtonat aether et gelidus nimias depluit imber aquas*, lines 7-8) attempts to remove the cloak of the traveler, who eventually lays it aside voluntarily before the pleasant warmth of *placidus* . . . *Phoebus* (line 1). The conjunction *nec* is probably here no more than alternative, as in, "neither hide nor hair"; "neither chick nor child"; "neither sick nor sorry" (in the sense of *sore*); *nec caput nec pedes* (Cicero, *Fam.*, VII, 31, 2; and an old curse in Pliny, XXVII, 131), or *neque pes neque caput* (Plautus, *Capt.* 614), or *nec caput nec pes* (Plautus, *Asin.* 729), used of any recognizable bodily organ; *non contis nec remulco* . . . *sed velificatione pleno* (Ammianus Marcellinus, XVIII, 5, 6), where the first two are clearly treated as an alternative pair, in contrast with the word introduced by *sed*; the Varronian satire *Dolium aut seria* (two names for casks); *neque eques neque pedes profecto est quisquam tanta audacia* (Plautus, *Mil.* 464), where the meaning is merely "warrior, soldier" (cf. Livy, I, 44, 1, *omnes cives Romani, equites peditesque*; or, as we say, "horse, foot, and dragoons"); *neque fictum* . . . *neque pictum* (Plautus, *Asin.* 174), used of any and all kinds of representation, but not in contrast one with another; *laqueum* . . . *quem nec solvere possis nec erumpere* (Seneca, *De Tranq.*, 10, 1: = neither break, nor break out of, i. e. escape from); *nec mu nec ma argutas* (Petronius, 57, 8; cf. the German "du sagst weder gicks noch gacks"); οὔτε ἐκ θύμβρας . . . λόγῃ, οὔτ' ἐκ τοιούτων λόγων ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς γίνεται (Athenaeus, V, 187D); μήτε νεῖν, μήτε γράμματα (Diogenes Laertius, VI, 56), and the like. The expression is not truly disjunctive and appositional as in "neither here nor there"; "neither fish, nor flesh, nor good red herring"; *neque quo pacto a me dimittam neque uti retineam, scio* (Terence, *Phorm.* 507, of the only two conceivable alternatives); οὐθ' ὕεται οὐθ' ἡλιούται (Zenobius, V, 53).

16 (p. 68). *Qui procul est oculis, procul est a cordis lumine,*¹

¹ Here one should certainly reverse the order of the last two words, and thus recover a very tolerable hexameter.

from the *Epistolae Obscurorum Virorum* (II, 22, vol. I, p. 129 of Aloys Bömer's edition, 1924), expresses an idea common to the entire world, but a close parallel from a relatively less well known quarter might be worth quoting. It is the modern Greek saying, in a Macedonian dialect: Ματάκια ποῦ δὲν γλέπονται, γλήγορα λησμονοῦνται, "When sweethearts are not seen, they are quickly forgotten" (G. F. Abbott, *Macedonian Folklore* [1903], p. 196).

59. *Durum est contra stimulum calcitrare: quippe qui . . .* Another mere quotation, this time from Acts 26, 14: *Durum est tibi contra stimulum calcitrare* (often interpolated in 9, 4, where one might have expected it).

135. *Nil opertum quod non reveletur, nec occultum quod non sciatur* is but slightly garbled from Matt. 10, 26: *Nihil enim opertum quod non revelatur: et occultum quod non sciatur*.

192. *Quae nimis apparent retia vitat avis* is no more than an unimaginative form (in pentameter) of the celebrated saying: *Frustra autem iacitur rete ante oculos pennatorum* (Prov. 1, 17).

208. *Qui non est prudens, sit saltem bene credens* descends pretty clearly from Hesiod's "That man is altogether best who considers all things himself . . . and he, again, is good who listens to a good adviser," etc. (*Works*, 293-7, tr. Evelyn-White). Intermediate, presumably, fall the long and close paraphrases of Hesiod in Cicero, *Pro Cluentio*, 84, and Livy, XXII, 29, 9.

213a. *Qui totum capit, totum perdit*, and 213b *Qui totum cupit, totum perdit*, perhaps likewise derive eventually from the Hesiodic "How much more the half is than the whole" (*Works*, 40, tr. Evelyn-White).

223. *Quod in corde, hoc in ore* is an attempted "pointing up" of *Ex abundantia enim cordis os loquitur* (Matt. 12, 34).

225. *Quot homines, tot sententiae* is taken verbatim from Terence, *Phorm.* 454, and I should call it a quotation rather than a proverb, although the line of discrimination is often a little hard to draw with consistency.

279. *Si quis amat ranam, ranam putat esse Dianam* appears also as a spurious epimythium to fable 14 of Avianus, in a 15th century hand, in the manuscripts Parisinus Lat. 15160 and Vaticanus Reg. 2080.

† W. A. OLDFATHER.

TWO NOTES ON THE *AGAMEMNON* OF AESCHYLUS.

555-557: μόχθους γὰρ εἰ λέγοιμι καὶ δυσανλίας,
σπαρνὰς παρήξεις καὶ κακοστρώτους, τί δ' οὐ
στένοντες οὐ λαχόντες ἡματος μέρος;

The words οὐ λαχόντες have been generally condemned; but they are in all MSS, and the meter is blameless. The sentence has no construction, nor do proposed emendations give it one, but the herald is obviously in a state of intense excitement and relief, and does not always finish his sentences (cf. 563-567). I would read the passage as it stands, and translate: "If I were to tell you of the hardships, the exposure by night, the huddled quarters and foul bedding, what part of the day did we not grieve aloud, not getting (such things, i. e., crowding, exposure, etc.)?" Admittedly, this is crabbed, even tortured; but it is better, perhaps, to keep such a text than to correct λαχόντες to λάσκοντες or an equivalent, which is to be merely otiose and repetitive without materially improving the construction.

575-579: ὥς κομπάσαι τῷδ' εἰκὸς ἡλίου φάει
ὑπὲρ θαλάσσης καὶ χθονὸς ποτωμένοις.
"Τροίαν ἐλόντες δὴ ποτ' Ἀργείων στόλος
θεοῖς λάφυρα ταῦτα τοῖς καθ' Ἑλλάδα
δόμοις ἐπασσάλευσαν ἀρχαῖον γάνος."

The words here that arrest attention are ποτωμένοις, ποτέ, and ἀρχαῖον. The first is certainly unnatural, in fact impossible, as a description of the painful, harassed return of the army from Troy. Again, ποτέ normally refers to remote, or at least indefinite, time of action, the context showing whether it is past or future; here, plainly, past. Ἀρχαῖον γάνος may simply repeat λάφυρα and mean that the spoils of Troy were ancient when Troy fell; but it probably, after ποτέ, means more than that. For, since the herald is speaking of the events of his own day as if they belonged to the distant past, he must be referring to the distant future. And this is precisely what he is doing. Ποτωμένοις means, then, not the voyage home, but the sweep across space of something abstract, timeless, and winged: the fame of these

warriors. Compare Theognis (who seems first to have expressed this idea), 237-238:

σοὶ μὲν ἐγὼ πτέρ' ἔδωκα, σὺν οἷς ἐπ' ἀπείρονα πόντον
 πωτήσῃ καὶ γῆν πᾶσαν ἀειρόμενος.

Ποτέ and ἀρχαῖον now fall into place. In some far day the fame of the capture of Troy and the possession of the spoils of Troy will sweep the world and be the *ancient* glory of Argos. That future day is the day of Aeschylus and of the tragedy in which he defends the legendary claims of the Argives. Finally, τῷδε . . . ἡλίου φάει, "beneath this very sun," which is immediate, binds the time and place of the herald's boast to the time and place of future glory through the sun that shines on Argos (not the sun in general; see 508, where ἥλιος is specifically linked to the land and soil) and which will shine on Argos forever.

RICHMOND LATTIMORE,
 Lieut. USNR.

WASHINGTON, D. C.

REVIEWS.

LAWRENCE RICHARDSON, JR. *Poetical Theory in Republican Rome*.
New Haven, Yale Univ. Press, 1944. Pp. xi + 173. \$1.00.
(*Undergraduate Prize Essays*: Yale University, Vol. V.)

In 1940 Allen wrote at the conclusion of a stimulating paper on the nature of the ancient epyllion¹ the following words: "It is most desirable, then, that we should banish from our critical vocabulary the term epyllion and from our critical thinking the grouping of poems under that name. . . . These poems, then, cannot smugly be placed in a distinct category and dismissed as finite; they demand consideration as part of the larger question of the nature of the verse and style of the Alexandrians and their Roman imitators." These sentences are of importance for the work under review, inasmuch as Richardson refers (p. 1) to Allen's "great service in the eradication of many false ideas which had grown up about a genre neither well-defined nor well-studied," and states that his own purpose is "to re-examine the poems and by reanalysis to secure evidence which might allow us to continue to associate the poems as individual examples of a literary form." His book is essentially a study of the form and structure of selected Latin poems of the first century B. C., and of the poetical theory which the form and structure reveal. Richardson begins with narrative poems written in hexameter verse and not longer than a single book. These poems are Catullus' *Peleus and Thetis*, and the *Culex*, *Ciris*, and *Moretum* from the *Appendix Vergiliana*. In this part of the work Allen's demand for consideration "of the nature of the verse and style of the . . . Roman imitators" is fulfilled in an admirable fashion. But Richardson does more than this: he examines with equal care the poetic structure of Vergil's *Bucolics* and *Georgics* (in a chapter with the somewhat misleading title, "The Early Works of Vergil") and shows how they resemble or depart from the earlier poems.

It must be said at the outset that the author's interest is not primarily historical or biographical, but his frequent references to the work of scholars here and abroad show that he is fully conscious of the many problems involved in the study of the poems. Though less interested in the authenticity of the *Culex* and the *Ciris* than in their poetic form, he looks upon the *Culex* as Vergilian and concludes that it belongs "near the period of composition of the *Bucolics*" (p. 12; cf. p. 100); of the *Ciris*, more stereotyped and artificial than the *Peleus* and lacking the humor and satire of the *Culex* (cf. pp. 167-9), he is less certain, and asks (p. 12): "Is it even at all unlikely that it was Gallus, the young friend of Vergil, who wrote the *Ciris* or that Vergil himself had a finger in its composition?" The *Moretum* Richardson considers an original invention, "in a form and style new in Latin poetry" (p. 77, n. 1); it closely

¹ Walter Allen, Jr., "The Epyllion: A Chapter in the History of Literary Criticism," *T. A. P. A.*, LXXI (1940), pp. 1-26.

resembles in structure Vergil's known work (p. 27). Other familiar problems are passed over hurriedly; Richardson says of the famous Fourth Eclogue, "it has already received more attention than is its rightful share" (p. 112), and favors the view of Charlesworth and Syme that the poem is the celebration of a symbolic birth.

After an introduction which sketches the development of poetry and poetic method from 60 to 29 B. C., the author devotes two chapters to the earlier hexameter poems. The second of these is an examination of their plot, character, thought, and diction in the light of the precepts in Aristotle's *Poetics*. Richardson shows that the writers were sensitive to the art of the drama and that the narrative and poetical techniques of their poems adhered closely to Aristotelian principles. This chapter is in general well done² but seems less important than the one in which Richardson sets forth his theory of the structure of these poems. He likens the poems to "a polyptych, or balanced composition, in which each panel is conceived separately yet has its symmetrical counterpart, except, of course, the central panel, to which each of the others and the collective effect are a foil; but the complete picture, the whole composition, includes integrally all the flanking panels" (p. 19). In the poems the arrangement of the polyptych of episodes leads the reader to and away from the crucial scene, the central panel on which depends the whole of the drama and the poem. Narrative poems like the *Peleus* and the *Ciris* are composed with such symmetry "that each scene or passage which contributes to the development of the climax, each segment of the rising curve, is balanced by a parallel scene which contributes to the resolution of the action" (p. 20). This principle of structural composition is worked out in careful detail and is illustrated by elaborate outlines at the end of the chapter.³ The poems not only have the framework of formal structure in common, but they use the device of repetition for the purpose of linking the individual scenes. Richardson divides the device of repetition into two categories, (a) recurrence of attention, and (b) the verbal reminiscence or recall, and discusses the effect of the recurrences and recalls as they appear in the different poems. This chapter is undoubtedly the most important in the book and is basic to the understanding of the later chapters. Richardson treats of unity, motivation and suspense, divine machinery, irony, figures of speech, catalogues, and digressions. All this material will be a valuable aid to a better understanding of poems which have often been viewed with disapproval. Richardson's own opinion is in general favorable: "these poets were alert and original. The imagination displayed is exciting and engaging; the whole new conception of narrative poetry is amazingly intellectual" (p. 43).

² Richardson says (p. 93): "The preponderance of end-stopped lines in these shorter poems may, in general, be taken as indication of the youth of the poets and the inexpertness of their work." This seems very questionable; it more likely marks an early stage in the development of the hexameter. Would Richardson be willing to maintain that the preponderance of end-stopped lines in Lucretius is a sign of the inexpertness of the *De Rerum Natura*?

³ Richardson includes in this chapter an examination of the *Attis* (Catullus, 63), although this poem is not in hexameter; see p. 24.

In the chapter on the *Bucolics* and the *Georgics* the structural analyses seem occasionally too closely related to the analyses of the earlier poems; the reader may feel that too little attention is being paid to tradition, to the effect of Theocritus or Lucretius upon Vergil's poetic methods. It seems unwise, for instance, to argue for the authenticity of the *Culex* from the fact that in both the *Culex* and the Third Eclogue there is a "division into three parts, the third of which is greater than the sum of the other two" (p. 12, n. 8; cf. p. 100). The structure of the Third Eclogue is characteristic of the amoebean pastoral and doubtless bears a closer relation to the structure of Theocritus V and VIII than to that of the *Culex*. As for the *Georgics*, Richardson does not underestimate the important influence of the *De Rerum Natura*, but he points out (p. 133) that "it is neither the method nor the end of this study to find parallels and consequently sources of the *Georgics*; instead I believe that by direct investigation of the poems themselves and by direct analysis of the structure I can establish a valid formulation of the theory of the artist." This is a good statement of Richardson's method, and shows that his work depends far less on secondary material than on his own interpretation of the poems.⁴

Richardson's treatment of the *Bucolics* and the *Georgics* seems particularly successful. He admits (p. 134) that "Vergil is so accomplished in his work that we can never expect the arbitrary divisions of an outline to analyze the subtlety of his conceptions," but his conclusions are nevertheless extremely fruitful. In many Eclogues he finds a simple arrangement of interior recesses somewhat like the polyptych arrangement in the *Peleus*, and his outlines of the collection as a whole, based both on form and subject (see pp. 119-21), reveal an interesting alternation of interest in subject and form which produces a structural balance around a central panel (*Eclogues* IV-VI) very similar to the structure of the narrative poems discussed earlier. The *Georgics*, unified as a whole, and with each book devoted to a separate subject, nevertheless fall into two groups (I-II and III-IV) from the standpoint of the subject (cf. pp. 156-8), whereas in form I and III are alike, each being subdivided into two chapters, and II and IV each have one chapter and a coda, the coda of IV being long as befits the conclusion of the whole work. In each book are two significant digressions, one geographical (I, 231-258, II, 136-176, III, 339-383, IV, 116-148; cf. pp. 153 f.), the other on what the author calls "natural laws and phenomena." The latter deal with the fundamentals of living: labor (I, 118-159), life (II, 319-345), love (III, 242-283), law (IV, 149-196). These digressions unify the poem and reveal Vergil's structural plan. Many episodes in the *Georgics* reveal the familiar polyptych pattern found in the *Peleus*, *Ciris*, and *Culex*. All these and similar points are expressed with clarity and conviction. The author realizes that certain theories cannot be proved and expresses himself with fitting caution. It is easy, he admits (p. 159), "to make out a case for the plan of the *Georgics* as based on the elements

⁴ Richardson examines the analyses of his predecessors, e.g. Sudhaus, Herrmann, Draheim, Witte, Drew, but does not hesitate to disagree with them when their results do not seem valid; see p. 108, n. 1; p. 127 and n. 5; p. 141, n. 9.

of reform and reorganization in the Augustan state," and the digressions "on natural laws" can be viewed as praise for such a reorganization. But, he warns, such a view requires allegorical interpretation, and "we can never prove the thesis conclusively, never quite assure ourselves of its validity." In the final chapter, in which Richardson examines all the poetry under discussion in accordance with the five canons of Longinus, the *Peleus* is admired as a work of accomplished art and the *Culex* is commended as a spritely parody of poetry such as the *Ciris*, but it is the *Georgics* that receive the greatest praise: Vergil's "correlation of the four aspects of the farm, ploughing, planting, herding, and bee-keeping, in accordance with four natural impulses, work, the life-urge, love, and law, is complex and intellectual" (p. 172); "the *Georgics* are probably the most perfect example of Roman poetry and manifest the finest union between invention and tradition" (p. 173).

The impression which Richardson's book has made upon this reviewer is that of keenness of insight and clarity of expression, of maturity and independence of judgment. It is a work which as a doctoral dissertation would be a distinguished performance. But it is not a doctoral dissertation; it is, amazingly enough, a prize essay written by an undergraduate of Yale University. In the Preface Richardson expresses his indebtedness "to Professor C. W. Mendell, who not only suggested the subject but also guided the work with extraordinary patience, to Mr. Walter Allen, Jr., who directed the organization and writing of the paper, and to Mr. Christopher M. Dawson, who advised and assisted me in the work of editing." The result is a book of which all concerned may well be proud. However much classical scholars may disagree with details of Richardson's analyses and outlines which are often admittedly subjective, they cannot fail to find much in the work that is thought-provoking and valuable. The author is to be congratulated upon the excellence of his achievement, and Yale University is to be congratulated upon the high standard of its undergraduate work in Classics which Richardson's book so ably reveals.

GEORGE E. DUCKWORTH.

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY.

T. Lucreti Cari *De Rerum Natura*, Libri Sex. Edited with Introduction and Commentary by WILLIAM ELLERY LEONARD and STANLEY BARNEY SMITH. Madison, The University of Wisconsin Press, 1942. Pp. vi + 886.

My regrets for delaying this review are the more serious because one of the editors cannot now read it. It is not my task to characterize the unusual man who was William Ellery Leonard. May it be said, however, that his former verse translations of Empedocles and Lucretius, and now his essay on "Lucretius, the Man, the Poet and the Times," are achievements which must endear this professor of English and man of letters to every classical scholar and which will not be forgotten in our field of study for a long time to come.

The new edition of Lucretius is "the result of nearly life-long interests of two scholars which some fifteen years ago became merged

in a cooperative enterprise." Leonard has contributed the General Introduction. Smith is responsible for the text, the Commentary, and the Introduction to the Commentary. Their collaboration, helped by the craftsmanship of the University of Wisconsin Press, has produced a volume which no student of Lucretius, of the classics, of philosophic literature can afford to ignore.

Tradition asks more from the reviewer than praise. He is supposed to know how even a good, a very good book might have been made still better. The present writer would prefer to decline this duty as regards a work which he has been studying with delight and which he recommends to other readers with sincerity. But since he needs must criticize, he may as well say at once that the unity of the volume is not as perfect as it might seem at first sight. The editors apparently are aware of this fact. "The commentary," states the publisher's announcement, "is designed primarily for students who are reading Lucretius for the first time," whereas "Professor Leonard's essay is a distinguished contribution to literary criticism." Indeed, though this characterization of the commentary is much too modest, it is nevertheless true that the two parts of the work are on different levels, and it will be the task of the reviewer to show how the Commentary and the Introduction to it, though excellent in workmanship, might have been brought, while not to the level of Leonard's contribution (which seems hardly possible) yet nearer to it.

Yet let us start with a few quotations from Leonard's Introduction. He begins, as a matter of fact, with "the meager external evidence about Lucretius' history and personality." "Ignoramus. It is only because he is so close to me that I linger thus: I so want to know." Indeed, the few sentences in Donatus and Jerome remain doubtful as to their historicity—except for the fact that, if they are true, they agree with the somber features of the poem; if they are fables, Lucretius could and must have attracted just such fables. Leonard makes a negative observation—but it is worth while having made it—"that in none of his urbane dialogues, with their charming setting in this villa or that, does Cicero introduce this mysterious man nor any words of his." Then we have a glance at Lucretius' library and his manner of dealing with his books, Greek and Latin: "He must have read with the same vitality in which he lived—and wrote." "But often . . . he left his library and . . . saw, not alone with his mind's eye, but with the verifying eye of reality." One may have some doubt about "his aristocratic birth and breeding," hardly about his aristocratic "temper." And everyone will agree with Leonard on what Lucretius' text "can reveal of his goings and comings and doings." "The moments of his life were not his theme. But they are in his theme." "I note how often he uses *videmus*, *vidi*, *cernimus* or other forms expressing personal experience." Leonard is conscious of formulating (but he formulates it with fresh vigor) "what all close readers of Lucretius must have realized for two thousand years: his intensity, his scorn, his pity, his nobility of spirit, his intelligence, his capacity for long, difficult toil, his zest for combat with the weapons of reason and song." Lucretius' mind is the mind of a scientist: he starts with "facts as pure facts," but he is at the same time "the one missionary poet

of antiquity." His peculiar artistic integrity "makes no effort at all to be agreeable," nor does his *terribilità* in describing human bodies in sexual embrace which was to him "a fact of Nature, massive, urgent, wrestling, naked." To invoke, in this connection, the name of Michel-Angelo is daring but not too daring. Lucretius' words are "by-products of a great man's trying to tell the truth, a great man who did not choose his words but had them." "Lucretius, the most Roman in character of the Roman poets, except perhaps Ennius, is as an artist the most Greek." "His landscapes suggest Hellenistic paintings . . . his pictures of individuals . . . Hellenistic sculpture" and, I should add, Hellenistic painting, too (*T. A. P. A.*, LXX [1939], p. 368). "But the matter that goes deepest relates him more to those centuries" of Empedocles and Parmenides. Like these great Greeks "he did not choose the theme; the theme chose him." One may ponder for a moment over Mommsen's judgment, not the least of his impressive misjudgments, that Lucretius, though a great poet, "*vergriff sich im Stoff*."

I could go on quoting, but I am afraid the allotted space would not permit it. Of course, one may disagree with an author of such sharp individuality—though one should not forget that he himself tries to discriminate between "our fancies" and "a true tale"; one may express things differently; one may add some points of view or some facts. When trying to assign Lucretius his place in the history of ancient thought and in tracing down his influence through the centuries Leonard does not hit the mark so well, nor is he so well informed as he is elsewhere. The great name of Giordano Bruno is missing, and yet how could one imagine the modern discoverer of the Infinite without his beloved Lucretius? W. Dilthey, in the second volume of his *Gesammelte Schriften*, has much to say about how Lucretius became a great figure in the history of pantheism. For, to quote Leonard again, "this hater of religion was, in the profounder sense that transcends creeds and forms, the greatest religious mind of pagan Rome."

"I have done my best to help the reader with the poem in his hand, heart, and head, to make up his own mind," says Leonard on a particular question; the same holds good for all his chapters.

Stanley B. Smith in his Introduction first discusses The Text of Lucretius by dealing with The Manuscripts, The Editions, The Textual Errors. This is a clear and learned account, though somewhat overshadowed by Leonard's vivid story (pp. 82-90) of the fate of Lucretius' book in monastic Europe. Smith, of course, adds details and widens this story; we are even told that he has not only collated the *codices antiqui* but also examined a great part of the Italian manuscripts. But all the more a strange discrepancy must be emphasized. These thirty-five pages of introduction will to some degree remain fruitless for the student of this edition because its text has no critical apparatus; only a few critical notes are interspersed in the commentary. It seems to me that one should do one thing or the other: either condense this introductory chapter to, say, a fifth of its length—which would be a pity—so that it would go with this edition, or keep it as it stands, and in this case the text of the poet should have at least a short critical annotation, for which room might be spared without adding to the bulk of the volume. Only

such a critical apparatus would transform the contents of the introductory chapter from an array of only half-digestible information into working principles.

The section on Lucretius' Diction and Style is not subject to so fundamental an objection: it is written by a learned classical scholar who is also widely read in modern poetry and literature. The thoroughness of his documentation is admirable (1084 footnotes accompany these chapters), his presentation always on a respectable level, so that it is worth while to discuss with him a few points of importance where one may differ from his opinion.

"Archaism." Lucretius' style has archaic features, and Lucretius is full of borrowings from Ennius (p. 132), as everyone will agree. But many Ennian words, phrases, and verse endings are as little archaic as are Homerisms in later Greek poetry. For Ennius is the founder of the Roman epic style. *Lumina sis oculis etiam bonus Ancus reliquit* is Ennian and is archaic; *lumina solis, daedala tellus, somnoque sepulti, Acherusia templa* are Ennian and Lucretian, and some of them are Vergilian, but I wonder whether they have the slightest archaic flavor.

The "Fluidity of Diction and Orthography," too, is to a degree a pre-classic feature. How far one has to follow the manuscripts on these points may often be doubtful. I have always thought that Diels in his edition went to the utmost limit, but Smith goes still farther. Is it really probable, for example, that Lucretius should have used *lux* in one isolated instance as a masculine, that he wrote *recta aut obliqua luce* in II, 800, but *largo cum luce* six verses later (p. 140)? I prefer to attribute the *o* instead of *a* in *largo* to the minute aberration of an inattentive scribe rather than to think of the great poet as helplessly vacillating in his grammar. Smith prints *cod* instead of *quod* in III, 555, *co* instead of *quo* in II, 447, 549, IV, 522, VI, 796, 1262, *corum* instead of *quorum* in I, 135, 467, *oblica* instead of *obliqua* in II, 247, *quontra* instead of *contra* in III, 198, *condam* instead of *quondam* in III, 1029, VI, 109, *nequead* instead of *nequeat* in III, 347, *reliquid* instead of *reliquit* in IV, 1137 (to give only a few examples), though in none of these cases is the unusual form attested in even all the "ancient" manuscripts and it is often opposed by both O and Q. There is some doubt, then, whether the responsibility for many of these annoying forms rests upon the autograph of Lucretius or upon mediaeval scribes. To introduce these forms into a text "designed primarily for students who read Lucretius for the first time" is a questionable procedure both from the scientific and from the pedagogic point of view.

"Rhetorical Elements of Lucretius' Style." We find (on p. 167) a valuable collection of Greek words which "contribute notably to that 'charm of the Muses' by which Lucretius sought to sweeten the bitter draught of Epicurus' gospel." But to list only words is an atomizing method. This most Roman of all the Latin poets had in his mind an abundance of Greek verses and parts of verses, and a few of his own hexameters or parts of them are almost as much Greek as they are Latin.

- I, 1 *Aeneadum genetrix, hominum divomque voluptas*
Αἰνεάδων γενέτειρα . . . ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε

- II, 412 *ac Musaea mele, per chordas organici quae*
 καὶ Μουσεία μέλη διὰ χορδῶν ὀργανικοί
 II, 416 *et cum scena croco Cilici*
 σκηνὴ Κίλικι κρόκῳ (cf. Κίλικα κρόκον in Nonnus)
 II, 505 *et Cycnea mele Phoebeaque daedala chordis*
 καὶ Κύκνεια μέλη Φοιβεία τε δαίδαλα χορδαῖς
 V, 334 . . . *organici melicos* . . .
 . . . ὀργανικοὶ μελικούς . . .

In such cases one often has only to transcribe the Latin letters into Greek ones in order to attain something which is or sounds like a part of a Greek verse (and why should not the students of Lucretius be given the privilege of seeing a few words in Greek lettering?). One may, moreover, compare the verse ending IV, 1129 *anademata mitrae* with one from *Anthol. Pal.*, V, 199 *ἐκδύματα μίτραι*, and it will not be difficult to add other analogies of that sort.

Smith has useful collections and remarks about what he calls alliteration—a term which, fortunately, he does not restrict to its exact sense—and about onomatopoeia and sound symbolism. He has a much wider outlook in this part of his introduction, it seems to me, than in his commentary, where the terse remark "Note alliteration" is repeated over and over again, sometimes more than once on a page, and almost deafens the ear and mind against the other sound effects abounding in the same or the surrounding verses. How the "Pattern of Sound in Lucretius"—to quote Rosamund E. Deutsch's Bryn Mawr Dissertation—joins with his atomistic philosophy is a problem raised by the reviewer (*A. J. P.*, LXII [1941], pp. 16 ff.) too recently to have been considered by the editor. If he had done so, many things in this chapter might have appeared in a different light: the concept "sound symbolism" would have a much wider range than now where it is restricted practically to the peculiarities of rhythm; the "numerous cases of verbal play" (of which a few are collected on p. 181) would prove to contain the deadly serious conviction of the poet that there is a fundamental analogy between letters and atoms, words and structures of atoms or bodies.

Smith's Concluding Survey of Lucretius' Style is excellent, beginning with the advice that "we must reweave the individual elements into the rich texture of his thought and imagination and allow them there to regain their proper emphasis in the whole pattern," and ending with "all the long array of poets from Homer to Propertius and from Villon to Baudelaire, who have written their greatest verses upon the theme of death. Lucretius is the most vivid, the most moving, and the most persuasive. . . ."

In the Selected Bibliography Giussani's edition may have been omitted because it is written in Italian; but Santayana's *Three Philosophic Poets* should certainly have been entered. (See, moreover, Hadzsits, *Cl. J.*, XXXIX [1944], pp. 422 f.).

About the text of this new edition I have already said a few things. My main objection is that one needs a critical text in addition. It is not consistent that the editor marks spurious words by square brackets and inserted words by italics, whereas in other cases he leaves the reader unsure whether he is reading what is in the

manuscripts or what is a modern conjecture. But at least two things can be said in favor of this text. The editor has often introduced a fresh punctuation; and punctuation is interpretation. Sometimes a dash in the place of a traditional comma or semicolon makes much better reading (e.g. II, 28, 1050). Another improvement is that Smith does not share "the queer dislike of capitals in what we call 'personifications'" (as I put it, *A. J. P.*, LXII [1941], p. 20). So far as I know, he is the first Lucretian editor to print *Natura* time and again with a capital, and likewise *Voluptas*, *Magna Mater*, *Letum*, *Aetas*, *Mors*, *Fortuna*, etc. One might even go further than he does in "supporting the poet against the philosopher."

Nothing is more difficult than to give a fair review of a commentary. The merits of this part of Smith's work are obvious. It is short in words and rich in information. The translations of words are sound and often excellent, whereas those hackneyed renderings so common in the average sort of commentary are almost entirely absent. That Smith has trained himself purposely toward this goal is shown by his criticism of a "colorless interpretation" in an ancient grammarian (*ad* II, 1142). (There are, of course, deviations from the sound principle: e.g. II, 759 *e quibus* is not "because of"; II, 1120 *aetas* is not "development" and *consistere* is not "cease.")

This commentary, like most of the others, is more concerned with the single words and shorter word combinations than with longer contexts. Though Smith gives useful surveys of the sections, the inner structure is hardly brought out. Generations of scholars have tried to understand the poetical form of the poems. One eagerly turns to Smith's annotation on I, 1 and is almost frightened away when one reads: "Lucretius discusses a number of topics that introduce the formal treatment of atomism." Should not even the beginning student learn how the old form of the hymn is transformed by the poet into this great piece of poetry? No wonder, then, that the editor for once hits upon the idea of breaking up the poem of book III into two strata: he thinks it "possible that lines 31-91 constituted the original introduction and that lines 1-30 were subsequently composed and then attached as a deliberate poetical embellishment." He has not recognized that III, 31 has its exact analogy in IV, 26. If he had done so, he would not have printed III, 31 *et quoniam docui . . .* in small letters but IV, 26 *ATQUE ANIMI quoniam docui . . .* with capitals.

About the importance of the Greek background for Lucretius I have already said some words. Greek quotations, e.g. those from Empedocles and Epicurus, are given in English translations, and nobody can blame the editor on this score: *Graeca paene non leguntur*. But a bit more Greek would have been helpful, and I think even necessary, in some places. Smith includes the headings of the manuscripts; a few of them are Greek, as is well known. He does not tell his readers that I, 43a (= II, 645a) τὸ μακάριον καὶ ἀφθαρτον as well as I, 950a and II, 1057a are Epicurus' own words, and the analysis of I, 958 ff. would definitely gain by this insight. On II, 13a our author annotates: "See Epicurus. . . ." But the student may have difficulty in realizing that again Epicurus is quoted verbatim in Greek. I cannot agree that these headings

"were certainly not written by Lucretius" (Commentary on I, 43a). It is not demonstrable, but the most natural explanation would be that Lucretius had noted down these catchwords from his master as reminders for himself in his own manuscript.

At the end it is only fair to repeat that this commentary is a work of sound scholarship which will not easily be surpassed. The one who might do so would be the author himself in a second edition. For the book of Leonard and Smith will be for a long time to come the standard Lucretius, at least in this country.

PAUL FRIEDLÄNDER.

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT LOS ANGELES.

S. N. KRAMER. *Sumerian Mythology. A Study of Spiritual and Literary Achievement in the Third Millennium B. C.* Philadelphia, The American Philosophical Society, 1944. Pp. xiv + 125; 20 plates, 2 text figures, and 1 map. \$2.00. (*Memoirs of the American Philosophical Society*, XXI.)

It is significant that an authoritative work on Sumerian mythology could not be produced until almost a century after the discovery of the existence of the Sumerian language. Unlike the study of Assyriology, which began about the same time, but which soon blossomed forth into one of the most productive fields of scholarly endeavor, the progress of Sumerian studies has been hindered by almost insurmountable difficulties up to the present day. In order that we may appreciate the true value of Dr. Kramer's work in this field, some of these difficulties must be pointed out.

In the first place, the language itself has so far successfully defied all efforts to connect it with any of the language families of the world. In fact, as late as the first decade of the twentieth century "the well-known orientalist, J. Halevy, continued to deny the existence of a Sumerian people and language," believing with others before him that it was devised by the Semites for esoteric, hieratic purposes. Thus, because of the uncertain status of Sumerian as a language, and because it had no linguistic connection with any known language family, the progress of Sumerian studies was seriously hampered. In 1923, however, with the appearance of Arno Poebel's *Grundzüge der Sumerischen Grammatik*, Sumerian grammar was put on a scientific basis. From that time on it has been possible to control the translation of Sumerian texts; many of the translations before that time must be carefully checked in the light of Poebel's work. Many serious lexical problems still persist, however, as well as problems of idiom and style. For instance, much of the material in the literary texts is written in two dialects, the *emeku*, or dialect of the men, spoken by the male deities, and the *emesal*, or dialect of the women, spoken by the female deities. Then, too, Dr. Kramer has discovered (p. 31) that one of the main characteristics of Sumerian poetry is the repetitive motif, whereby a message of the gods, given to a messenger, is fully repeated, word for word, when it is delivered. The discovery of this phenomenon

has helped the author piece many hitherto disconnected fragments together in one continuous story, as well as solve many textual problems. One wishes that the author had noted that the repetitive motif is quite common in Semitic literature as well. Its presence in both literatures may well posit a problem worthy of further investigation. In regard to the copying and transliterating of these and all Sumerian texts, the reviewer here makes only one remark, namely, that every Sumerian text must be transliterated in two ways, phonetically and grammatically. Only in this way, as Dr. Kramer repeatedly emphasizes in his own work, can an accurate translation of the text be made.

Besides these linguistic problems there are those of a more physical character. Not only are the tablets very fragmentary, being made usually of unbaked clay, but they are scattered throughout the world in various museums. To study them therefore entails not only great ingenuity in piecing them together, but also considerable expenditure of funds and effort to visit the museums where they are to be found. There are no more thrilling tales in the annals of scientific discovery and endeavor than those told by the author when he describes his almost unbelievable success in piecing together fragments of tablets from all over the world to make amazingly complete and meaningful texts. With meticulous care and excellent scholarship literary treasures that have lain hidden and locked up for almost five thousand years have once more been brought to light.

Dr. Kramer, who is now the associate curator of the Babylonian Collection of the University of Pennsylvania, and one of the leading Sumerologists of the world, has incorporated in the present work the material which he gave in the Jayne Memorial Lectures for 1942. It is an introductory volume to a proposed series, entitled *Studies in Sumerian Culture*, which will appear in the coming years. Each of five subsequent volumes will be devoted to a particular class of Sumerian composition: epics, myths, hymns, lamentations, and wisdom, and a seventh volume, *Sumerian Religion: A Comparative Study*, will sketch the religious and spiritual concepts of the Sumerians as revealed in their own literature. The undertaking of this tremendous project has been made possible primarily through the extraordinary vision and generosity of the American Philosophical Society.

This introductory study contains a detailed description of the sources, as well as a brief outline of the more significant mythological concepts of the Sumerians. The source material consists of twenty-four Sumerian epics and myths which have been translated from largely reconstructed texts. The actual writing of the tablets may be dated about 2000 B. C., but the material itself was created and developed during the third millennium B. C., which means that this is "the oldest written literature of any significance ever uncovered." The author further points out that in contrast with the texts of the Bible, the Rigveda, and Avesta, which have been modified, edited, and redacted by compilers and redactors with varied motives and diverse points of view, Sumerian literature has come down to us as actually inscribed by the ancient writers, unmodified and uncoded by later compilers and commentators. But the question arises, might there not have been modifications and redactions within the Sumerian

period itself, if, as the author maintains, several centuries separated the creation and development of the literary material from the actual written form of it that we possess to-day? This can be proved only when tablets from some earlier centuries of the third millennium are brought to light.

Photographs of some of the original tablets which were used in these studies and some copies are included in the book. Only a few of the most significant lines from the sources are transliterated in the notes, although the main text of the book is replete with translations from which the author draws his observations and conclusions. For this reason the work commends itself to the non-specialist who may wish to become acquainted with this field of study.

The myths of origin, dealing with the creation and organization of the universe (pp. 30 ff. and 41 ff.) and the creation of man (pp. 68 ff.), take up the largest part of the book. The Sumerians believed that heaven and earth, at one time united (cf. Gen. 1, 1), were begotten by the primeval sea; that heaven and earth were separated and moved away from each other (cf. Gen. 1, 2 ff.); and that man was fashioned of clay (cf. Gen. 2, 7) to free the gods from laboring for their sustenance. In the myths that have come down to us these basic ideas were clothed with theological trappings, just as centuries later they were appropriated by the Babylonians and Hebrews and interpreted according to their respective theologies. Another important myth that is discussed is "Inanna's Descent to the Nether World" (pp. 83-96). It is the Sumerian counterpart of the Semitic poem "Ishtar's Descent to the Nether World" which was written in the Accadian language on tablets that postdate the Sumerian literary tablets by more than a millennium. The Sumerians also had a flood story, with a man by the name of Ziusudra as their Noah (pp. 97-8), and three different versions of the Cain and Abel motif have been found in the texts thus far translated (pp. 49, 53, 101). It is interesting to see how many of these stories came down through the Babylonian literature into the Hebrew Bible where they were transformed into one of the most beautiful literary creations known to man.

Biblical scholarship, therefore, will be especially benefited by the material which is now being made available through the efforts of Dr. Kramer, for it will become more and more evident how deeply indebted the Hebrews were to the Sumerians for many of their literary sources. But lest the evil days of a Pan-Sumerianism appear again, it must be pointed out that the Sumerians were not the only contributing factor in the rather complex background of Hebrew religion and thought. The Hebrew genius drew upon the best elements in many cultures and civilizations and wove them skilfully into its own unique pattern. In order that we may acquire a better understanding of the Bible and its background, each one of these civilizations must be thoroughly and carefully studied. This is what Dr. Kramer is doing so admirably in the field of Sumerology. Every Old Testament scholar is eagerly awaiting the completion of the project outlined above, when another link shall have been firmly and securely added to the chain of Biblical studies.

CHARLES T. FRITSCH.

PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

RAPHAEL TAUBENSCHLAG. *The Law of Greco-Roman Egypt in the Light of the Papyri, 332 B. C.-640 A. D.* New York, Herald Square Press, Inc., 1944. Pp. xvi + 488. \$12.50.

More than thirty years have passed since Ludwig Mitteis published his *Juristischer Teil* of the *Grundzüge und Chrestomathie der Papyruskunde*. The need of replacing, or rather supplementing, his work by a new comprehensive treatise has long been felt. In spite of depressions, wars, and revolutions, research activities have never ceased and have produced an ever increasing mass of new sources and literature and many lasting results which it is hard even for the initiated to keep track of. Professor Taubenschlag, himself a disciple of Mitteis', and for decades one of the outstanding authorities on legal papyrology, has undertaken to fulfil this demand. In the present volume, which is the fruit of more than five years of work begun in Cracow and carried on after the war had forced the author to seek refuge in France and later in the United States, he displays the legal institutions and customs practiced by the inhabitants of Egypt during the millennium from Alexander the Great to the Arab conquest.

Subject matter of the book is the private law, penal law, and law of procedure in Greco-Roman Egypt. The reader is supposed to be familiar with the constitutional and administrative institutions that formed the background for this legal system, but the author promises a second volume to deal with public law. We are presented with a convenient survey, not only of official institutions but also of business practices and customary contractual stipulations used by the populace. Almost every feature of the highly developed legal system emerging from the sources, in familiarity with which the author is probably not surpassed by anybody, is displayed before the reader. As regards some of the very few topics omitted, such as the origin and status of the Πέρσαι τῆς ἐπιγονῆς or the forms and legal effects of instrumentation, it may be hoped that the author will find in the second volume an opportunity of dealing with them.

To present all this within the limits of one volume, the text had to be terse. But, with the possible exception of a few sections where matters may have been somewhat oversimplified, the book provides a lucid, and often even astonishingly detailed, panorama. All this is step by step fortified by a wealth of documentary evidence. As is always the case in the author's writings, documentation is practically complete, and frequently sources are cited which shed only an indirect but for that no less significant light on a question. Almost the same completeness has been achieved in citing the literature; some omissions may have been caused by the fact that Taubenschlag has avoided packing the book with polemics. Thus everyone of its sections is a satisfactory statement of what is known and will serve students as a reliable guide to sources and literature. A large part of the book is based on the author's own earlier publications, a list of which is attached to the book, but many of his statements form new contributions.

This is how Taubenschlag himself, on p. viii of the Introduction, states his purpose: "What precisely is there in the papyri? To

answer this question in respect to every field of private and penal law, and to the law of procedure and execution, is the aim of my book."

In accordance with this program, the book is not a history of the Greco-Egyptian law but a systematic presentation of legal institutions and juridical facts revealed by the papyri. But history is not forgotten. The various epochs within the long period covered by the book are of course distinguished; changes and developments are duly noted. The Egyptian, Greek, or Roman origin of individual institutions is pointed out whenever ascertainable. Of special value are numerous observations regarding the extent of the impact of Justinian's codification on every-day legal life in Egypt. In all these matters, particularly, we owe to the author a great deal of pioneering work laid down in several earlier articles and now conveniently condensed in the present volume. The result of his effort is a most desirable clarification of the situation emerging from the sources which show a bewildering tangle of Egyptian, Greek, and Roman elements existing side by side and often mixed with, and overlapping, one another. Again and again the questions indicated are discussed all through the book, not only in the valuable first chapter entitled: "Egyptian, Greek and Roman Law and Their Interrelation," but also in the sections dealing with the institutions as such.

It is true that in this respect the author confines himself to certain limits. As regards the national origin of the various forms and institutions, he points out, as a rule, only such elements as have either survived in the Greco-Egyptian system more or less in their original shape or were introduced into it by express legislative acts of the Ptolemaic or Roman governments. Many phenomena, however, took on a peculiar character in Egypt but can nevertheless be traced back to other spheres. Future research may be expected to pay attention also to such exchange of ideas and transformations as took place, sometimes inadvertently, through the embodiment in Greek documents of transactions based on Egyptian or Roman conceptions or through the fact that Greek judges were concerned with Egyptian, Roman judges with Egyptian and Greek conditions of life and institutions. Traditional concepts founded on the *polis*-organization of the Greek homeland found new expression in the colonial atmosphere; forms and institutions developed in Egyptian, Greek, or Roman law had to be adapted to the peculiar administrative set-up in Ptolemaic and Roman Egypt. If such research may, perhaps, result in drawing the lines between the various legal systems and their spheres of application somewhat less sharply than they appear in Taubenschlag's presentation, the reviewer wishes all the more to stress the fact that it was the author who has provided it with a safe basis without which it could not be carried on.

The main part of the book begins with a chapter on private law, which is the bulk of the presentation. This is subdivided into three topics: (1) the law of persons, both corporate bodies and natural persons; (2) domestic relations, including marriage, family relations, and matters pertaining to succession; (3) the law of property, consisting of a section I on "real rights" and a section II dealing with the law of contracts. The legal categories employed to classify the various institutions are those of the Roman law. In this respect

the author may indeed have gone a little too far; for instance, it appears doubtful whether, and if so to what extent, Greek law really developed the notion of a consensual contract, i. e., a covenant which derives its binding force from a mere agreement between the parties ("sufficit eos qui negotium gerunt consensisse," Gaius, *Inst.*, III, 136). As a whole, however, the principle of arrangement chosen by the author offers a convenient scheme for the distribution and clear presentation of the mass of material. Certainly the author has not succumbed to the temptation of using it indiscriminately. Necessary differentiations are made, transactions alien to the sources of Roman law are duly characterized as such. The fact that the legal system of Egypt before the *constitutio Antoniniana* was something quite different from the Roman is not obscured, and survivals of pre-Roman institutions in the post-Antoninian period are always pointed out.

The chapter on private law is followed by a discussion of the penal law, which also includes private torts, and the whole is rounded out by a description of the judicial organization and the machinery of procedure and enforcement in private and penal matters. Particular thanks are due the author for his presentation of the principles regarding delicts and their legal effects, especially, in so far as public crimes and their punishment and the enforcement by way of punitive measures of the purposes of the fiscal administration are concerned. Not much has so far been done to clarify these matters, the author's own book on the penal law in the papyri, published in 1916, still being the only treatise dealing with them *ex professo*. Taubenschlag's restatement, which takes into account sources that have become known only after the publication of his earlier work, should elicit an increased interest of historians and jurists in these problems which are so intimately linked up with the general development of political institutions.

While the primary importance of Taubenschlag's book of course lies in the realm of law, it contains much that will also appeal to an audience outside of the circle of legal scholars. Among the matters that will interest the historical readers of this Journal, attention may be called to the section dealing with the objects and forms of interests in real property and the evolution of private ownership in land. The student of social and economic history will find useful information on forms of trade and business practices reflected in contractual stipulations and other transactions; in this respect, the section on leases especially deserves to be mentioned. Philologists, historians, and jurists alike will welcome frequent discussion of terminology. It is hoped that the clarification thus achieved will help to dispel the superstition that the Greeks lacked a clear-cut legal terminology.

With this general description of Taubenschlag's book and his methodological approach the reviewer must content himself. It is indeed inevitable that a comprehensive work dwelling on so vast a number of individual topics as does the one under review contains some statements that are controversial. Many of the problems discussed are still the subject of lively dispute, and new questions will arise, as research proceeds and new sources are published. It would serve no useful purpose if the reviewer attempted to enter upon a

critical analysis of every section of the book; nor would such an undertaking be possible within the limits of this review. Whatever argument may arise with regard to theories advanced by the author, it can be stated safely that it will not take away anything from the value of his compendium.

When the time comes to embark upon the great task of rebuilding our civilization, legal history will again have to take its rightful place among the sciences of human behavior and social organization. Then Taubenschlag's book will serve us as one of the foundations for the yet unfinished edifice of a history of the legal thought and institutions of antiquity. For many years to come, this work, complete with a carefully prepared table of sources and subject indices based on English, Latin, and Greek terms, will be a source of information and inspiration for all further research on the field covered by it. American scholarship is destined to assume a leading part in this endeavor. It is a gratifying fact that Taubenschlag's work appears as an American publication.

HANS JULIUS WOLFF.

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN.

Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association. Edited by T. ROBERT S. BROUGHTON. Volume LXXIV, 1943. Lancaster, Pa., Lancaster Press, Inc.; Oxford, B. H. Blackwell, Ltd. Pp. v + 306 + lxviii. \$4.00.

This is the seventy-fourth volume of the *Transactions of the American Philological Association*, but when it appeared the Association could have celebrated its seventy-fifth birthday and was prevented from doing so only by war conditions. Our American organization is one of the oldest societies of Classical scholars still in existence. Its annually appearing publication, the *Transactions*, contains, in addition to various reports by the officers, a series of papers which are contributed almost exclusively by members of the Association. These *Transactions* are, incidentally, one of the oldest current periodicals in the field of Classical Scholarship, but they are, unfortunately, not too widely known outside the United States. Yet they give proof of the democratic character of the Association which gives every member a fair chance to present a paper and see it afterwards published. My only serious criticism is less concerned with the quality than with the length of some of the articles. No paper should be printed which did not serve (or could not have served) as the manuscript for a lecture of twenty minutes. In the present volume, three of the eighteen papers (XI, XVII, XVIII) occupy 126 of the 306 pages. None of these papers has been or could have been presented orally. These three articles may indeed constitute the most valuable part of the volume but they violate, in my opinion, a principle which should be upheld in order to preserve the peculiar character of the *Transactions*: to give a fair cross-section of the work done in Classics in the United States.

It may be permitted at this point to call attention to the

Bibliographical Record (pp. xxxi-xxxix) listing the publications of the members ("as reported to the editor") arranged in the alphabetical order of the authors' names. I beg to suggest that an index to this bibliographical record might be appended. The material for this index (proper names, passages of ancient authors, inscriptions, papyri, etc.) could easily be prepared by the authors according to instructions (sample of filing card) received from the editor. With many of the journals little known here (and less abroad) such an index would add considerably to the value of the *Transactions*.

The first paper contains the text of the Presidential address by Marbury B. Ogle on "Romantic Movements in Antiquity." It is a stimulating essay which justifies "the application of the adjective 'romantic' to the social and literary movements during the Hellenistic Age and the last centuries of the Roman Empire."

The second paper, by Norman W. DeWitt, deals with the statement attributed to Epicurus, "All Sensations Are True." After a careful survey of Epicurean methodology, the author rejects the statement made in the title. He could have substituted for it the less reprehensible assertion: Only sensations are true, i. e. dependable.

The third paper is a discussion of "The *Verbum Abbreviatum* of Petrus Cantor," by Eva Matthews Sanford. This is a modest and scholarly study of the classical citations in this "handbook intended for the moral guidance of the Paris clergy in the late twelfth century." Seneca's epistles give most of the quotations and the poets Ovid, Horace, and Juvenal are close seconds. Lucan, Vergil, Statius, Martial, Terence, Claudian, Persius, Propertius, and especially Cicero are all mentioned more or less often. "Of the one hundred and fifty-three chapters of the *Verbum Abbreviatum* only sixty have no classical citations or allusions . . . In some the classical portions outweigh those from biblical, patristic or mediaeval sources." Thus the classical component of European Christian Ethics is still clearly recognized.

The fourth paper is entitled "The Tragic Philosophy of the Iliad" by Marion Tait. ". . . the scope of the *Iliad* is tragic rather than epic, and the two figures in whom the elements of conflict are made most explicit, Achilles and Hector, are tragic rather than epic heroes." The wrath of Achilles (the *μῆνις* motif) has "been superimposed upon a primitive epic character, and inevitably traditional epic material and treatment occasionally necessitate modification of the design." The author might have devoted some space to a discussion of the wrath of Meleager as a motif parallel to that of the wrath of Achilles.

The fifth paper contains another of Lillian B. Lawler's contributions to the Greek dance: "Ὁρχήσις Ἴωνική." Miss Lawler will in due time, I hope, unite in a book her various excellent papers on this subject. In this paper, as in its predecessors, she combines her rare knowledge of the literary evidence with such archaeological material as is pertinent to the subject. It may seem unfair to dwell upon a detail which has no bearing upon the main argument, but I do not feel convinced that "the Acropolis *Korai* may represent dancers performing Ionian dances to Artemis or Athena." Miss Lawler asserts "although they were found on the Acropolis, the Athenian maidens are not necessarily dedicated to Athena . . . They

may represent victors in dancing competitions." The Ionic prototypes of these statues may have been representations of dancers, but the Attic Korai were, as far as one can tell from extant inscriptions, dedicated by men to the goddess Athena. They represent not dancers but Athenian girls who played an important part in the cult of Athena, especially in the weaving of the peplos.

The sixth paper is a critical study on Wordsworth's indebtedness to Aristotle and Horace, by John Paul Pritchard. "The weight of the evidence indicates his (Wordsworth's) first-hand knowledge, and recurrent use, of Horace's teachings from his youth up."

The seventh paper contains an original and interesting study by D. Herbert Abel on "Genealogies of Ethical Concepts from Hesiod to Bacchylides." Vices and Virtues, just as men and Gods, have parents, brothers and sisters, sons and daughters. After Hesiod outlined some of these relationships, they became on the whole traditional for the later poets. Looking more closely at these family trees, Abel discovers certain inherited qualities which provide these genealogies with a deeper ethical significance. Here is what Plato says (*Republic*, 422 A): Πλουτὸς τε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ πενία, ὥς τοῦ μὲν τρυφῆν καὶ ἀργίαν καὶ νεωτερισμὸν ποιοῦντος, τοῦ δὲ ἀνελευθερίαν καὶ κακοεργίαν πρὸς τῷ νεωτερισμῷ.

The eighth paper, "A Note on the Classes of Roman Officials in the Age of Diocletian" by Angelo Segrè, is a highly technical study which provides the evidence for the author's statement "after 297 ducenarii and centenarii were no longer high officials . . . They had nothing to do with the equestrian officials, called ducenarii and centenarii, of the previous age."

The ninth paper, by Edward A. Robinson, contains a reaffirmation of the author's conviction that Cicero's *De Legibus* was written late in 44 or early in 43 B. C., that it is complete except for an introduction, and that Cicero "abandoned the design of publishing it when his political situation became desperate about the middle of 43."

The tenth paper, submitted by Stanley Wilcox, is devoted to a critical discussion of the passages in Isocrates in which this writer complains about opposition to and criticism of his teaching and philosophy. Wilcox comes to the not surprising conclusion that Isocrates "was unfairly criticized by his contemporaries," and "that Plato and Aristotle are to some extent deliberately misrepresenting contemporary rhetoric." It is a healthy sign to see this increased interest in Isocrates and the growing courage to criticize Plato.

The eleventh paper is entitled "Sallust and the Attitude of the Roman Nobility at the Time of the Wars against Jugurtha (112-105 B. C.)." This article by Kurt von Fritz is one of the most ambitious of the volume, both in language and in size. It is a study of the conflict between the nobles and the commons in Rome. Von Fritz upholds Schwartz's views (from 1897) against those expressed by Schuhr (in 1934). The bibliographical references show that the whole controversy concerning the reliability of Sallust is pretty much a family feud between German scholars. The study, which reads like a chapter of a book on Roman history, may be summed up in the author's own words: "one may say that the majority of the Senate at least still had a foreign policy, even if an antiquated one, and carried it out with some skill in spite of the prevailing corruption, while the opposition was perhaps aware of the

rudiments of a new foreign policy, but became so blinded by the heated internal conflict that in the end it had no foreign policy at all."

The twelfth paper is a brilliant essay by Phillip DeLacy on "The Philosophy of the *Aetna*." He proves, in methodically exemplary fashion, that the poem's author was at heart an Epicurean. "It is the acceptance of the principles . . . , not the fortuitous agreement on some belief" which should be made the basic criterion, and DeLacy shows that the *Aetna* follows methodically the Epicurean philosophy.

The thirteenth paper is an interpretation of "Plotinus *Enneads* 2.2" by Philip Merlan. This minute investigation leads to the conclusion: "it seems that Plotinus is indebted very much to Greek philosophy as it existed in the second and third centuries."

The fourteenth paper, by William Hardy Alexander, discusses "*Nullus argento color* (Horace *Odes* 2.2.1-4)," or rather the character of Sallustius Crispus whom Horace addresses in this ode. It is good to have all the evidence on this man collected, but Alexander's interpretation of the lines of Horace hardly differs from the one given in my college text (Page, Palmer, and Wilkins): "Gold, Crispus, lacks lustre unless used wisely and well."

The fifteenth paper contains new readings of "The Greek Signatures of P. Mich. Inv. 4703" by Verne B. Schuman. The readings are sound and so are the restorations. No volume of the *Transactions* would be complete without a papyrological contribution, indicating the great amount of work done in this field by American scholars.

The sixteenth paper "Elissa" by William C. McDermott tries to show that "Virgil used this variant form of Dido's name as an affectionate name applied by Aeneas alone to Dido."

The seventeenth and eighteenth papers violate most flagrantly the principle mentioned above. The former takes up fifty-four, the latter thirty-seven pages, and neither has served or could have served as a lecture, especially as a lecture of twenty minutes duration. John L. Heller's article "Nenia 'παῖγνον'" is substantially the author's dissertation, and its most valuable part, the lexicographical material, has been collected by somebody else (see p. 223, note 25). Word studies have become fashionable as dissertations ever since Diels wrote his famous "Elementum," but their conclusions should go beyond the mere lexicographical aspect of the problem. Heller has not failed to do this, and his summary (pp. 262-3) is very interesting. E. Adelaide Hahn's learned treatise on "Voice of Non-Finite Verb Forms in Latin and English" is a purely linguistic study and should be judged by somebody who is "thoroughly well-trained in linguistic method."

A few words may be said about the abstracts of nine papers which appear on pp. xxii-xxv. Some of these summaries are tantalizing in their brevity, and one has to trust the verdict of the referees that these papers could not be printed in full. Particular attention may be called to Jethro Robinson's reinterpretation of "The *Oedipus Tyrannus*: Meaning and Date." Equally interesting might prove Fred W. Householder's "Lucian's Use of Inscriptions." I have looked up all the references, and I think that *V.H.*, I, 20 alone should provide enough material for a small study.

WILLIAM A. MAAT. A Rhetorical Study of St. John Chrysostom's *De Sacerdotio*. Washington, D. C., The Catholic Univ. of America Press, 1944. Pp. iii + 85. (*Patristic Studies*, Vol. LXXI.)

This thesis supplements P. Heinrich Degen's previous study of the two figures of metaphor and comparison as they appear in John Chrysostom in general and in the treatise *De Sacerdotio* in particular.¹ Maat does not repeat, therefore, the results attained by his careful predecessor but presupposes them. The thesis by Sister Mary Albania Burns, entitled *Saint John Chrysostom's Homilies on the Statues: A Study of their Rhetorical Qualities and Form* (1930), served as a kind of model and parallel. Although the methods of investigation followed by both of them are very similar, one important difference between the two works of John Chrysostom did not escape Maat's attention. He had to take into account the fact that the Homilies which we now read originally were delivered sermons or, in other words, were mainly extemporized by their author while the *De Sacerdotio*, in all probability, was a written treatise from the very beginning. In addition to his specific purpose of discussing the rhetorical features, Maat wishes, with the help of this particular case, to put into relief the relationship between Hellenism, or, as we should say, between the rhetorical achievement of the Second Sophistic, and Christianity in the field of literature. In this connection it must be remembered that John Chrysostom was a pupil of Libanius.

Maat makes ample use of statistical surveys without, however, restricting himself exclusively to this method. He examines the figures of Redundancy (Periphrasis, Pleonasm, Arsis and Thesis—the figure in which the same idea is expressed negatively and positively), Repetition such as Anadiplosis, Epanaphora, and Antistrophe, the figures of sound, dramatic vivacity, and argumentation, and in addition some minor figures such as Hyperbaton, Oxymoron, and Hyperbole, and the Gorgianic figures of Parison, Isocolon, Homoioteleuton, and Antithesis.

One of the most interesting features, inasmuch as it not only has a long back-history but was by preference cultivated and developed, sometimes individually and attractively, by Byzantine writers and poets, is the Ecphrasis, to the study of which the eighth chapter is devoted. In one important respect John Chrysostom is here characteristically different from pagan writers. Almost nowhere (see the cautious restriction on p. 80 at the end of the discussion of the ecphrasis of war) does he use ecphrasis for mere display or for showing his artistic mastership but for bringing home some Christian truth or elaborating a pertinent argument. This tendency is best illustrated by one of the very few examples of descriptions of nature and place which occur in the treatise. Maat is quite right in calling it a "mere suggestion of ecphrasis"; it is rather a simile and hardly deserves to be listed among the true cases of ecphrasis: I mean the

¹ P. Heinrich Degen, *Die Tropen der Vergleichung bei Johannes Chrysostomus* (Olten, 1921).

brief description of the stormy sea in III, 15 (Migne, *Patr. Gr.*, XLVIII, col. 654): "Just as when violent winds sweep across the calm sea, at once it rages and rolls and wrecks those who sail upon it, so if corrupt men be admitted into the Church, its calm is exchanged for storm and shipwrecks." In other cases, for instance in the case of ephrasis of passions (pp. 76 f.), one feels tempted to connect it with a long chain of tradition, of which Seneca's *De Ira* and some famous passages of his tragedies, the treatises *περὶ ὀργῆς* and Ovid's allegory of Invidia in the second book of the *Metamorphoses* are outstanding representatives, and one regrets that the author confined himself too much to listing and discussing the examples contained in the treatise *De Sacerdotio*. The feature of ephrasis would have offered an especially good opportunity to trace a long line of evolution. This would have gone, however, far beyond the range of the chapter and was not within the scope of the thesis which, in its restraint, is a careful and considered piece of work.

FRIEDRICH WALTER LENZ.

NEW HAVEN, CONN.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

(It is impossible to review all books submitted to the JOURNAL, but all are listed under BOOKS RECEIVED. Contributions sent for review or notice are not returnable.)

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